Fast Track to Fast Jet?

Generating fast-jet pilots is an expensive business with air forces adopting a number of different training models to achieve their goals. This fast-jet training pipeline is not easy to manage, and a number of air forces are suffering pilot shortages and incurring increasing costs as a result.

What does it take to fly a modern fifth-generation fast-jet in the counter-air or ground attack roles? The obvious answer is excellent training and although all air arms would agree with this statement, how that training is delivered creates serious debate. Over the past 40 years, nations have opted for a variety of different training models. During the Cold War for example, air arms either had the resources to train their own pilots or sent them to an external training establishment for certain phases of their training. An example of this would be the US Air Force’s Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program (ENJJPT) conducted by the 80th Flying Training Wing at Sheppard AFB in Texas. European nations such as Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium along with 11 other air arms all sent their pilots to Sheppard for fast-jet training and many continue to do so.

More recently some nations have decided to use commercial contractors to provide fast-jet flight training. An exemplar of this approach is the UK’s Military Flying Training System (MFTS) delivered by Ascent Flight Training that provides all four phases of flight training for its fast-jet pilots – as well as for multi-engine and rotary-wing pilots. For the fast-jet pilots these phases are:

• Phase I (Basic Pilot Training)
• Phase II (Primary Pilot Training)
• Phase III (Specialized Pilot Training)
• Phase IV (Lead In to Fighter Training – LIFT)

Another approach can be found in Italy where a partnership between the Italian Air Force, Leonardo and CAE under the banner of the International Flight Training School (IFTS) provides Phase IV LIFT. IFTS is continuing to grow and has now become established as part of the expanding NATO Flying Training Europe (NFTE) initiative. A similar model could be found in Canada with the NATO Flying Training in Canada (NFTC) programme, that when combined with the Contracted Flying Training and Support programme provided by Allied Wings, saw contractors provide multi-engine, rotary-wing and fast-jet training to the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). Although the multi-engine and rotary-wing courses remain, fast-jet training has now stopped.

The major commercial incumbents for these two Canadian programmes, KF Aerospace and CAE, have now been selected under the SkyAlyne brand to provide flight training services for the RCAF’s Future Aircrew Training (FAcT) programme that is expected to be signed later this year and come into force during 2028-29.

With the retirement of the CT-155 Hawk in Canada the RCAF is sending its fast-jet pilots to ENJJPT, IFTS as well as discussing sending some pilots to Finland to train on that country’s Hawk fleet. Although it seems strange to retire its Hawks before a replacement has been selected and FAcT is up and running, ESD understands that this is due to the aircraft approaching the end of their airframe life.

In essence, today’s modern fast-jet training can be theoretically provided under four different flight training models. As we shall see later, these four models are not finite but serve as an approximation before we look at some specific examples.

• GO-GO – Government Owned training resources, including instructors and Government delivered training.
• CO-CO – Contractor Owned resources, instructors and training support and delivered by contractor instructors.
• GO-CO – Government owned training resources and contractor provided instruction.
• CO-GO – Contractor owned resources and Government provided instructors and training delivery.

Before considering fast-jet training programmes it is worth discussing the training pipeline. Although simple in theory with its input standard to the left and output standard to the right, any changes to what can affect the student on his or her journey can have serious implications for the time taken to transit the pipeline as well as the training received. As the attached diagram shows, these issues may be broadly discussed under political, technical, desired training outcomes and service issues. It is fair to say that far too many air arms fail to realise the relative complexity of the training pipeline and the impact that changing policies can have upon it. Resultant misunderstanding can lead to students remaining in the pipeline for longer than expected and having to wait, or ‘hold’, for the next phase of training to start. This ‘holding’ issue may be compounded if the wait for the next phase of training is significant and results in the student having to undertake refresher training – in other words, receiving the same training twice.

Referring again to the Training Pipeline diagram, the input standard to the left is mainly concerned with meeting educational and medical criteria, successfully passing aircrew selection tests and having completed initial military training. The output standard is that required for a fast-jet pilot to begin his or her training at an operational conversion unit or in US Air Force parlance, Formal Training Unit (FTU). One other factor to consider is that training becomes more expensive as the student moves along the pipeline due to the increasing cost of the aircraft types. For example, according to the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report published in April 2024, it costs USD 6.6 million each year to operate one F-35. Added to this is that the “fleet’s overall availability has trended downwards considerably over the past five years”, so aircraft availability on which to undertake conversion training is also an issue. The answer is to move as much training to the left of the pipeline as possible and wherever feasible, integrate synthetic training equipment, particularly part task trainers and full mission simulators.

One final point to reflect upon when considering the adoption of any fast-jet training model is the impact of devolving responsibility and control to third-parties to provide apparent economic short-term benefits versus the greater expense of keeping that control in-house. Fundamentally the latter can be described as GO-GO providing control, flexibility and the retention of resources – typically training aircraft and instructors but at high-cost. CO-CO on the other hand sees resources, control and flexibility lost but for a lower training cost. The choice between the two is not a simple one and frequently results in a hybrid approach.

