Ajax – problems solved and lessons learned?

As of early August 2024, with the British Army reporting the completion of its first firing-on-the-move trial on Ajax, the overall outlook for the British Army’s long-troubled programme appears more optimistic. As a high-profile programme, Ajax has served as a posterchild for the MoD’s procurement woes over the last few years. However, Ajax is far from the only British MoD programme which has faced serious issues. Increasingly, the focus has shifted to the MoD’s procurement practice as a whole, with the lessons of Ajax catalysing calls for reform of Britain’s procurement system.

Even the most fervent supporter of the Ajax programme will admit that the programme is running late and has encountered all sorts of difficulties. However, it is not the only procurement programme that finds itself being criticised for not delivering what was expected, when it was expected. Year-on-year, the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) finds itself having to defend its procurement process, its ability to manage projects and its ability to utilise its budgetary resources to maximum effect.

The prevailing opinion is that the UK’s present procurement system is not fit for purpose, and most are perfectly happy to criticise the procurement system as the default setting. In July 2023, the House of Commons Defence Committee published a report entitled ‘It is broke — and it’s time to fix it: The UK’s defence procurement system’. The report used the Ajax programme as one of its case studies evidencing a dysfunctional procurement system, along with the Type 26 frigate and E-7A Wedgetail programmes.

Road to the Ajax programme

The starting point for an analysis of the Ajax programme has to begin with previous efforts by the MoD and the British Army to modernise their armoured vehicle assets. The road to Ajax begins in 1985 with the Future Family of Light Armoured Vehicles (FFLAV) study aimed at defining a successor to the FV430 and CVR(T) vehicle fleets, which led to the Tactical Reconnaissance Armoured Vehicle Equipment Requirement (TRACER). In 1992, Britain initiated a joint programme with the US to meet the TRACER requirement with the intention to acquire 355 vehicles. The programme was overambitious in technology terms and eventually the US decided to end its involvement; consequently, the MoD cancelled its programme in 2001 after spending GBP 131 million.

Then came the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES), which would replace the FV430, CVR(T) and Saxon vehicle fleets. FRES entered concept development in 2001, and would enter the assessment phase in 2004 with the envisaged in-service date being 2009. FRES was ambitious, since 3,000 vehicles were to be acquired in three variants: Heavy, Utility and Reconnaissance. The utility vehicle (FRES UV) was to be the first FRES vehicle to enter service, but the programme began to fall apart as the envisaged in-service date slipped to 2012 and then 2015. In 2008, FRES UV was de facto cancelled after some GBP 133 million had been spent.

Out of the wreckage of FRES, the FRES Specialist Vehicle (SV) emerged. This was to be a programme covering around 1,200 vehicles in five blocks, the first of which covered 589 vehicles in three variants: Scout, Protected Mobility, and Equipment Support. This would later evolve into the Ajax programme and two main bidders emerged to meet the requirement: General Dynamics with the ASCOD and BAE Systems with the CV90. In 2010, General Dynamics Land Systems UK (GDLS-UK) was awarded the demonstration contract for the programme.

According to the ‘Report of the Armoured Cavalry Programme (Ajax) Lessons Learned Review’ quoted by the Defence Committee, the programme originally covered the delivery of 245 Ajax reconnaissance vehicles, 93 Ares protected mobility vehicles, 112 Athena command and control vehicles, 52 Argus engineer reconnaissance vehicles, 50 Apollo equipment repair vehicles and 38 Atlas recovery vehicles. By purchasing an armoured vehicle ‘off-the-shelf,’ ASCOD had been purchased by Spain and Austria, so it was hoped to de-risk the programme.

In September 2014, GDLS-UK was awarded a contract for 589 vehicles; it would later emerge that this was a ‘fixed price’ contract, meaning that costs over the agreed programme contract value, that would amount to GBP 5.52 billion, would be the responsibility of the contractor. This was the most important and expensive British Army armoured vehicle contract for some 30 years. Also, ASCOD would be assembled in the UK (in Wales), whereas BAE Systems’ CV90 offer had been based on production in Sweden. The programme timetable at the time was that the Main Gate 2 business case for Ajax was approved in June 2014 (before the procurement contract was officially awarded), with the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date for Ajax set for July 2020, with initial vehicle deliveries commencing in 2017.

Things fall apart again

With the procurement contract signed, the timescale to deliver the initial vehicles was short and consequently, problems started to emerge. Understandably the British Army wanted the best vehicle that they could possibly get, and although the base vehicle was ‘off-the-shelf,’ the plan was to integrate advanced sensors and systems into the vehicle. The danger in this approach was being seduced by the possibilities of technology, often ignoring what was available now for something far better that might be available in the future. This had happened before with TRACER and it was now happening again!

