The EU’s space strategy for security and defence

In 2022, the EU launched its first ever Space Strategy for Security and Defence. The document confirms that the EU has understood the military significance of space. However, the question remains whether Brussels will be able to achieve its goals.

The space policy constitutes one element of the EU’s broader policy having earlier been included in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, which introduced a range of new policy areas and expanded a number of them. The treaty unequivocally granted the EU competence in the field of research and technology development. However, most of the documents adopted by the EU primarily refer to a civil dimension, especially to societal and economic matters. For example, the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy proposed in 2010 referred to space activities in the context of globalisation and as a driving force for the innovation of European industry.

It is essential for the EU’s space activities to have dual-use capabilities. Space is now a fully-fledged operational domain and although it has been utilised by various armed forces for decades, its military significance is not always consistently understood and recognised. This is particularly relevant for EU decision-makers, who often have an ideological aversion to military-related activities. Space assets today are crucial in providing critical capabilities to armed forces. The list includes navigation and targeting, communication, as well as observation and analysis of the battlefield – optical, and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites.

The Russian aggression against Ukraine, including its critical phase in early 2022, when Russian preparations for war were assessed based on satellite imagery, vividly illustrates the importance of space systems for both security and foreign policy. Monitoring military movements and their buildup in offensive positions, allows for pre-emptive decision-making, both politically and militarily. Satellite data are also crucial during wartime operations. Real-time detection, identification, and tracking of targets, in order to subsequently destroy them with beyond-visual-range strike systems, such as UAVs or cruise missiles, would not be possible without systems deployed in space.

It is important to remember that space assets do not constitute a universal solution and are not a panacea for every situation. Alongside space systems, alternative solutions should also be developed. A diversity of solutions is key to protecting European forces from jamming. For instance, satellite communication can be suppressed, which can impact UAV navigation and communications. The example of Ukraine, whose communications were suppressed during the early portion of the February 2022 Russian invasion, is a perfect illustration. It is also important to note that both China and Russia possess anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, with Russia conducting a direct ascent ASAT (DA-ASAT) test in 2021.

Another key aspect is accessibility. Commercial solutions exist on the market, but in a crisis situation, such as during a war, states might not have control over them. These systems can be jammed, disabled, or become politically inaccessible – a good example is Ukraine’s problems with access to the Starlink system, due to interventions by SpaceX CEO Elon Musk. Therefore, it is crucial for states, but also for the EU as an institution, to build effective, modern, and resilient solutions over which they have both technical and operational control. If Europe wants to increase its strategic autonomy, then a space programme must be one of its priorities.

The EU’s vision for space

Although over the years the EU has published several space-related documents, a strategy launched in March 2023 by the European Commission is the first document that emphasises the significance of hard power. It is a result of the adoption a year earlier of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, in which space, along with cyberspace and the sea, was identified as a contentious strategic domain whose security must be ensured. Researchers Raúl González Muñoz and Clara Portela noted that “this marks a shift in policy from a focus on mostly scientific and civilian uses of EU space assets to prioritizing defence-oriented applications”.

The EU openly acknowledged the fact that “space is a critical enabler for military missions and operations as well as one of their operational domains along with land, sea, air, and cyber” and reiterated “the need to fully integrate the space dimension into the planning and conduct of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations (…) it is necessary to take defence needs into consideration in the creation of dual-use services”. The EU strategy proposes two pilot programmes: one to supply initial space domain awareness services by the end of 2024, building on Member States’ capacity, and another to introduce a new governmental Earth observation service within the Copernicus Programme. Moreover, the EU plans to respond to space threats, conduct exercises, and detect and identify space objects (space domain awareness).

The EU emphasises the necessity of a shared understanding of threats related to space and a need to build resilience in systems and services. To this end, the European Commission will consider proposing an EU Space Law and establishing an Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (ISAC). There are also plans to ensure the EU’s long-term autonomous access to space and increase the EU’s technological sovereignty. The EU also acknowledges that space-based services are increasingly crucial for military operations, but simultaneously recognises that those assets are highly vulnerable and need to be protected in close cooperation with partners, such as NATO, which acknowledged space as a new operational domain in 2019 and published its first space policy three years later. The EU also underscores the importance of cooperation with the United States.

EU space capabilities

The announcement of the EU’s space strategy in 2023 does not mean that certain capabilities had not already been built up, although these are much more modest – especially in the military dimension – compared to American, Chinese, or Russian solutions. It should also be noted that the EU’s space activities do not hold a monopoly in Europe. Several major European economies have their own potential, such as France, Germany, Spain, and Italy; a good recent example of existing capabilities is the Athena-Fidus, a Franco-Italian dual-use satellite providing secure communication to their armed forces and emergency services. As noted by Muñoz and Portela, “France has long been at the forefront of the development of space capabilities, boasting significant assets in areas such as satellite communications, Earth observation (EO) and military surveillance. Germany has also made substantial strides in the development of space assets, particularly in the domains of EO and communications. Italy has focused on EO and communications capabilities in close collaborations with France, while Spain has also invested in military surveillance and communications.”