UKMFTS

UKMFTS was created to provide the UK Ministry of Defence with a single-source for all of its pilot and other aircrew training services. The 25-year private finance initiative service that was signed in 2008 is provided by Ascent Flight Training, a consortium comprising Lockheed Martin and Babcock (initially VT Group) that works in conjunction with the MoD’s Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S), Air Command and 22 Group. As far as fast-jet pilots are concerned, the initial model saw student pilots start on the Prefect T1 for elementary training, move on to the Texan T1 for basic fast-jet training before jet training and LIFT on the Hawk T2. In many ways, this three-aircraft approach was not dissimilar to the training conducted during the Second World War.

Over the past five years, Ascent has been looking to streamline this training process by sending some pilots straight from the Prefect T1 to the Hawk T2, with some missing out on the Prefect and starting on the Texan T1. Others, who have completed some elementary flying training with a University Air Squadron have also been sent directly to the Texan T1. Known as Fast Jet Transformation, these trials used a range of high-fidelity synthetic training equipment to “exploit technology to increase the pace of change”. The use of synthetic training is a growing trend both to increase training transfer and save costs. According to Air Commodore Jamie Hunter, the RAF’s Director of Flying Training: “That should enable us to reduce our time in training by around 30% and increase flexibility between aircraft types.”

“It is unquestionable, to my mind, that we will rely on synthetic training for the flying training to get to the frontline, but also at the frontline,” Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Sir Richard Knighton, the RAF’s Chief of Air Staff (CAS) told a UK Parliamentary Future Aviation Capabilities committee earlier this year. “It is cheaper, and there are some things that you just cannot do in the live environment without giving away your tactics and your capability, so we have to do that in a synthetic environment. Our thinking around the training system will not be just about the aircraft; it will be about the synthetic solutions that sit alongside it as well.”

Unfortunately for Ascent Flight Training and the UK MoD, MFTS fails to deliver as far as the fast-jet stream is concerned. Instead of the two-and-a-half to three years it should take to train a fast-jet pilot, MFTS is now taking six to seven years. Although it is easy to blame industry for these troubles, the UK Government must shoulder a significant responsibility starting with the changes to the RAF’s order of battle defined in the 2010, 2015, and 2021 Strategic Defence & Security Reviews/Integrated Review and the fundamental alterations that these changes caused to the training pipeline. In addition, the lack of flexibility and resilience built into MFTS has meant that the system cannot cope with any disruption to the training pipeline and one of the most significant disruptions has been to the Hawk T2 fleet and more specifically, to its Rolls Royce Adour 951 engine that has meant that only a handful of aircraft are available from a fleet of 28 aircraft. According to the CAS, AVM Knighton, “that is going to be a problem for at least the next three years and potentially longer,” due to a lack of engine components to fix the problem.

Another significant area of concern is the lack of instructor pilots. At present RAF Valley hosts 75 Squadron (Texan T1), 25 Squadron and 4 Squadron (Hawk T2) and only has 60% of the instructors that they need. In moving from a pure GO-GO to CO-CO there is no need for the military to train large numbers of qualified flying instructors (QFI). MFTS is slightly different in that they use a mixture of military and ex-service QFIs but there is still a shortage. In April 2024, the RAF was trying to recruit Texan instructors and Hawk QFIs to fill this shortfall.

The result of the Adour engine and instructor shortage problems has been that fast-jet students have had to be sent elsewhere to complete their training. As well as ENJJPT, students have also been sent to IFTS in Decimomannu in Sardinia and to 11 Squadron, a joint RAF, Qatari Emiri Air Force squadron at RAF Leeming. With Hawk production now ended, the question on the RAF’s lips is what will replace that particular platform?

US Approaches

It is not just the UK that is facing a pilot shortage and a disruption to its fast-jet pilot training pipeline. In the US both the US Air Force and US Navy are facing pilot shortages. In the case of the former, this shortage is around 1,800 although this is not just about pilot training but also concerns pilot retention. In an attempt to recognise and ameliorate the situation the US DoD has formed the Aircrew Crisis Task Force.

Like MFTS, one of the issues concerns training aircraft, and more specifically, training aircraft engines. In the US the T-38C Talon II provides fast-jet training and its General Electric J85 turbojet is suffering parts shortages and according to some reports this means only 50% of the aircraft are available. Add to this the damage to the US Air Force’s Texan II turboprop trainer fleet that resulted in all 99 aircraft having to undergo inspections following storms at Vance AFB in 2023.

The T-38 availability issues are not being helped by the delays seen with that aircraft’s replacement, the Boeing/Saab T-7A Red Hawk. Due to a number of issues, the T-7A’s initial operating capability (IOC) date has been moved back until 2028 meaning the T-38s must soldier on for longer than expected. Despite these woes, there is little doubt that the T-7A will provide an extremely capable training platform. As well as being supported with a raft of synthetic training equipment and embedded training systems, it is expected that the T-7A will also feature Red 6’s Advanced Tactical Augmented Reality System (ATARS) and, Augmented Reality Command and Analytic Data Environment. In essence, ATARS generates virtual simulated aircraft, ground targets and weapons to the pilot through their helmet visor.

