Uncertain future: The deep crisis of Poland’s submarine force

The last few decades have been difficult for the Polish submarine force. Despite many plans to modernise the Polish submarine fleet, the Polish Navy currently has only one diesel-electric submarine (SSK) – the ex-Soviet Kilo class ORP Orzeł. This vessel is ageing and has not undergone extensive modernisation, meaning its combat capabilities are very limited.

Plans and ‘gap fillers’: Poland’s submarine force 1991–2023

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Polish Navy was in a similar state to the other branches of the Polish Armed Forces – oversized and mostly obsolete. With the country’s economic problems, the ensuing transition period, and the weakening of Russia under Boris Yeltsin’s regime, the Polish Armed Forces and defence spending were significantly reduced. For the Polish Navy and its submarine force, the 1990s meant maintaining the status quo. This meant that cuts in defence spending made it impossible to buy new submarines. In 1999, the Polish Navy had the same number of submarines as in 1991 – two obsolete Foxtrot class vessels and one Kilo class SSK.

However, the next decade brought some changes: until 2003, two Foxtrot class units were withdrawn from service. However, the decommissioned post-Soviet warships were not replaced by brand-new submarines, but by second-hand vessels (so-called ‘gap fillers’). These gap fillers came in the form of 4 Kobben class submarines received from Norway between 2002 and 2004. All these SSKs were old, though in good technical condition, and thus sufficient for training purposes. For a short time, this was an acceptable solution, but it did not solve the need for modern combatants. In 2008, the purchase of a modern Type 214 SSK from Germany was discussed. The submarine was originally built for the Hellenic Navy, but the Greeks pointed to defects in the boat and refused to commission it. The option of selling it to Poland was examined, but Greece and Germany reached an agreement in the end.

The 2010s can be considered to have been a ‘lost decade’ for the Polish submarine force. Despite various plans, very little was done to acquire new SSKs, or to modernise the sole submarine – ORP Orzeł. The ‘Technical Modernisation Plan for the Polish Armed Forces’ (three editions: 2013–2022, 2017–2026, 2021–2035), the ‘Polish Navy Development Concept’ and the ‘Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security’ all emphasised the need to acquire new submarines. Polish officials maintained the vision of acquiring new submarines as a crucial element for the Polish Navy. In general, the documents (and the policymakers) sounded similar: new SSKs should be acquired immediately. Meanwhile, through numerous papers and statements, the real solution was essentially the same – plans were replicated, but never implemented.

In 2012, a programme for the purchase of SSKs for Poland codenamed Orka (ENG: Orca/Killer Whale) was launched. It assumed that Poland would purchase two SSKs by 2022 and a third by 2030. So far, however, no contract has been signed, and it seems that the Orka programme has been postponed. Moreover the Polish Navy is due to receive three new Miecznik multipurpose frigates. Assuming that there are no delays in delivery, these warships will be commissioned between 2028 and 2033. The cost of the programme raises concerns that funds earmarked for naval modernisation will be spent on the frigates rather than SSKs, especially given that the Polish Armed Forces have recently launched many ambitious and rather expensive modernisation programmes. Under these conditions, there are doubts about the affordability of new submarines. In 2019, there was a plan to purchase two second-hand Swedish Södermanland class submarines, but the negotiations ultimately failed. Meanwhile, in 2017, one Kobben class SSK was retired, with the remaining three withdrawn from service in December 2021 without any replacement. As things stand, the Orka programme functionally exists only on paper and in political rhetoric, although recently, the discussion on submarines for the Polish Navy has entered a new phase, as the Ministry of Defence announced that the Orka submarine contract would be signed in 2025.

The poor condition of the Polish SSK fleet is the result of several factors. Financial realities have played an important role. Indeed, the Polish Navy has always been at the bottom of the list of Polish military expenditures. However, attributing everything to a lack of funds is an oversimplification of a complex situation. Since the end of the 2010s, Polish military spending has increased significantly, and there have been opportunities to modernise the Polish Navy in the recent past, despite the fact that there has been a ‘short blanket dilemma’ in the Polish defence budget. The main problem, however, was that the Polish political elite lacked a vision as to why Poland needed a navy at all, and the lack of will to modernise this branch was a consequence of such an approach. Moreover, a strong belief that NATO and European Union membership guaranteed Poland’s security hampered long-term modernisation programmes, including with submarines. This lack of strategic vision, combined with a short-sighted naval modernisation policy, has led to the current situation. Indeed, only in the area of mine countermeasures (MCM) can the Polish Navy currently boast modern vessels in the Kormoran II class, and Poland has built up a comprehensive land-based coastal defence system equipped with the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM).