Regarding the EU’s own space capabilities, which are intended to form the backbone of its space strategy for security and defence, the Galileo system was already launched in 2016, effectively initiating the European space policy as established by the Lisbon Treaty. It provides Europe with positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities, and according to Muñoz and Portela, “Galileo offers greater accuracy and reliability in higher latitudes than other GNSS [global navigation satellite systems] systems and provides a signal that is more resistant to interference and jamming.” It is also worth mentioning the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) system, developed on behalf of the European Commission. EGNOS, a satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS), is used to enhance the performance of GNSS, such as GPS and Galileo. The latest version, developed by Airbus Defence and Space and known as V3, incorporates enhanced security features for civil aviation and offers new services for maritime and land users. Although EGNOS was initially designed for civilian markets, it undoubtedly has military applications as well, as improvements to positioning accuracy benefit navigation and mapping generally.

The EU also operates the Copernicus Earth observation programme, and it already encompasses security-related applications, aiding emergency response, border control, maritime surveillance, and homeland security. Copernicus has established partnerships, including with FRONTEX, and has previously provided maps and intelligence reports to various EU Member States. The security role of Copernicus may further expand in the future. Another example of dual-use potential is the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) system, a component of the EU’s space situational awareness (SSA) initiative. It identifies hazardous objects, such as space debris, which is relevant to detecting hazards caused by DA-ASAT – for instance, the 2021 Russian DA-ASAT test generated approximately 1,500 pieces of debris. Additionally, there is the GOVSATCOM project, which is to offer satellite communications services, and future Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite (IRIS2).

The EU’s space capabilities have numerous limitations, with one of the primary ones being the lack of sufficient independence in launch systems. A significant boost is expected with the launch of the Ariane 6 launch vehicle, which is intended to provide Europe with its own capabilities to lift payloads into orbit. The launch vehicle comes in two variants – Ariane 62 (with two boosters) and the heavier Ariane 64 (with four boosters). The latter weighs close to 900 tonnes and measures 60 m in length, and will be capable of placing payloads up to 20,600 kg into Low Earth Orbit (LEO), or 11,500 kg into geostationary transfer orbit (GTO). The first launch of Ariane 6 is expected to occur between 15 June and 31 July 2024. The next step is the development of a new launch system, which, unlike the Ariane 6, will feature reusable elements. This system, dubbed ‘Ariane Next’, which is still in a very early stage of development, is expected to be powered by the Precursor Reusable Oxygen Methane cost Effective propulsion System (PROMETHEUS) engine, fuelled by a mixture of liquid methane and liquid oxygen.

Ongoing projects

Thus far, several space-related programmes have been undertaken within the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The latter includes initiatives such as Common Hub for Governmental Imagery (CoHGI) facilitating the exchange of classified governmental imagery at the European level; European Military Space Surveillance Awareness Network (EU-SSA-N), aimed at developing autonomous, sovereign military SSA capabilities to detect and respond to natural and man-made threats; and EU Radio Navigation Solution (EURAS) focused on developing military PNT capabilities.

Through the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), a precursor programme of the EDF, the European Commission funded projects such as QUANTAQUEST and OPTIMISE, both aiming to find ways for the EU to prevent disruptions in space. Additionally, the Innovative and iNteroperable Technologies for spacE Global Recognition and Alert (INTEGRAL) project, intended to create a command and control (C2) system assisted by AI and utilising SSA data produced by military space assets, is noteworthy. The EU also funded other interesting projects through the EDF, such as Space-based Persistent ISR for Defence and Europe Reinforcement (SPIDER), a feasibility study on the development of multi-mission affordable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellite constellations.

There is also Responsive European Architecture for Space (REACTS), which aims to provide “a new disruptive and collaborative defence capability: a resilient and scalable Network of Responsive Space Systems (RSS), fully interoperable, able to launch satellites and commence data delivery within a timeframe of 72 hours”. The multinatiOnal Development INitiative for a Space-based missilE earlY-warning architecture II (ODIN’S EYE II) is another project supported by the EDF. It is intended to contribute to the further development of a European space-based missile early warning (SBMEW) architecture initiated under the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP). The target system addresses timely warning, technical intelligence, missile defence systems against ballistic, hypersonic, and ASAT threats, as well as proliferation control. Time will tell which of the many funded programmes will succeed and how many of them will become operational.

Closing thoughts

The publication of the EU’s Space Strategy for Security and Defence in March 2023 is undoubtedly a positive move. In doing so, the European Union has demonstrated its understanding of the current geopolitical context, including clear tensions that are unlikely to diminish in the coming years. The military significance of space systems has been recognised, but significant issues – including crucial legal restrictions – remain. As Chiara Cellerino rightly pointed out, while the EU space policy falls within the competencies of the EU, “security and defence remains an exclusive competence” of its member states.

Experts also highlight other deficiencies, such as a “common narrative rather than a defence-oriented approach”. The EU’s space strategy is very general and consists mainly of a collection of declarations. The EU is very active when it comes to expressing its position, expectations, and hopes, but at the same time it is less effective in terms of concrete actions.

Even if the EU overcomes executive impotence, other problems will remain; for instance, how should the EU’s space assets be used for military purposes? In the past, not all EU Member States were in favour of using the Galileo system for security-related activities. With the expansion of operational capabilities, problems will accumulate. As noted by Baudouin-Naneix and Liza Raïs, “the development of a common approach regarding the military use of space technologies meets numerous difficulties. Firstly, the development of such a programme implies the merging of different military systems and doctrines into a single defence doctrine. Secondly, as most of the satellite systems – either communications or even navigation – are related to sensitive and sovereign data or information, a high number of member states are still unwilling to delegate access to the latter at a supra-national level”.

Robert Czulda