Unmanned advantage: Russia’s drones and the fight for ISTAR in Ukraine

From wedding photographers with DJI Mavics, to Lancets and Z-16 reconnaissance drones, the Ukrainian conflict has witnessed an unprecedented proliferation in drone-based battlefield Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), as well as precision strike. This article explores primarily how Russia has rapidly adapted and evolved its drone capabilities, turning drones from less-common support tools into near-ubiquitous critical assets to help their forces can locate, track, and engage targets with high accuracy.

Behind Grandma Hanna’s house

As columns of Russian troops poured into Ukraine across the border with Belarus, confusion reigned. Colonel Oleh Shevchuk was commanding Ukraine’s 43rd Artillery Brigade which operated three batteries of 2S7 Pions, the fearsome 203 mm howitzer designed during the Cold War to provide counter-battery and tactical nuclear strikes. It can fire its 110 kg ZOF 43 shells out to ranges of 37 km, which meant the three batteries defending Kyiv were uniquely positioned to bring the Russians under early fire, preventing them from advancing and organising as they wished – but only if the commander could figure out where they were. To start with, they received conventional requests for fire from the formations defending Hostomel airfield, but soon civilians who worked as wedding photographers were phoning Shevchuk and offering to find targets with their DJI Mavic drones, sharing the information over WhatsApp and video calls.^[1]

In another example, the 43rd Brigade learned that Russian forces were approaching a village within range, but they did not know where. Now, as the story that he repeated to a journalist goes, the targeting team used Google Maps to find the phone number of a shop in the village and contact the owner who confirmed the location of Russian forces in the village. He described one interaction like this, “Good evening, we’re from Ukraine! Do you have any katsaps [an ethnic slur for Russians] in the village? – Yes. – And where? – Behind Grandma Hanna’s house? – And what house does Grandma Hanna have?” The brigade was able to conduct a fire mission based on this information. Using similar contacts, they also corrected unobserved fire by asking people to watch a given area and let them know if a shell exploded there. Working once more with Google Maps, they could adjust their fire based on where the person said the round had landed. It was clear at the time that the Russian forces were struggling to establish the reconnaissance-fire contours that could bring fire down within minutes of Ukrainian guns unmasking.

It was several months before the 43rd Brigade received its own drones to conduct fire correction and target detection with. When asked whether his brigade had not had the need for aerial reconnaissance before the war, Shevchuk answered, “The need was always there, but the application was supposed to be different. The plan was like this: the scouts would find the target, dictate its coordinates to us, we would work it out and that was it. But practice has shown that if the shooter cannot see his target, the effectiveness of this shooting is reduced several times.” He was referring here to forward observers and reconnaissance teams, elements that can be found in most forces. The principle is fairly simple and has remained similar since indirect fire became possible and useful. An observer who is physically able to see the target area radios coordinates to the supporting artillery and then may correct fire if necessary, although many Western forces work to fire for effect from the first shots. This developed quickly, however, and the growing lethality of both sides led to one Russian commander complaining that his forward observers in Kharkiv refused to leave their bunkers, instead relying on DJI Mavics and similar drones to do their job. As Russia’s forces advanced and retreated, and Ukraine’s forces adapted, the nature of Russia’s ISTAR battle changed, moving from a conventional approach that was enshrined in doctrine, to one that prioritised precision to a far greater degree than any Russian force before it.

Orlan-10 and the ISTAR battle

From the start of the war, both sides have battled for an edge in intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR). Russia likely held an advantage in unmanned aerial reconnaissance, but the situation varied depending on the area and units involved. Nonetheless, the Russian MoD indicated that there were 2,000 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in service in 2018 – many of them the Orlan-10. These UAVs were primarily integrated into Russia’s artillery brigades to provide fire correction and reconnaissance in a counter-battery role, and only later made it into wider circulation with other Russian units. This meant that in the opening phases of the war, many Russian artillery units would simply conduct massed fire missions against area targets with little in the way of target confirmation. “They mainly shoot at squares,” Shevchuk’s chief of staff Colonel Serhiy Ogerenko said, “This is how it was last summer: evening begins, and they go – every forest strip, grove, stream, regardless of whether there are people there, everything is shot through. They had no shortage of ammunition.” It was only towards the end of 2022 that most Russian artillery units began correcting their fire with DJI type drones and Orlan-10s.