What would happen with Ajax was that there were changes, far too many changes. Across the six variants, some 1,200 new capability requirements were added – something which would inevitably impact delivery timescales. In an effort to resolve the issues hampering the programme, the MoD and its procurement arm, Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S), and the contractor agreed to a ‘contract reset.’ This saw the Ajax programme reorganised into five ‘Capability Drops,’ ranging from Drop 0 to Drop 4, with Drop 4 being the full specification vehicle, and vehicles built to earlier standards all due be upgraded to Drop 4 level.

After the contract reset, the IOC remained the same, but originally the IOC would have required the delivery of 45 vehicles; after reset the number was down to 27. According to the 2023 Defence Committee report: “The IOC date was nonetheless missed. In addition, from around 2014 onwards, concerns began to be expressed about potential safety issues relating to noise.” Rumours about noise would become more visible in 2017, but it would only become a publicly visible issue much later.

The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) informed DE&S that the safety case for Ajax was unsound in April 2018, and in September 2018 DE&S issued a safety notice citing high levels of vibration, but trials continued. In January 2020, Dstl informed DE&S that the noise and vibration calculator being used in the Ajax programme was underestimating the actual levels of noise and vibration. Then in November 2020, the Minister for Defence Procurement was told that the Ajax trials programme had been suspended due to excessive noise and vibration. The trials programme would restart in February 2021.

In a further sign of a procurement system in trouble, in March 2021, with the publication of the 2021 Integrated Review (IR) and subsequent Command Paper, the MoD announced the cancellation of the Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP). This left the UK’s obsolescent Warrior infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) without badly-needed upgrades, facing a planned retirement of the fleet by 2025 with no apparent successor. In November 2023, the MoD signed a contract to upgrade the UK’s Warriors with rearview cameras, and unidentified British Army personnel have stated that the vehicle is likely to continue service to the end of the 2020s. A successor IFV programme has yet to be announced.

In the middle of all this, in March 2021, the Defence Committee would issue a report titled: ‘Obsolescent and outgunned: the British Army’s armoured vehicle capability’. They noted that: “The Ajax programme, which is now also seriously delayed, is yet another example of chronic mismanagement by the Ministry of Defence and its shaky procurement apparatus.” In June 2021, DE&S issued a stop notice for the Ajax trials programme. According to the Defence Committee report on procurement of July 2023: “As of 9 December 2021, 310 individuals were exposed to noise and vibration from Ajax vehicles. Four individuals were medically discharged from Service, and eleven were recommended for long-term restrictions on noise exposure (thereby limiting their military duties).”

Given that the MoD, DE&S and the British Army have a duty of care for personnel working on the Ajax trials programme, and the noise/vibration issue was a known problem and safety risk, it is astounding that corrective measures were not taken sooner, or the trials programme suspended until safety concerns could be fully satisfied. Ajax trials resumed in May 2022 after corrective measures had been taken, nearly a year after trials were halted.

By this point, the controversy surrounding the Ajax programme was immense. In response, Secretary of State for Defence Ben Wallace appointed Clive Sheldon KC to conduct a review (known as the Sheldon Review) of the Ajax programme in May 2022, later published as ‘Report of the Armoured Cavalry Programme (Ajax) Lessons Learned Review’ in May 2023. The Defence Committee procurement report noted that: “In March 2023, the Government announced a new IOC date for Ajax of between July and December 2025, with FOC (Full Operating Capability) scheduled to be achieved between October 2028 and September 2029, both years later than originally envisaged.”

Adding to the litany of procurement mishaps, in December 2023 the MoD cancelled major elements of the Morpheus tactical communications programme central to the Land Environment Tactical Communications and Information Systems (LETacCIS) strategy of the MoD. The existing Bowman system will be updated to fill the gap caused by the Morpheus cancellation; Bowman was originally supposed to be withdrawn from service in 2026 and this was changed to between 2031 and 2035. Morpheus was supposed to provide key communications capabilities for the Ajax programme, but will an updated Bowman system be able to deliver the necessary capabilities?

Recovering confidence?

In 2007, the House of Commons Defence Committee in a report on the FRES programme stated the following: “This is a sorry story of indecision, constantly changing requirements and delay.” Today, nearly 17 years later, they would probably say much the same about the Ajax programme. Why is it so difficult for the MoD, DE&S and the British Army to run an armoured vehicle programme? While Britain has been grinding its way through FFLAV, VERDI 1 & 2, Tracer, MRAV, FRES UV/SV, WCSP, Ajax, Boxer, and Challenger 2 LEP/Challenger 3, among others, France has introduced four entirely new armoured vehicles into service in the form of the VBCI, Jaguar, Griffon, and Serval, and has begun receiving their upgraded Leclerc XLR tanks, all within much shorter timescales. Is there something that the Direction générale de l’armement (DGA) in France knows that the MoD and DE&S do not?