The US Navy conducts its fast-jet training using the T-45C Goshawk, a variant of the BAE Systems Hawk. Following its grounding for four-and-a-half months starting in October 2022 the fleet continues to grapple with engine problems. The writing is certainly on the wall for the T-45, with the US Navy looking for a replacement with its Undergraduate Jet Training System (UJTS) programme. The Request for Information (RFI) is focussed on a contract award in 2026 for a minimum of 145 aircraft. Contenders for UJTS include a team from Textron Aviation and Leonardo with the M-346N, Lockheed Martin offering the TF-50N and Boeing with its T-7A.

European Drive

For more than 30 years, Europe has been struggling to create a holistic pilot training environment through a number of different projects, but these have always failed due to political and industrial imbalances. Although one of these initiatives resulted in the development of the EADS Mako/High Energy Advanced Trainer (HEAT), the fact that this aircraft was a direct competitor to the BAE Hawk and Aermacchi M339 meant that not all European governments were 100% behind the programmes.

Today, these issues have been overcome with the creation of the NATO Flight Training Europe (NFTE) programme to address NATO’s flight training needs, not only for fast-jet but also for multi-engine, rotary-wing and UAV platforms. Twelve nations have signed-up to the programme operating from 14 campuses with training being conducted in seven countries. According to NATO, the aim of NFTE is to: “fundamentally reshape the aircrew training landscape in Europe towards less fragmentation, lower training costs and increased interoperability.”

There is no doubt that the early success of NFTE highlights a growing acceptance of joint allied pilot training, and this is particularly evident with IFTS in Decimomannu. Originally based at Lecce-Galatina and with its roots in the Italian Air Force’s 61° Stormo, that organisation has trained overseas pilots for many years. As well as Europeans, students also came from Argentina, Japan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore.

Another European fast-jet training school with international training aspirations is the Hellenic International Flight Training Centre (IFTC) in Kalamata. IFTC has been established in conjunction with Elbit who is responsible for the IDF’s M-346 and T-6 Texan fleets in Israel. As part of the deal, the Hellenic Air Force (HAF) is procuring 10 Leonardo M-346 training aircraft, three of which have now been delivered, and all have been fitted with Elbit’s Integrated Virtual Avionics (IVA) embedded training system. The IFTC programme will also see Elbit shoulder responsibility for maintaining the HAF’s fleet of 45 Texan T2 turboprop trainers. Also based at Kalamata, the Texan and M-346 are operated by 120 Air Training Wing.

Future Platforms

With the arrival of future sixth generation aircraft, the RAF is now looking to its replacement. “Hawk T2 was a derivative of the original Hawk,” CAS ACM Knighton told the UK Parliament Future Aviation Capabilities committee in January 2024. Knighton noted, “It came into service over 20 years ago, and right now it continues to meet our needs for fast jet training for Typhoon and F-35. But it was always planned to go out of service around the end of the next decade – 2040 is the out-of-service date we describe. We are pretty clear that it will not meet the requirements for a Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) solution. As a consequence, we need to plan now and start a programme for the replacement of Hawk as an advanced jet trainer.”

One thing that the RAF is considering is using a surrogate aircraft to replicate the capabilities of GCAP. According to Knighton, “Instead of flying the all-up combat aircraft every day, for some of those missions you could get all the training that you needed through the [surrogate platform]. The benefits are that it is cheaper to fly and operate, and that it does not give away your tactics or have some of the electromagnetic emissions from the aircraft that GCAP would provide.”

As to the Hawk replacement and the surrogate platform, UK company Aeralis has been positioning itself for a number of years to fulfil these roles. Although still a paper aeroplane, according to the company, the design is “pretty much frozen”, with the UK’s Hamble Aerostructures having undertaken the airframe CAD work.

In many ways, the Aeralis approach resonates with the Boeing T-7A in that digital design and testing were largely completed before metal was cut. The major difference is that Aeralis is yet to find a customer. The US Air Force currently has 351 aircraft on order along with synthetic training equipment and support under a USD 9.2 billion contract. Not everything has been positive for the T-7A however with the aircraft IOC delayed and losses of USD 94 million accrued so far. According to Boeing, the losses have stemmed from higher than expected production costs.

In Italy, the M-346 goes from strength to strength. As well as being in service with Italy, Israel and Greece, other customers include Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Poland, Qatar, Singapore, Turkmenistan and the UAE. Nigeria is the latest customer for the aircraft, procuring a mix of 24 that will be used in the fighter ground attack and trainer roles. The first six aircraft are expected to arrive at the end of the year. This sale means that Leonardo has sold a total of 126 M-346 trainers and combat aircraft variants.

To conclude, the cost of training fast-jet pilots is significant – USD 10.2 million for an F-35A pilot for example. Historically, this training process used to be undertaken by individual air forces but unless that air force is a large one, such as the US Air Force, the two trends that have emerged have been the increased use of commercial contractors to conduct that training for individual nations or sending student pilot cohorts to international training centres such as ENJJPT, IFTS or NFTE where costs can be amortised more easily.

Author: Following a career in the British Army specialising in air defence, Trevor Nash PhD spent four years in the T&S industry before becoming defence journalist concentrating on training, simulation technology and air power studies.