For many reasons, the discussion of drone use in Ukraine has shifted away from the Orlan-10, despite it forming the backbone of Russia’s airborne ISTAR. Its continued use makes it worth examining. It is a fixed-wing UAV designed and manufactured by Russia’s Special Technology Centre in St. Petersburg, and entered service with Russian forces from around 2013. It would be referred to as a Group or Class 2 UAV in US military parlance, meaning it weighs no more than 16.5 kg, with a base weight of 12 kg, which varies depending on the payload. It has an operational range of 150 km, which can reportedly be extended out to 600 km with repeaters or by other Orlan-10s, and it can fly for at least ten hours with recovery via parachute. The system is typically deployed as a group of two or three UAVs, which can all be operated from a single MP32M1 command and control vehicle.^[2]

The payload of Orlan-10s varies enormously – some sources indicate there are as many as 11 different variants. One version disassembled by Ukrainian soldiers carried a simple digital camera from Panasonic. However, there are known to be some variants that carry thermal imagers, or digital cameras in gimbal mounts that allow the camera to be moved separately from the drone. There are others still that provide a platform for electronic warfare payloads. Perhaps the most well-known is the RB-341V Leer-3 system, which uses Orlan-10s to intercept and monitor 3G and 4G communications. This was used in Ukraine prior to the invasion to target Ukrainian formations as well as to send messages to soldiers’ mobile phones in a bid to undermine morale.^[3] Another, less infamous version is known as Shelest (Шелест; ENG: Rustle); an interesting system designed to locate and support the engagement of counter-battery radars. Supposedly leaked reports from 2016 from the Russian MoD state that it was used to locate AN/TPQ-48 Fire Finder radars through signals intelligence. It was also used to jam or deceive those radars, preventing them from registering the fire that eventually destroyed them.^[4]

The Orlan-10 is a relatively simple UAV, even when carrying a thermal imaging payload. This is because it is not equipped to automatically provide actionable coordinates. It is understood to be used in one of two ways; either triangulation of a target, in which case it would essentially be used as if it were a forward observer, or by holding a position above the target. The operator would then use those coordinates to generate a fire request.^[5] This approach was fine when ammunition was plentiful and targets concentrated. Artillery can often be an imprecise weapon for several reasons; the flight of a shell is impacted by the temperature of the charge and the barrel, how well the gun is sited in relation to the target, and the wear of the barrel. Once fired, the meteorological conditions begin changing the shell’s flight path. The end result is that a howitzer or – preferably a battery – will produce a beaten zone that is approximately cigar-shaped around the target area.^[6] This means that if you are trying to destroy a single gun and its crew in the edge of a woodblock, it will likely be necessary to fire dozens of rounds to have an effect. This takes time, depletes barrels and ammunition, and is exhausting for the crew. Precise target coordinates were nice to have but unnecessary for Russian formations, considering that one form of counter-battery engagement was a full salvo from a BM-21 battalion. This would mean 18 vehicles firing 720 rockets each with a 20 kg warhead covering an area the size of four football pitches. So, while ammunition was plentiful, there was little need to improve the accuracy of Russian ISTAR. However, as Ukraine’s artillery dispersed to improve its survivability, at times with single guns fighting independently, Russia’s ISTAR had to adapt.

Precision strike, needs precision find

Russia has employed a potent mix of counter-battery ISTAR assets to find and engage Ukrainian howitzers.^[7] This included the 1L219 Zoopark-1 counter-battery radar, the AZK-7M acoustic artillery ranging system, and the 1B75 Penicillin acoustic artillery ranging and thermal detection system. Between them these systems are able to detect and locate large calibre (152/155 mm and up) artillery fire out to distances of 25 km. Some, like 1B75 Penicillin, can locate fire within five seconds, according to Russian media reports. However, the Ukrainians quickly countered these systems. Zoopark radars have been engaged with anti-radiation missiles, M982 Excalibur 155 mm GPS-guided rounds, and guided rockets. This has changed the unmasking policy around these vehicles; one Russian news outlet conducted an interview with a Zoopark-1 operator who indicated in late 2022 that the system was used sparingly to minimise the risk of it being detected and engaged.^[8] These systems worked alongside the Orlan-10 to provide counter-battery ISTAR and they were – and still are – reasonably successful; however, the dispersion of Ukraine’s forces and lack of ammunition drove a different approach. Russian strikes had to become more accurate, and to do this, they needed precise location and engagement capabilities. In this vein, from 2023, Russian forces noticeably increased the use of the Orlan-30 and the 3OF39M1 Krasnopol’-M1 laser-guided artillery round to find and engage Ukrainian howitzers.

