Mirror, mirror on the wall: Deceiving, destroying, and denying ISTAR

As battlefields trend toward increasing transparency through the proliferation of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) technologies, denial of these vital streams of information is becoming imperative to survival.

In the 1980s the Soviet Union propelled Nikolai Ogarkov to the position of Chief of the General Staff. Ogarkov was a technologist who argued for technological changes to the Soviet armed forces that would revolutionise the way they fought, according to Mike Kofman, a Russia expert at the Carnegie Endowment.^[1] Ogarkov had examined the development of nuclear weapons and concluded that limited tactical use was not possible, that NATO was shifting to greater reliance upon conventional weapons, and that the USSR must do the same.^[2] Part of his legacy was the development of what he referred to as the reconnaissance-strike complex, which envisaged the networking of sensors and missiles to strike a variety of targets throughout a theatre at short notice. The practical implementation of this led to the SS-23 Oka short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). However, the Oka suffered from poor accuracy with a circular error probable (CEP) in the region of 50-100 m, which meant it was only suitable for large static targets such as airbases.^[3]

Ogarkov was removed from his post in 1984, many of his ambitions and modernisations went with him. However, the Russian military in the post-Soviet world appears to have continued with some of his reforms. One of which, the modern iteration of the reconnaissance-strike complex, is particularly noticeable in Ukraine. Russian ground forces are able to use a variety of ISTAR assets such as the Orlan-30 uncrewed aerial system (UAV) and presumably some form of space-based intelligence assets to coordinate strikes with the 9K270 Iskander SRBM, a technological descendent of the Oka with much greater accuracy.

The footage may be familiar; it is often recognisable from the blue or yellow crosshair in the centre of the screen and the reasonably large loop that the UAV has to fly. The subject is most often a high-value target, a recent example included a collection of Ukrainian fixed wing aircraft on the ground, but others have included air defence system components and what appears to have been a HIMARS launcher.^[4] The videos conclude with either a significant cluster munition strike, or what is clearly a very large unitary warhead creating an enormous circular pattern of fragmentation. The latter is presumed to be an Iskander 9M723 SRBM armed with the 9N722F high explosive (HE) warhead. Iskander is not the only weapon available for Russia’s reconnaissance-strike contours in Ukraine; the Tornado-S 300 mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL) has played a much greater role in 2024 than prior years, using its guided munitions to strike targets including helicopters and Ukrainian howitzers.^[5]

Russia has gained valuable experience from its war in Ukraine including how to find targets that are dispersed over a very large battlespace, which places a much greater burden upon the available ISTAR assets. Furthermore, Russia is working on increasing the number of sensors networked to its conventional and rocket artillery so that they can receive coordinates directly from UAVs or artillery locating radars.^[6] In addition, loitering munitions are being used in increasing numbers by Russia, with the Lancet family of loitering munitions reported to have conducted over 1,600 visually-confirmed strikes by mid-May 2024, leading to the destruction of over 200 Ukrainian howitzers, and over 30 air defence system components.^[7] Between Lancets, the Krasnopol 152 mm laser guided munition, and its ground-launched missiles from Iskander and Tornado-S, Russian units in Ukraine are able to engage battlefield-relevant targets with precision at depths up to 120 km from the frontline. This matters because it demonstrates the effects that modern ISTAR networks, combined in real time with a sufficient quantity of precision effects, can have upon an opponent. Russia’s capabilities in this regard are similar to China’s, which means it is important to assess the ways in which ISTAR can be degraded to improve survivability.

A changing landscape

Degrading ISTAR falls down to reducing its ability to effectively locate, identify and target vehicles, systems, and positions. As with most facets of modern warfare, success in this regard requires a layered, multi-domain approach. One element of which is the destruction of the sensors themselves, another is the use of decoys to complicate target identification and location, as well as the use of camouflage and concealment. There is little new in this basic premise, decoys may even be as old as warfare itself. However, there are many technological changes within the world of ISTAR for land targets that complicate this task.

