Romanian naval modernisation: Status report

The Romanian Navy has seen only limited investment since the Cold War’s end. Accordingly, the deteriorating security situation and increasing defence expenditure has driven plans for wholesale modernisation. However, prioritisation given to other branches of the Romanian Armed Forces and, notably, difficulties in concluding acquisition contracts have meant that, to date, only limited progress has been achieved. This article examines the challenges that Romanian naval modernisation has faced over recent years and assesses its likely future direction.

 Current fleet structure

Some 25 years after the end of the Cold War, the Romanian Naval Forces still retain much of their Warsaw Pact era equipment. The core of the surface fleet comprises the frigate NMS Mărășești and a quartet of ‘Tetal I’ and ‘Tetal II’ class corvettes. These ships were all first completed in Romania during the 1980s. They are supplemented by numbers of fast attack craft, minehunters and riverine patrol vessels built locally or in the Soviet Union during a similar timeframe.

The most significant naval investment during the post-Cold War era was the acquisition of two former British Royal Navy Type 22 frigates, which was announced in January 2003. Their purchase was intended to enhance interoperability with Romania’s new NATO partners. The ships were commissioned as NMS Regele Ferdinand (ex HMS Coventry) and NMS Regina Maria (ex HMS London) in, respectively, September 2004 and April 2005. Their acquisition included a limited, GBP 116 million (EUR 138 million), refurbishment and modernisation. This encompassed combat management system upgrades and installation of a 76 mm gun. Although stripped of their missile armament, they are arguably the Romanian Navy’s most effective assets. However, the two vessels were first completed in the late 1980s, meaning that they are roughly contemporary with the remainder of Romania’s fast-aging fleet.

The initial Type 22 frigate refurbishment was originally intended to be the first phase of a more extensive modernisation project that would ultimately provide these ships with a much wider range of capabilities. Limited defence funding during this phase of the post-Cold War era and priority accorded to the air force and army meant that this ambition was deferred. However, Russia’s annexation of the Crimea meant that the need to undertake a more through programme of naval modernisation was increasingly recognised. Accordingly, in November 2016, the Romanian government announced that Damen’s ‘Sigma’ 10514 light frigate design had been selected to meet a requirement for four new corvettes in a deal variously reported to be worth between EUR 1.1 billion and EUR 1.6 billion. Construction was to be carried out at Damen’s Romanian Galati shipyard and include the long delayed Type 22 frigate upgrades. This decision proved to be short-lived, as a change of government resulted in the project being cancelled.

 Abortive collaboration with Naval Group

Despite this setback, the acquisition of new surface combatants and modernisation of the Type 22 frigates remained a priority. It formed part of a wider framework of eight major equipment programmes approved in 2017 under the Romanian Armed Forces Acquisition Plan 2017-2026. This led to the opening of a competitive tender process the following year that initially attracted proposals from five European shipbuilding groups. Subsequently, in July 2019, the Romanian government announced the selection of France’s Naval Group, acting in partnership with local company Santierul Naval Constanta (SNC), to undertake the naval modernisation programme. Reportedly valued at EUR 1.2 billion, this encompassed the construction of four new ‘Gowind’ type corvettes and implementation of the long-delayed Type 22 upgrades. The creation of associated maintenance and training facilities was also included. Contemporary news reports suggested that the first of the newly-built ‘Gowind’ corvettes would be delivered in the course of 2022.

 Despite this positive development, tangible progress remained elusive. Part of this was seemingly due to continued prioritisation of army and air force programmes, such as US ‘Patriot’ surface-to-air missiles and ‘Piranha’ armoured personnel carriers. This, alongside legal challenges to the preferred bid, resulted in delays to contract discussions. However, it seems that a more significant problem related to reported tensions in the Naval Group-SNC alliance over the contractual details of how the programme was to be implemented. Although hopes were raised as to a final conclusion of the deal after signature of a letter of intent between France and Romania in June 2022 to enhance naval collaboration, signature of a final agreement continued to be postponed. In August 2023, the Romanian government finally lost patience and cancelled the agreement, throwing the navy’s most important procurement programme into disarray.

 Incremental successes

In spite of the considerable problems faced by the ‘flagship’ corvette acquisition, more success has been achieved with other Romanian naval projects. The most significant of these relates to the procurement of mobile anti-ship missile launchers. This was another of the major schemes contained within the 2017-2026 acquisition plan. After several false starts, Raytheon was awarded a USD 209 million (EUR 192 million) contract for the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) Coastal Defence System under the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process in December 2022. The contract followed receipt of US State Department approval for the sale in 2020. Its value could be increased to USD 217 million (EUR 200 million) if all options are exercised.  The majority of the work will be carried out by Kongsberg in Norway and is expected to be finished by September 2028. Each NSM Coastal Defence System encompasses a fire distribution (command and control) centre, mobile launch and transportation vehicles, and – optionally – a suitable surveillance and tracking radar.

Another significant purchase has been the acquisition of two former British Royal Navy Sandown class minehunters under a government-to-government transfer agreement approved by the Romanian parliament in May 2023. Their purchase was probably influenced by the increased risk to Black Sea shipping posed by stray sea mines after the outbreak of the current Russo-Ukrainian War. This had seen one of Romania’s existing minesweepers, NMS Lt. Dimitrie Nicolescu, damaged in September 2022 whilst attempting to neutralise one of these hazards. NMS Sublocotenent Ion Ghiculescu (formerly HMS Blyth) was formally handed over in September 2023 after refurbishment by Babcock International at Rosyth. She arrived at Constanta towards the end of the year. Her arrival was heralded as Romania’s first significant naval acquisition in nearly two decades. Preparations for the delivery of her sister, Căpitan Constantin Dumitrescu (ex HMS Pembroke) were well advanced as of the end of 2024. However, her arrival in Romanian waters has yet to be reported.