The Orlan-30 is a larger cousin of the Orlan-10, with a greater payload capacity of 8 kg and a maximum take-off weight of 27 kg, which means it can carry three or more mission payloads simultaneously. Its operational range is up to 500 km using a signal repeater and it has a top speed of 170 km/h with an endurance of eight hours. Like the Orlan-10, its maximum altitude is 5,000 m and it provides a video data link so that footage from its optoelectronic sensors can be received by the ground control station in real time, assuming that it is not jammed or otherwise disrupted.^[9] However, the key differentiator between the Orlan-10 and the Orlan-30 is the latter’s ability to carry a laser target designator. This means that it can provide more accurate target locations for Russian batteries, or act as a provider of laser guidance for a range of munitions. The Krasnopol’ round is a 152 mm round designed to be fired from towed and self-propelled howitzers (SPHs). It has a range of up to 20 km and a 6.5 kg warhead, which makes it suitable for defeating towed and self-propelled howitzers, and in some cases tanks. Russia may have expended its stocks of this munition very quickly in 2022, with some reports indicating they were simply fired without guidance. Nonetheless, by 2023, the CEO of Russia’s High-Precision Complexes indicated that production of the Krasnopol’ had increased twenty-fold.^[10] It was also modified to the M2 standard, with a larger warhead and improved guidance. [Editor’s note: Somewhat unhelpfully, Russian industry has previously promoted the ‘Krasnopol-M2’ as the 155 mm variant of Krasnopol-M1; however, since then, a 152 mm version with the GRAU designation ‘3OF95’ has appeared, also referred to as ‘Krasnopol-M2’, thereby somewhat muddying the waters.]

Paired with the Orlan-30, Russia’s counter-battery efforts were able to precisely engage Ukrainian howitzers with a single shell. Krasnopol is not always effective, as low cloud is understood to have disrupted the seeker in some cases, and a wooden shelter above a hide is reportedly sufficient to degrade its effects and at least save a howitzer. However, announcements from Uraltransmash, the design authority for Russia’s modern howitzers, indicate the intent to integrate UAVs such as the Orlan-30 directly into the Msta-SM2. This would only be worth doing if the howitzer was carrying laser guided munitions, which may suggest that Russia is planning to empower some guns to fight independently of a battery or battery command post.^[11] This is not all for the Orlan-30, however. In September 2023, a series of videos showed precise Russian strikes against bridges in the rear of Ukrainian forces. The bridges were struck, according to Russian sources, by Kh-38ML missiles fired from a Su-34 fighter-bomber jet.^[12] The Kh-38ML is a laser-guided missile with a range of 40 km and a 250 kg high explosive warhead; some videos released by Russian channels indicate that the targeting of bridges was provided by an Orlan-30.

Z-16 and Lancet-3

In July 2022, a handful of videos were released via social media showing a white drone with two pairs of cruciform wings streaking into Ukrainian vehicles. This was the first evidence that the Lancet-3 loitering munition from Zala Aero had reached the frontlines. Its use was minimal at first – only 100 uses were logged by pro-Russian website lostarmour.info by the end of 2022.^[13] However, as with the Krasnopol, the use of the Lancet family of loitering munitions would grow dramatically, and it represented the most significant shift in the ISTAR battle.

The Izdeliye-52 (also known as Z-52, or sometimes as ‘Lancet-3’), is a loitering munition in the Lancet family. There have been several versions of this design, and the latest production version is understood to carry the designation Izdeliye-52-3. It has a range up to 30-40 km and a top speed of up to 80-110 km/h. It carries an optoelectronic and infrared camera as standard – while earlier models were understood to simply use a day camera. In a further difference from earlier variants, the latest variant is also fitted with Lidar-based fuzing, enabling it to detonate the warhead at a short distance from vehicles, thereby potentially negating some kinds of protection. It is catapult launched and armed with the KZ-6 3 kg shaped charge warhead, which can penetrate up to 215 mm of rolled homogenous armour equivalent (RHAe). This makes it well-suited to engaging the less-protected areas of a howitzer or tank, often including those used to stow ammunition. Importantly, Izdeliye-52 can effectively strike moving targets.

The Krasnopol can also hit moving targets, providing they do not exceed 36 km/h, which is potentially valuable. However, as Western guns entered service, Ukrainian units found they were sufficiently mobile to quickly relocate after unmasking, avoiding counter-battery fire from the likes of a BM-21 battalion or Krasnopol. However, Lancets have proven to be very effective for tracking Ukrainian guns down on the road and engaging them. They are, at times, daisy-chained, meaning the two or three will be launched at a single target to increase the likelihood of a kill.^[14] Lancet can provide its own ISTAR, however, with a relatively short endurance of 40 minutes, it is typically only used in this way when the crew is reasonably sure that a target is present – and this is where the Z-16 reconnaissance drone from Zala Aero comes in.