For example, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) is one form of intelligence collection that has proven valuable for its all-weather capabilities. However, it is limited by its need for an experienced analyst that is capable of interpreting the received imagery. Recent advances in neural networks and machine learning mean that artificial intelligence (AI) is now capable of performing the bulk of an analyst’s work in target identification.^[8] Optoelectronic satellite imagery is now commercially available, and Russia’s reported use of imagery provided by US companies indicates that even Western solutions may be available to malign actors through a variety of means.^[9] UAVs of course are now so widespread that ISTAR must be considered persistent in some theatres and the cameras that they carry are capable of providing real-time, high-resolution imagery. Increasingly, they are also able to employ thermal imaging at scale, which negates some of the safety provided by nightfall.

Adversaries of the West have taken note of its reliance upon radio frequency (RF) communications and developed vast suites of electronic warfare (EW) capabilities designed to locate and identify command posts for kinetic engagements.^[10] Additionally, frequency analysers are widely available if one has the funds, which can provide even a non-government force with the means to identify and understand radio communications. Taken together, a modern force seeking to degrade its opponent’s ISTAR capabilities must consider:

• Persistent coverage from the air and space using a variety of means.
• Widely available thermal imaging.
• The potential for an opponent to interpret and strike based on signals emissions.
• The use of AI to take in and interpret ISTAR data faster than a human could, and potentially with greater accuracy.

This does not mean that degrading an opponent’s ISTAR is impossible, nor is it a poor use of time. In fact, the use of Russia’s reconnaissance-strike contour should stand as evidence for the absolute need to degrade an opponent’s ISTAR. There are five key elements to consider: Decoys, the use of dummy platforms designed to mimic a vehicle or position with sufficient fidelity that they disrupt an opponent’s targeting cycle. Camouflage and concealment is required to reduce the vulnerability of platforms in the visual and infrared spectrum. Emissions control is a necessary facet of military operations. It is familiar to most, but practising it can be difficult in times of constrained budgets. Finally, there is the role of kinetic and non-kinetic effects against an enemy’s ISTAR assets. For instance, simply shooting a drone down is more likely to save a formation than the deployment of decoys. Nevertheless, decoys remain relevant, and this has been exemplified by the war in Ukraine.

Decoys, camouflage, and emissions control

Decoys can be used for a variety of purposes. The simplest application is to disrupt an opponent’s targeting cycle by either introducing doubt, or by causing strikes to be carried out against the decoys themselves, thereby wasting a munition or revealing the opponent’s position. It is also possible to use decoys of sufficient fidelity to facilitate tactical operations. For example, they can be used as a distraction to force an opponent into a suboptimal position, as recounted by one US armour officer in a 1994 thesis.^[11] This requires planning and some ability to control the battlefield, for instance, a reasonable degree of certainty that the opponent will advance, and will do so from a certain direction. Another 1994 US study found that the US Army’s Multispectral Close Combat Decoy (MCCD) could improve loss exchange ratios by 20-50% by reducing an opponent’s effectiveness, and increasing opportunities to engage them at a disadvantage.^[12] However, it is worth noting that this test was conducted in direct fire range and without aerial reconnaissance.

To be effective, decoys must of course provide a sufficient degree of fidelity and appear realistic to the ISTAR means in question. US troops deployed to Operation Desert Storm in 1991 employed MCCDs to some effect at the start of the ground operations. The decoys consisted of a cloth painted image stretched over a metal frame. It carried a gas generator and heating element to provide emissions in the infrared range, which reportedly convinced Iraqi forces that the US was planning to advance directly into its best-prepared defences, when in fact the main blow fell hundreds of miles to the West.^[13] This is naturally critical, a poorly-constructed decoy will be quickly recognised. However, it is not the only factor, decoys must also be economical and not represent a significant expense – they are expendable after all. They must be easy to deploy and relocate or they risk being abandoned as units advance, or not deployed at all. Finally, decoys should be convincing for the unit commander that is deploying them. If the commander is not convinced of their value, it is unlikely that they will be deployed.

