As far as combat aircraft programmes go, there appears to be one inescapable fact; although every new generation of combat aircraft aims to outperform its predecessor and often does so, it is unable to achieve a significant reduction in costs. Despite efforts to control costs, the reality of designing, developing and fielding an advanced combat aircraft system and what seems to be a global problem in achieving effective programme management, that can deliver on time and on cost, adds to programme risk. As we move into the initial phases of sixth-generation fighter programmes, where technology risk is inevitable and the twin dragons of cost escalation and ineffective programme management are yet to be slain, the challenges for the future are immense.
In many respects, it almost seems premature to be discussing sixth-generation combat aircraft – after all, if recent combat aircraft purchases in the NATO area are studied, the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which epitomises fifth-generation combat aircraft, is now continuing to gain momentum in terms of orders, with deliveries taking place to at least the end of this decade and into the 2030s. Added to which, capabilities are still being added to the F-35 to deliver promised performance, with further upgrades likely over the next few years. Despite that, if the sixth-generation aircraft is to be delivered in the mid-2030s/2040s timeframe, work must start now and hopefully the new system will be ready when required and at a price that national air forces can afford.
As things currently stand, the programmes underway to meet sixth-generation combat aircraft requirements are as follows: the Future Combat Air System (FCAS)/Système de combat aérien du futur (SCAF), a multinational European programme involving; France, Germany, Spain, and in the future Belgium, which currently has observer status with the programme. In the US, there are two different sixth-generation programmes; Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) for the US Air Force (USAF) and F/A-XX for the US Navy. However, there is very little information available on either of these US efforts, with the USAF programme said to be working towards selecting a prime contractor by end-2024 or early-2025. However, a US presidential election in the midst of that time period will be held and if the result is a new administration, then policies and priorities will most likely change – by how much remains to be seen.
Outsiders
Russia has been talking about next-generation combat aircraft for some considerable time, but Russian combat aircraft programmes have not delivered what was expected in recent years and it is well to remember that Russia has its own air doctrine and very different mission requirements. The Sukhoi Su-57 was portrayed by many as the Russian fifth-generation programme, but an extensive testing programme delayed its service entry with the Russian Air Force, although aircraft are being delivered in limited numbers. An upgrade path is said to have been defined for the Su-57, though much depends on what resources are available to Russian industry and the Russian Air Force for advanced combat aircraft while the War in Ukraine continues. It is also quite probable that Russia does not want to risk an Su-57 being downed over Ukraine to avoid embarrassment; though on 8 June 2024, an Su-57 stationed at Akhtubinsk airfield was damaged on the ground, reportedly by Ukrainian one way attack (OWA) drones.
Developing a sixth-generation aircraft equivalent is possible for Russian industry, although significant obstacles remain. Not least of these is securing critical subcomponents amid sanctions. Additionally, funding for future developments remains uncertain and there is a need to significantly improve programme management and industrial efficiency, as well as reducing inefficiencies caused by corruption. While the Ukraine conflict continues, it is difficult to see significant resources being devoted to a complex and therefore expensive future combat aircraft programme.
This brings us to China, and it is necessary to acknowledge at the outset how rapidly the Chinese aerospace industry has advanced over the last 30 years. They have absorbed defence technology from Russia since the 1990s and aerospace technology from the US and Europe since the 1980s. At the same time, vast resources have been invested in Research & Development (R&D) and in education to create a massive pool of science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) graduates to support indigenous advanced technology development and production. Not forgetting the fact that China has invested in acquiring data on foreign technology innovation, by both fair and not so fair means. Acquiring a treasure trove of data on the F-35 and the F-22 by penetrating computer networks at US contractors and subcontractors is one well-documented case of the latter. There are also strong suggestions that data on advanced aircraft designs was acquired from Russia in an unauthorised manner as well.
With the Chengdu J-20, China has demonstrated that it can develop an effective fifth-generation stealthy advanced air combat platform and produce it in significant numbers. In addition, the J-20 programme already has a mapped out evolutionary capability growth path to further enhance its performance characteristics. Chinese industry now has high-end capabilities in avionics, electronics and air weapons to support its aircraft programmes. It also appears to have solved, or at least be close to solving, one of its most glaring weaknesses in combat aircraft designs – engines.
For many years, the basis for Chinese combat aircraft designs was Soviet engine technology from the 1950s, hardly a byword for performance and efficiency. In the 1970s, the acquisition of British Trident airliners with Rolls-Royce Spey engines, followed by the acquisition of a licence to produce the Spey in China as the WS-9, greatly helped engine development. Gradually, China would acquire more Western engine technology, although in the late 1980s, into the 1990s and beyond, it was Russian military engines and engine technology that was decisive for China.