Does Poland need submarines?

When analysing the current situation of the Polish SSK fleet, it is worth considering whether Poland really needs submarines. Firstly, the Baltic Sea is small and rather shallow (only 392,979 km² in area, with an average depth of 52 m) and surrounded by various landmasses. At first glance, therefore, it seems unsuitable for submarines. However, further analysis shows that while the Baltic Sea presents a challenge for SSK operations, its salinity and temperature differences, combined with water pollution, make it difficult to detect submarines. Indeed, Baltic Sea states such as Germany, Poland, Russia and Sweden all maintain submarine forces and all have modernisation plans. Second, there are some doubts as to whether SSKs would be useful in a hypothetical high-intensity conflict with Russia. Indeed, some analysts have argued that the usefulness of Polish SSKs would be limited by the fact that the main battles would take place on land, in the air or in cyberspace. Moreover, given that the Russian Baltic Fleet currently has only one SSK in service, does the Polish Navy really need such an expensive weapon of war?

Analysing the usefulness of the Polish SSK solely in the context of a hypothetical military conflict provides an incomplete picture. In fact, the Navy has important tasks to fulfil during peacetime as well. Protecting Poland’s maritime interests is important for many reasons, including Poland’s increasing dependence on energy resources delivered by sea. In 2015, a major liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal was opened in Swinoujscie, near the Polish-German border. In October 2022, the Baltic Pipe pipeline will start delivering natural gas from the North Sea via Denmark to Poland, with both facilities considered crucial for Poland’s energy security. There is also an old but fully operational crude oil terminal in Gdansk. Offshore wind farms are also planned for the near future. In addition, Poland’s maritime trade is growing and new investments in seaports are planned. Securing maritime interests is therefore important for Poland’s economy and energy security. Potential sabotage of Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 has shown that damaging maritime energy transport infrastructure is not fiction. Meanwhile, Poland’s ability to respond to such crises is limited. However, the protection of critical underwater infrastructure can also be achieved by surface vessels and unmanned underwater vehicles, not necessarily by expensive submarines.

From a military perspective, submarines are useful platforms for surveillance and intelligence-gathering. SSKs can also act as a deterrent and complicate an adversary’s naval operations. Modern submarines armed with a wide range of weapons could be used against surface combatants, such as enemy SSKs, merchant ships and even land targets. Submarines equipped with submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) could even become an element of a national deterrent system. Moreover, despite its current weakness, Russia can reinforce its Baltic Fleet with relative ease. If necessary, Russia can redeploy warships from other fleets to the Baltic Sea region. Currently, Poland has very limited anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, so if a Russian SSK were to enter the Baltic Sea, the Polish Navy would not be able to track it if submerged. A modern, fully operational submarine fleet can mitigate such risks. On the other hand, with Sweden and Finland now in NATO, Russia is at a major strategic disadvantage in the Baltic, and there are doubts about whether the Russian Baltic Fleet poses a real threat to Poland.

In conclusion, there are good arguments both for and against the maintenance of a submarine force by Poland. However, for almost two decades, Polish governments (regardless of their political camp) have adopted a strategy of postponing a decision on the problem, despite the fact that the Orka programme has attracted the interest of major companies from Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Spain and South Korea. The SSKs on offer are of modern design and could be tailored by the manufacturers to meet a buyer’s requirements. As things stand, however, no decision has been taken, and the Polish SSK fleet is slowly dying.

Acknowledgements

The research has been supported by a grant from the Faculty of International and Political Studies under the Strategic Programme Excellence Initiative at Jagiellonian University.

Łukasz Stach

Łukasz Stach (PhD) is a researcher at the Jagiellonian University’s Centre for International Studies and Development. He is the author and co-author of over 30 scholarly articles and monographs, and author or editor of five books. His current research interests have been focused on the security threats in Southeast Asia.