At the start of 2024, it was also confirmed that the navy would acquire two Airbus H215M helicopters equipped for anti-surface warfare under a transaction valued at approximately EUR 165 million. According to local reports, the two rotorcraft will be manufactured by Airbus in France. However, final integration is to be carried out in Romania by prime contractor IAR Brașov. It is anticipated that the lead helicopter will be delivered in 2026, with both rotorcraft likely to be assigned to the Type 22 frigates. The helicopters are to be equipped with the MBDA Marte ER (extended range) anti-ship missile, which the manufacturer claims has an effective engagement envelope of over 100 kilometres.

 A potential way ahead

Although these programmes offer the likelihood of incremental improvements in Romanian naval capabilities towards the end of the current decade, it is clear that a broader programme of naval modernisation is becoming increasingly pressing. It seems that the Romanian government never considered an alternative ‘Plan B’ to the abortive Naval Group alliance. This produced a vacuum when contractual negotiations stalled. The fact that the long-delayed Type 22 frigate modernisation was structured as an integral part of the contract has exacerbated the navy’s problems. In essence, it means that the failure to obtain new surface combatants will be accompanied by the increased obsolescence of the fleet’s most effective warships.

At the time of writing, some 18 months after the collapse of the Naval Group deal, the means by which the Romanian government intends to address the navy’s needs is only slowly emerging. Positively, Romania’s defence spending has expanded rapidly in recent years as it responds to the deteriorating strategic situation, surging to around USD 8.6 billion (2.3% of GDP) in 2024. Moreover, surface combatant acquisition remains an important element of the government’s updated procurement plans. There is, however, a danger that the priority accorded to naval requirements will, again, suffer in comparison with army and air force needs given the influence of the largely land-based Russo-Ukrainian war. This is likely to be a particular danger if an alternative naval acquisition strategy is not quickly implemented. Certainly, Romania’s agreement to acquire 32 F-35A Lightning II strike fighters under a deal reportedly valued at USD 7.2 billion (EUR 6.6 billion) that was announced in November 2024 is evidence that future demands on defence spending will remain heavy in spite of the expanded financial framework.

Reports emerging in local Romanian news sources in mid-2024 suggest that a phased naval modernisation programme might now be envisaged. The first element of this plan would be the acquisition of two new offshore patrol vessels, which would be procured by means of a competitive procurement process. A project budget of some EUR 300 million has been mentioned. In due course this would likely be followed by construction of more sophisticated ships under the European Patrol Corvette (EPC) programme. In mid-2023, it emerged that Romania had joined Greece, Italy, France and Spain in the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) sponsored project, which is intended to produce a common hull for a modular, “second line” warship. This participation might eventually allow Romania to obtain its planned corvettes during the early part of the 2030s; a decade or so later than initially envisaged.

It is possible to speculate that a significant driver of this potential approach might be a realistic appraisal of the current capabilities of Romania’s indigenous shipbuilding sector and the best means by which these might be further developed. Notably, Damen’s Galati shipyard has already delivered fully-outfitted OPVs of the Yarmook (OPV 1900) and Hunain (OPV 2600) types to the Pakistan Navy, adding a further level of complexity to the naval hulls that the facility has delivered for a number of other Damen projects. It is not difficult to see the proposed Romanian OPV project as an attempt to build on this success as part of an endeavour to recreate a sovereign naval construction capacity.

 A Romanian submarine flotilla

One other, much discussed development is the potential reconstitution of a Romanian submarine flotilla. The Romanian Naval Forces still retain the ‘Kilo’ class boat Delfinul as a harbour-based training asset after she ended her operational service in the mid-1990s. However, the potential acquisition of a more active underwater capacity emerged in 2023 with reports that parliamentary authorisation had been received for the acquisition of two new vessels.

The submarine programme appears to have been envisaged in the previously-referenced Franco-Romanian collaboration agreement signed in June 2022. It would likely involve the purchase of French-built ‘Scorpène’ type units. If a contract is concluded, it would make Romania only the third submarine operator (Russia and Turkey are the two others) in the Black Sea. However, there has subsequently been little tangible news on the programme, which might potentially have fallen victim to the subsequent collapse of the ‘Gowind’ corvette acquisition. The realisation of such a programme would, in any event, inevitably be a costly and lengthy venture given the three decade long hiatus since Romania has last operated an active submarine.

 Concluding words

The Romanian Naval Forces have suffered from a significant lack of investment in recent decades, steadily eroding their operational capability. Although this problem has long been recognised by several Romanian governments, the implementation of major modernisation has failed to gain traction in spite of several false dawns. Recently, the implementation of a number of smaller procurement projects holds out the prospect of more modest, but still valuable, incremental improvements pending the reformulation of a more comprehensive modernisation scheme. The outline of this programme is now seemingly starting to take shape, holding out the prospect of significant operational and industrial benefits. However, its ultimate achievement will remain subject to the competing demands of other elements of the Romanian Armed Forces, as well as the vagaries of an uncertain political backdrop.

Conrad Waters