China was perfectly aware of the fact that it could not develop an indigenous high-performance combat aircraft engine equivalent to those available to Western aircraft programmes. Solving this problem would become a critical task for China, leading to significant resources being invested in all aspects of engine development. For example, materials technology used to be a weakness in Chinese engines, but this issue appears to have been fixed. Major indigenous R&D efforts in engines have taken place, as has the aforementioned acquisition of information and engine data from US manufacturers. It would not be surprising if data from European engine manufacturers had been acquired in a similar manner.
The fact that China has an ongoing and productive fifth-generation fighter programme, added to the fact that it has made enormous investments into aerospace technology and improving and growing its aerospace industry, makes China a potentially significant player in advanced combat aircraft design and production. They also have the necessary technology resource base to design and develop a competitive sixth-generation combat aircraft and have the money to pay for this and to acquire the resulting advanced aircraft in significant numbers.
In India there is the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme to develop a fifth-generation equivalent indigenous combat aircraft. India is prepared to invest major resources in the national aerospace and defence industrial base, and programmes such as AMCA are also seen as boosting advanced technology and, by implication, national economic growth. Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) received official sanction to proceed with AMCA in March 2024. Assuming that AMCA goes according to plan and HAL delivers an aircraft that meets the outlined performance requirements, then the basis for an indigenous sixth-generation programme will exist. Certainly, the Indian Air Force (IAF) will want a sixth-generation platform to counter peer and near-peer competitors. Another option would be for India to attempt to join a foreign sixth-generation programme as a partner.
Another country that sees significant advantages from investing in its national aerospace and defence industry is the Republic of Korea (ROK). Their indigenous 4.5+ generation combat aircraft, the Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) KF-21 Boromae, reflects their national aerospace ambitions. Thus far though, ROK has needed technical support from the US for its aircraft programmes, and uses US engines and other US-origin systems. As such, this effectively gives the US veto-power on ROK exports of these aircraft, something which the ROK wishes to avoid in the future. Could the ROK develop an indigenous sixth-generation combat aircraft? The answer is potentially yes – there would be considerable risk though and it would be a very expensive programme. On the other hand, joining a multinational (non-US) sixth-generation programme could have its attractions.
There are other countries that could be interested in joining international sixth-generation combat aircraft programmes, and which might not be able to offer much in the way of technology. Primarily, they want to gain access to advanced aerospace technology, but they could offer order offtake as their price of admittance. Undoubtedly, India and the ROK could fit in this category, as could Türkiye perhaps, but there are others as well, operating from a far lower technology base than either India and ROK, such as the Gulf States that would be drawn to an opportunity to work on a major high-tech aerospace programme.
Europe and beyond
Before discussing the last active major sixth-generation combat programmes, it is important to look at the potential for the various programmes to pick up partners and/or customers in Europe. Sweden had looked to be a part of the British and Italian effort to move towards a sixth-generation platform, instead it chose a different path. The Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) has awarded Saab a contract covering upgrades and future capabilities to current Gripen C/D and Gripen E aircraft. These measures could extend Gripen life-of-type through the 2030s, but eventually Sweden will need to consider replacing the Gripen.
Sweden would then face a number of difficult choices; if having an independent national combat aircraft design, development and manufacturing is important, how can Sweden sustain that capability? What impact will the ending of Swedish neutrality and joining NATO have on the Swedish aerospace and defence industry? Can Sweden afford to develop a Gripen successor that is a competitive combat system in the face of evolving security threats? A decision on whether to opt for a national solution for a Gripen replacement or to take the opportunity to, most likely, join a European origin sixth-generation programme, where Swedish aerospace capabilities would be welcomed, will need to be taken and it cannot be delayed for too long.
Looking across Europe, there are numerous potential customers for a sixth-generation combat system over time. Bearing in mind the likely high acquisition cost of a future platform, the number of aircraft likely to be purchased would be limited, but it would still be significant. Winning such business will inevitably require an offset obligation, such as aerostructures work or the establishment of new maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) locations for the future combat aircraft. Some potential customer countries would have more to offer than others in terms of effective input to the programme. While the main emphasis will undoubtedly be on how the sixth-generation platform will be designed and developed, there also needs to be some serious thought on how to broaden the customer base and attract new clients. Sales outside of the primary countries developing sixth-generation systems could have a decisive effect on the long-term health and affordability of these programmes.
Discovering Japan
This brings us to the last of the declared sixth-generation combat aircraft programmes, the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) involving Britain, Italy and Japan. Britain and Italy have previously and successfully worked together on multinational combat aircraft programmes, such as the Panavia Tornado and the Eurofighter Typhoon. It is the presence of Japan that marks a new departure in terms of international collaborative programmes, adding a capability-rich partner to the GCAP programme.
Japan was a believer that a domestic aerospace and defence industry brought important strategic, economic and technological benefits. That is why it was prepared to pay high prices for domestically developed defence systems rather than purchasing from overseas. On the other hand, the defence relationship between Japan and the US was seen as critically important and one aspect of this was the purchase of US defence equipment.
While Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) had built the F-1 fighter for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF), the search for a replacement in the 1980s was initially supposed to be another domestic programme. Japan then came under immense US pressure to work with US industry on the new aircraft, leading to the F-2 fighter, which was based on the F-16, with Japan having a 60% workshare and the US 40%. Another part of the F-2 agreement was that while Japan would only have limited access to US technology involved in the programme, the US would receive full and unfettered access to Japanese technology. This development created ill feeling and would cause problems later.
Japan would go on to make a major F-35A purchase for the JASDF and acquire the F-35B for operations by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). Then came the F-X programme, which was to be the replacement for the F-2, with MHI as the prime contractor, with the objective of having the new combat aircraft ready from 2035. Japan had three options: it could opt for a totally domestic approach; it could look to build a new fighter on the basis of an existing design (as with the F-2); or it could develop a new design in partnership with a foreign contractor. Having ruled out a repeat of the F-2 experience and not being totally confident of the wisdom of a totally domestic approach, it seemed that Japan would turn to Lockheed Martin for technical support on F-X. Then everything changed.
As 2022 went on, it became clear that the goalposts were moving as far as the F-X programme was concerned. With Japan worried about the growing military power and assertiveness of China, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 demonstrated instability in the international system; in response, Japan resolved to massively increase defence expenditure. There was also a perception that security relationships needed to be diversified away from simply following the US lead. Changes to the Japanese constitution would allow Japan to play a more active strategic role internationally and Japan would now start to look for export markets for the products of its own defence industry.
While the Japanese clearly wanted more strategic freedom of action, they recognised that they needed a sixth-generation fighter and were prepared to invest substantial sums of money to achieve that goal. After the Japanese experience in the F-2 programme and with the F-35, Japan was reluctant to give the US the veto on what US technology it could have on its aircraft, thereby limiting its ability to upgrade and modify US technology to suit its own needs and blocking Japan from adding Japanese electronic systems and integrating Japanese missiles and air weapons with the aircraft. Nor did it wish to repeat the F-2 experience of handing Japanese defence technology over to the US for, at best, marginal returns. Furthermore, while the current Biden administration hardly inspires much confidence as a reliable security partner, who knows what could happen after the next US presidential election?
GCAP futures
As for Britain and Italy, Tornado and Typhoon prove that an aerospace partnership between the two nations works. From an industrial perspective, both nations are well aware that if they do not work together on a sixth-generation programme, their ability to remain amongst the leading aerospace nations will be compromised. They see it as imperative that they retain the intellectual property of the technology that they develop and have the ability to export combat aircraft to whomsoever they desire, subject to the limitations imposed by their national governments. To avoid hampering the exportability of GCAP, the Japanese government has agreed to liberalise its defence export rules to open up the broadest possible spectrum of export customers.
Despite the fact that BAE Systems and Leonardo have significant US-based defence industrial interests, they recognise that a sixth-generation programme is essential to avoid becoming a supplicant to US strategic, political, economic and industrial interests. Both Britain as a Tier 1 Partner in the JSF programme and Italy as a Tier 2 Partner, have learnt some harsh lessons in terms of how international defence partnerships work with the US – what they expected and what they received differed greatly. The aim with GCAP is to not have to go through this experience ever again, and to remain in control of their own destiny.
While possibilities for GCAP are immense, so are the challenges. Firstly, an election will be held in Britain on 4 July 2024, and polling suggests a change in government is almost inevitable. A new Labour government would conduct a Strategic Defence Review in its first year in office, though the question is will it keep to the promises of the previous government as regards programmes and expenditure? Thus, post-election clarity will be required rather rapidly. There is also the need to come up with a programme and management structure acceptable to all involved parties. Moreover, a properly costed structure for the design and development phases of the programme will also be needed.
The fact that Japan accepted that exports were a critical part of long-term sustainability is extremely important, but what of the contribution that new partners could bring? Sweden is obviously a desirable candidate in this respect, but what of others? One name that has emerged in this regard is Saudi Arabia, a country that could make a serious financial contribution to the programme and offer significant order offtake as a successor to their Typhoon and F-15 fleets. From the Saudi perspective, participation in GCAP would meet their objectives in terms of developing its national aerospace and defence industries, as well as access to advanced technology at the highest level. Reportedly, Japan was not that open to Saudi participation, though when Saudi financial resources are added to the equation, coupled with the fact that they could take some 100 aircraft, the lure of Saudi participation might be difficult to argue with.
There is still much work to be done before these sixth-generation combat aircraft programmes advance towards reality and the possibilities that they might offer become more visible. What we do know is that these sixth-generation combat aircraft are intended to be far more capable and survivable than anything available today. Inevitably, they will also be more expensive; as ever, the question will be can you afford not to have these capabilities for the air battles of tomorrow
David Saw