Ukrainian forces have made extensive use of decoys designed to reduce the efficacy of Russia’s ISTAR and introduce doubt into its targeting cycles. Furthermore, the use of decoys has had the knock-on effect of causing expensive munitions to be spent for no material outcome that benefits the battlefield. Ukrainian engineers have developed their own domestic decoys, some of which are designed to appear highly realistic. High quality decoy versions of the Iris-T air defence system have been observed, and in some cases engaged by Russian Lancets.^[14] Similar efforts to create dummy AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel radars have gained media attention, as well as M777 and D-20 howitzer decoys.^[15] In some cases, Ukraine may have built its decoys to explode or burn upon engagement to further the deception and protect its limited and precious resources such as HIMARS. Ukrainian companies have poured effort and resources into manufacturing decoys in response to the country’s needs. Ukraine has also received donations and support from abroad including inflatable systems with heat sources that make them similar in concept to the MCCDs employed during the Gulf War.^[16] The decoy M777 manufactured by Metinvest cost USD 1,000 to produce, according to manufacturer, who also stated that hundreds of their decoys had been destroyed by September 2023.^[17]

In theory, the large number of Russian reconnaissance systems operating in Ukraine provide plentiful opportunities for deception and the use of decoys. However, at least one Ukrainian commentator has warned against their ineffective use, noting that poor deployment of decoys can prompt Russians to take greater care with their reconnaissance, which is arguably the opposite effect desired of decoys.^[18] Furthermore, decoys can serve the purpose of distracting an opponent’s reconnaissance and strike assets, but it does not follow that doing so prevents the opponent from achieving its aims. This is arguably the case for the well-known air campaign over Kosovo. The stories of Serbian decoys in that campaign are well known, from wood burning stoves disguised as howitzers to tanks built from Tetra Pak cartons.^[19] However, NATO airpower was still sufficient to reduce the Serb armoured forces and personnel, which led to their withdrawal from the country. It stands to reason that the ability of decoys to reduce losses or enable tactical operations likely hinges on the balance of forces and means of both forces. A force with a lot of reconnaissance and strike capacity may still be able to cripple and degrade a force employing large quantities of decoys, regardless of their fidelity.

Camouflage remains important, although its utility is arguably reduced by the persistence of aerial reconnaissance. This is simply because any movement is more likely to be observed than would have been the case when aerial reconnaissance assets were scarce and reserved for priority missions at operational depths. Drones can now be expected in quantity from tactical to operational echelons of an armed force, especially if comprehensive air defences are not provided.^[20] This can reduce the efficacy of camouflage and concealment when movement becomes necessary. Furthermore, the persistent nature of observation, and the ability of quadcopter drones to hover, also means that an operator may be able to monitor a suspected position for a long time and make a thorough assessment of any targeting opportunities.

Footage from Ukraine indicates that vehicle track marks are often evident in soft soil, it may also be apparent that the same path has been followed multiple times. These are signs that can aid a drone operator in target location and enable a targeting solution to be prepared. There is, therefore, a necessity to avoid reusing the same locations for firing, but this is challenging when operating in narrow areas of operation (AO) as guns, air defence systems, and infantry will inevitably end up revisiting past spots if deployed to an AO for long enough. It also means that effective camouflage, including netting erected above a position can be of limited utility if an opponent is willing and able to invest significant time on reconnaissance, or if the positions are static.

Nevertheless, camouflage remains important in reducing risk from direct fire engagements and may be particularly effective in reducing thermal signatures. This is applicable to armoured vehicle engagements as well as those against infantry positions using ATGMs. Systems such as the 9K1113 Kornet are widely available and employ dual-channel day and thermal sights that provide a good level of target detection and recognition out to distances of 4 km or more depending on the terrain.^[21] Video footage of Kornet engagements in Ukraine indicate that its thermal imaging capabilities are more than sufficient for long-range engagements against armoured vehicles and even personnel.^[22] The target is often clearly visible because of its thermal signature, so it stands to reason that the use of multispectral camouflage such as the Barracuda system from Saab or the UK’s Thermal Camouflage Woodland are important for reducing the vulnerability of vehicles at night. The same systems may also reduce visibility to drones with thermal imaging cameras.

