Why an end to the War in Ukraine remains so elusive

Prior to the 2024 US election, Donald Trump claimed it would take him “one day” to end the War in Ukraine. Yet as the first 100 days of President Trump’s second term have slipped by, a peace deal between Kyiv and Moscow still seems like a remote prospect. At the time of writing in late-April 2025, Russia certainly appears intent on keeping the war going, having that month called up 160,000 personnel in their conscription drive, and rebuffed a Ukrainian proposal for even a 30-day ceasefire.

An honest assessment of the situation through the Kremlin’s eyes would suggest that there are relatively few incentives for Russia to pursue peace seriously at this point in time. While President Vladimir Putin would no doubt welcome various concessions such as an end to sanctions, diplomatic recognition of Crimea, and the chance for his armed forces to replenish stockpiles, he probably also understands that in reality, things won’t be that simple.

A key problem is the limited degree to which the US can offer meaningful incentives without its European allies agreeing to the same. Trump may be able to promise an end to US sanctions, but unless the EU makes a similar promise – which doesn’t look likely – this would still leave Russia cut off from key pre-war trade partners in Europe. Much the same goes for diplomatic recognition of Crimea as Russian – the US’ unilateral recognition carries less weight than multilateral US and European recognition.

Next, even if sanctions were broadly ended, Russia would not necessarily see a major uptick in trade and investment overnight. While there will no doubt be some businesses who would be willing to recommence trade with Russia, many wouldn’t. Even leaving aside the negative optics and potential public backlash of doing so, Russia represents a fundamentally risky business prospect. No business will want to sign a contract with a Russian company, only to have war restart soon after, and find that sanctions have been reimposed and that any agreements signed will not be honoured.

In a similar manner, Europe’s two key energy policy priorities are ensuring security of supply, and the green energy transition, neither of which are compatible with a return to dependency on cheap Russian gas. As such, Russia’s prospects for reintegration into Europe’s energy mix look limited at best. All told, while the war has not been good for Russia’s economy and industry – both appear condemned to stagnation, at least for the time being – many of the root causes would likely carry through even after a ceasefire; thus providing little economic incentive to stop the fighting.

On the battlefield, there is no obvious propaganda victory to be capitalised upon either. Thus far, the opening months of 2025 have not seen much in the way of battlefield success for Russia – the front lines have moved only slightly since January, with the most notable gain being Russia’s near-total recapture of Kursk Oblast, lost to Ukraine’s 6 August 2024 incursion. However, this isn’t a particularly convincing success story for the Kremlin to be able to spin into a ‘mission accomplished’, not least because it was only due to Russia’s 2022 invasion that the Kursk incursion occurred.

Looking to the war effort, Russia’s armed forces appear to be feeling the effects of exhaustion and equipment shortages really start to bite. Many would therefore be tempted to argue that a pause is necessary for its forces to regain offensive potential. This isn’t wrong – a pause would indeed give Russia the chance to rest its troops and replenish its stockpiles – yet the exact same goes for Ukraine. In this kind of war, relative gains can often be more valuable than absolute gains.

When speaking to Ukrainians, it is clear most of them fear a ceasefire would give Russia time to rearm and then re-invade more competently in a few years’ time. Yet upon closer inspection, Ukraine may get more in relative terms out of a pause to the fighting. For starters, Kyiv is likely to continue to receive some form of military and financial support from Europe in peacetime, not least to deter Russia from another invasion in the future. Additionally, many Ukrainian citizens who fled their country at the war’s outbreak may return, boosting the economy and providing a source of fresh potential recruits were war to break out again. Furthermore, depending on how long it lasts, peace could bring Ukraine enough stability to eventually realise its EU accession ambitions, bolstering the country’s access to badly-needed funding for development and defence. Russia by contrast will be left to grapple with restoring its battered economy in a difficult economic climate amid currently low oil prices. Collectively, these factors could erode what little relative advantage Russia currently enjoys.

As such, the Kremlin appears to prefer the current situation, bad as it is, over a peace where Ukraine might benefit more from than Russia. The logic at play here can perhaps be best summarised through an old joke: One day, an old farmer encounters a magical fairy, who offers to fulfil any wish the farmer has, but on the condition that whatever the farmer gets, his neighbour will get double. The old farmer immediately replies: “Take one of my eyes.”

Mark Cazalet