Regardless of their relatively short endurance, Lancets have become a key feature of Russia’s counter-battery doctrine. Between July 2022 and February 2025, more than 3,000 uses of these munitions were documented by lostarmour.info. The highest usage on a monthly basis occurred in May 2024 as Russian forces advanced into the Kharkiv region. There, Lancets were used 108 times inside a single month within a 133 km stretch of front, the deepest strike extended 50 km from the most forward Russian units, into the Ukrainian rear. Often, the strikes were conducted against vehicles that were rushing to stem the advance, some of them carried on heavy equipment transports, indicating how Russia was able to dominate the ISTAR battle at that time.

The Z-16 is another series of Class 2 UAVs (around five different versions exist). The baseline model has an endurance exceeding four hours and a range of over 75 km. It has a maximum operational altitude of 5,000 m and a top speed of 110 km/h. It is also claimed to be resistant to electronic warfare by the manufacturer, as well as having a low radar cross section.^[15] The Z-16 is lighter than the Orlan-10, with a take-off weight of 10.5 kg including a 1.8 kg payload. It can be fitted with a range of sensors, but typically carries an optoelectronic day and thermal camera combination that is relatively high definition. It can loiter over a target area searching for Ukrainian artillery either through thermal detection, or by flash spotting. At its typical operational height, the Z-16 provides a viewing range of more than 3,000 m, which is valuable when looking for howitzers hidden in a treeline. It has come to be a regular fixture among Russian formations, supporting the use of Lancets and regular artillery fire support missions with its laser designator. In a reflection of the ISTAR battle in Ukraine, the Z-16 is reportedly also used to detect Ukrainian drone crews and facilitate strikes against them either with Lancets or other munitions as available. It seems that the system is particularly prized for the high quality of its thermal imaging camera. Moreover, it is also understood to be involved in observing and supporting the use of UMPK glide bombs, which have posed a significant danger for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.^[16] The Z-16 also appears to have provided targeting coordinates for the 9M723 Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile against Ukrainian military infrastructure and vehicles, indicating that it is potentially resilient to electronic warfare.

Wrapping up

There are of course tens of thousands of drones in use every day in Ukraine. The smaller Mavic-type drones are used for many roles but not covered here. The three primary Russian assets covered in this article are likely to form the backbone of Russian ISTAR in the post-war period. The Russian forces have learnt to use and exploit these assets in both tactical and deep engagements indicating that they are likely to be aggressive and capable in future conflicts. The overall view also suggests that Russia has adapted well since 2022, from a force that was unable to service all of its targeting needs and dependent upon massed fires to make up for the lack of precision, to one that leverages precision extensively, every day. This is only possible because Russia has increased its ability to conduct precision find, and despite losses, maintain enough ISTAR assets along its main lines of effort to apply consistent pressure to Ukrainian forces.

Sam Cranny-Evans

 

^[1] Треба було бачити, як “Піони” вагою 47 тонн своїм ходом рухалися по проспекту Перемоги – комбриг 43 бригади Олег Шевчук

^[2] ODIN – OE Data Integration Network

^[3] Blind, Confuse and Demoralize: Russian Electronic Warfare Operations in Donbas – Jamestown

^[4] docplayer.com/32125582-O-sozdanii-razvedyvatelno-ognevogo-kompleksa-s-bla-orlan10-dlya-vypolneniya-osobo-vazhnyh-zadach.html

^[5] 2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf

^[6] Russia’s Artillery War in Ukraine: Challenges and Innovations | Royal United Services Institute

^[7] In-Depth Briefing #86: From mass to mass-precision – CHACR

^[8] The Ministry of Defense showed the work of the Zoopark radar in the special operation zone – RIA Novosti, 28.11.2022

^[9] ODIN – OE Data Integration Network

^[10] Глава “Высокоточных комплексов” заявил о применении “Панцирь-М” для поражения Storm Shadow

^[11] Rostec – Media – News – Rostec delivered a new batch of self-propelled guns “Msta-S” and “Acacia” to the troops

^[12] Our Best Look At Russia’s Kh-38 Missile Now Being Used In Ukraine

^[13] The use of loitering ammunition “Lancet” in the NVO zone

^[14] Russia ramps up strike drone use on Kharkiv front, Ukrainian artillery crew says | Reuters

^[15] ZALA Z-16 – Air Defence and Air Defence Signals Resistant BAF

^[16] Оснащенные тепловизионными камерами БЛА Z-16 применяются в ходе СВО