Thus far, this author has referenced numerous official reports on the dire state of the UK MoD’s procurement system, but these all beg the question of who is responsible and who is accountable? It is very easy to blame at all sorts of people in the MoD, DE&S, the military and in government. Yet what is most disturbing is that there seems to be no real systemic accountability. Was anybody held accountable for the failure to deal with safety issues during the Ajax test programme? While all of this is going on, the British Army finds itself operating aged and/or underperforming equipment, while it waits on the promised arrival of new systems that will eventually replace legacy equipment.

This brings us to the Sheldon Review of May 2023 – if one read it with the expectation of a blistering critique of the procurement system as is, and a call for its rapid replacement by something new and better, one would be disappointed. The review stated: “The Review makes a total of 24 recommendations. These do not aim to achieve a wholesale re-configuration for the delivery of major programmes. None is a magic bullet. Rather, they represent relatively small improvements, which cumulatively should help the MoD avoid similar problems in future.”

As regards the 24 recommendations, the review groups them as follows: “Of these: four are aimed at improving the working relationship between DE&S and Dstl; five are aimed at improving the support and information provided to the SRO [Senior Responsible Owner]”, who specifically provides direction for a project or programme. They do this by taking ownership of the business case and objectives, successful delivery and benefits on behalf of the organisation. Five Sheldon recommendations are aimed at improving the processes for holding to account and assurance; and eight are aimed at improving information flows and escalation. What Sheldon is suggesting is eminently sensible and achievable. The report tried to be fair, noting how COVID from early 2020 to mid-2021 severely disrupted work on the programme.

Regarding the safety issue, Sheldon comments as follows: “The SRO, DLE (Director Land Equipment at DE&S) and Chief of Materiel (Land) were first aware in general terms of the noise and vibration concern from late spring or summer 2020. Neither they nor the Army’s Director Capability (“DCap”) understood that noise or vibration posed a significant risk to the programme over and above other safety hazards identified, or that crews may potentially have been harmed in trials as a result of noise and vibration, until autumn 2020. Concerns about harm to crews in the trials were not raised in writing with DCap, and it was only in autumn 2020 that he became aware that crews had reportedly been injured by noise and vibration in the ATDU trials. The Minister for Defence Procurement was only informed on 13 November 2020.”

Given that safety concerns from excessive vibration had been expressed by Dstl in their quarterly reports as far back as 2014, the length of time for the SRO and DCap to become aware of the issue is concerning. In this vein, Sheldon continued: “Reporting was at times lacking, or unclear, or overly optimistic. That led to senior personnel and Ministers being surprised to discover in late 2020 and early 2021 that the programme was at much greater risk than they had appreciated.” By June 2021, expenditure on the Ajax programme amounted to GBP 3.17 billion (including tax).

It should be noted that not all variants in the Ajax family have been equally problematic – in July 2020, the Household Cavalry Regiment announced that it had received the first six vehicles of the Ares armoured personnel carrier variant, making it the first the MoD accepted delivery of. By January 2024, the figure had increased to 44 Ajax family vehicles delivered (at Capability Drop 1 standard), with the variant split as follows: 17 Ajax, 14 Ares, 5 Athena, 2 Atlas, 4 Apollo, and 2 Argus. While it has been a long road, at present the outlook for the programme admittedly looks considerably better than even a year prior. Thus far in 2024, the Ajax reconnaissance variant has completed cold weather trials in Sweden, and a firing-on-the-move exercise in the UK, among others. Furthermore, in response to a question by Labour MP Luke Akehurst to Maria Eagle, the new Minister for Defence Procurement, concerning progress on Ajax entering service, Eagle responded: “The Armoured Cavalry Programme (Ajax) is due to achieve Initial Operating Capability by December 2025 as planned.”

It would be nice to think that post-Sheldon Review, there is a real trend towards reforming and revitalising the procurement system. Hopefully that is, or perhaps might become, true. Fundamentally the issue is that modern defence equipment is so complicated and expensive, therefore specifying it, acquiring it and managing a programme to bring it into service requires specialist skills. These include engineering skills to understand the technical aspects, commercial experience to understand the industrial/business aspects, legal knowledge and experience to craft contracts that are legally sound, and a solid understanding of real-world operational requirements. Also essential are people with real programme management skills, and in this respect, effective SROs must be from the top end of the talent pool!

There are a multitude of lessons to be learned from the Ajax programme and from the many and varied procurement failures that have blighted the British defence sector. Yet these failures will have been for naught unless the UK’s defence institutions learn from and absorb these lessons. In this regard, there is a weight of expectation for reforms to be proposed in the next Strategic Defence Review (SDR), due in 2025.

David Saw