​​One final element to consider in degrading an opponent’s ISTAR through passive means is the role of emissions control (EMCON). EMCON is often recognised and acknowledged to be important by land forces, however, training realities make it difficult to practise. For instance, insufficient communication can lead to exercise failure for safety reasons, which becomes problematic when budgets and training space are limited. This is not conducive to practising operations with a reduced emissions profile. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the impact that poor EMCON can have upon a formation. It is possible for skilled EW operators to locate and identify a command post through its emissions profile and Russian units are known to fire upon identified signals sources. According to articles in Russian military journal Voyennaya Mysl’ (ENG: Military Thought), they may even do so without taking the trouble to visually confirm that the target is indeed a command post.^[23] There are many measures that can complicate an adversary’s attempts to locate and target units through electronic intelligence. They range from careful siting of antennas, through to selective use of radio frequency channels and the use of antenna farms as decoys.^[24]

It is reasonable to conclude that a combination of the above measures would provide some reduction in the efficacy of an opponent’s land ISTAR leading to greater survivability and probability of mission success. However, it is also reasonable to suggest that the efficacy of these measures depends in no small measure upon the nature of the fighting and the means available to an opponent. It is therefore necessary to also consider the active means of degrading and disrupting land ISTAR.

Destruction; Air defence, EW, and forward observers

The use of decoys, camouflage and EMCON to reduce the effects of ISTAR are important, however, they only offer routes to disrupt an opponent’s ISTAR efforts. As is becoming clear in Ukraine, this is not sufficient to hold the worst of an opponent’s capabilities at bay. Consistent and scaled destruction and targeting of ISTAR assets is also necessary. This can be achieved through kinetic strikes against drones and forward observers, for example.

Very short-range air defence (VSHORAD) and short-range air defence (SHROAD) are central components of any land force. They provides needed interception capabilities against threats such as rotary-wing aviation and close air support, but are also important in holding reconnaissance drones at risk and destroying an opponent’s ISTAR assets. Russia’s use of Orlan-10 reconnaissance UAVs exemplifies the need for VSHORAD/SHORAD: Russia’s defence industry is able to produce hundreds of Orlan-10 and Orlan-30 reconnaissance drones, they are relatively unsophisticated in their design but can be used to lase targets for 152 mm OF-39 Krasnopol laser-guided rounds or provide target cueing for Lancet loitering munitions.^[25] They are also used to assist a commander in controlling and understanding the flow of a battle, for correcting unguided artillery fire, and some variants – such as those used in the Leer-3 EW complex – are built to conduct signals intelligence against an opponent’s electronic devices. This makes Orlan-10 an important and capable ISTAR asset for a Russian commander. There is, of course, a cost discrepancy between the price of a typical air defence missile and an Orlan-10. However, the cost of leaving them in the sky can be much greater.

The US Army is pursuing its ‘Maneuver SHORAD’ (M-SHORAD) system based on a Stryker to offer its mobile forces an element of protection against drones and other low-altitude threats. It employs Stinger and Hellfire missiles as well as the XM914 30 mm cannon to engage air and ground targets in support of brigade combat teams (BCTs).^[26] There are several counter-UAV (C-UAV) programmes under way in the US across its services, often pairing kinetic effects with EW on two different platforms. This ensures US units have a suite of options for defeating reconnaissance and attack drones. In Ukraine, more traditional air defence platforms such as the Strela, Buk and Tor have provided kinetic interception against larger fixed wing reconnaissance drones.^[27] EW is used to counter smaller systems and the ubiquity of them has led to the development of homemade jammers as well as the layered use of systems to disrupt global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) over a wide area. The prevalence of small UAVs and their availability indicates that a dual-pronged approach of kinetic and soft-kill counter-drone capabilities will be essential for all forces moving forward, in both the counter-ISTAR fight, and as far as force protection is concerned.

As a reconnaissance asset, drones have occupied a considerable space within the field of defence since the extensive use of the Bayraktar TB2 in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and in Syria also that year.^[28] Those conflicts were taken to demonstrate the apparent supremacy of drones and the ease with which they can alter a battle. However, the same TB2s were relatively powerless against Russia’s layered air defences, which indicates that a key takeaway from the 2020 warfare should be that SHORAD is important if a force does not wish to be gradually taken apart by reconnaissance and strike assets.^[29] Doubtless most forces realise and appreciate this, but are contending with limited budgets and spiralling costs. However, if the wars of 2020 are coupled with evidence from Ukraine, where Russian drones can effectively provide targeting up to 120 km behind the front line for Iskander short-range ballistic missiles, and Tornado-S guided rockets, it should become clear that GBAD is a central component in countering land ISTAR.

One further element to consider in the kinetic destruction of an opponent’s land-based ISTAR is the role of the forward observer. Even in the era of drones, forward observers are very important in the accurate targeting and correction of artillery fire onto a target. An effective forward observer can lase targets and improve the accuracy of the first rounds fired by an artillery battery. They can also provide rapid adjustments to further improve the ensuing fire mission’s effects. Russian forward observers may also have access to the 1D15 laser designator or similar which enables them to direct Krasnopol rounds onto targets, and so can increase the precision of the fire support systems they provide targeting for.^[30] However, Russian forward observers operating around Kharkiv in 2023 suffered such attrition from performing their role that they became reluctant to leave their positions and provide targeting, according to documents seen by the author. Instead they chose to rely upon drones of different sizes for artillery targeting and correction, which was assessed to have reduced their efficacy at the time.

In sum

The ability of computers to automatically process and assess huge quantities of sensor data is growing and will likely accelerate over the next decade, leading to a harsh environment for land-based systems seeking to degrade or disrupt land ISTAR. At present, a combination of decoys, camouflage and EMCON is a reasonable start in improving survivability, provided that there is care for planning and employment when it comes to decoys. However, kinetic effects against ISTAR assets may grow in importance, especially as the ability to connect them in real time with effectors increases, and the risks of not engaging reconnaissance assets are multiplied by the possibility of a prompt strike from precise and lethal missiles or loitering munitions.

Sam Cranny-Evans

^[1] The Ogarkov Reforms: The Soviet Inheritance Behind Russia’s Military Transformation

^[2] Marshal Ogarkov On Modern War: 1977-1985

^[3] The Iskander-M and Iskander-K: A Technical Profile | Royal United Services Institute

^[4] https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1781041689655718385; https://twitter.com/DagnyTaggart963/status/1767527265548574850

^[5] Артиллеристы показали ночную работу РСЗО «Торнадо-С» по скоплениям техники ВСУ | Новости армии | Известия | 22.02.2024  https://twitter.com/EurekaNews10/status/1780660338217607606

^[6] Разведывательно-ударный контур: как совершенствуются тактика и средства контрбатарейной борьбы ВС РФ

^[7] https://lostarmour.info/tags/lancet

^[8] Using AI+SAR+Optical To Find The Invisible – Simularity; https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S095219762300489X?via%3Dihub; Introduction to Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) – NATO STONATO STOhttps://www.sto.nato.int › EN-SET-086-03

^[9] A Suspicious Pattern Alarming the Ukrainian Military – The Atlantic

^[10] 2021 – RUSSIAN Recon Fire Strike (Timothy Thomas) – FMSO Books – Foreign Military Studies Office – APAN Community

^[11] An Effectiveness Analysis of the Tactical Employment of Decoys

^[12] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA281077.pdf

^[13] Tanks Made Of Cloth, Ghost Army Duped Iraqis — Campaign Of Deception Helped Set Up Victory In Persian Gulf War | The Seattle Times

^[14] Russian kamikaze drone strikes Ukrainian Iris-T decoy

^[15] Ukraine’s Air Defense Decoys Keep Getting Better | The War Zone

^[16] Arms From Down Under: Australia’s Aid To Ukraine – Oryx

^[17] CNN: Russian forces destroyed hundreds of units of decoy Ukrainian equipment – Euromaidan Press

^[18] Masters of illusion: Ukraine’s decoy makers outwit Russia – Euromaidan Press

^[19] NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment

^[20] As Small Drones Shape How We Fight, is the British Army Ready to Face Them?

^[21] 25 Days to Aden: The Unknown Story of Arabian Elite Forces at War eBook : Knights, Michael: Amazon.co.uk: Books

^[22] https://twitter.com/Lord__Duke/status/1662231077333905409

^[23] Introducing the Russian Radio-Electronic Fire Strike Concept | Royal United Services Institute

^[24] Electronic Warfare – Threat from a Command Post Perspective | The Cove

^[25] Loitering munitions – a revolution in Russian warfare? » Wavell Room

^[26] Counter-UAV: meeting emerging threats

^[27] Ukrainian Strela-10 air defence system destroys Russian Orlan-10 reconnaissance UAV | Watch

^[28] Turkey’s Drone War in Syria – A Red Team View

^[29] The Key to Armenia’s Tank Losses: The Sensors, Not the Shooters | Royal United Services Institute

^[30] Threat Update Krasnopol–A Laser-Guided Projectile for Tube Artillery