The Ukrainian military and defence industry are managing to employ indigenously developed missiles and bomb-laden drones to strike deep into Russia with potentially significant effect.
During a conversation with journalists reported by Ukrainian state news agency Ukrinform on 9 October 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy mentioned a number of recent developments in particular.
Firstly, Zelenskyy noted that Ukraine’s Palyanytsya turbojet-powered ‘missile drone’ “has already begun to hit enemy military formations in dozens of cases” adding that “This is positive, because we had different moments; now we are [talking] not about isolated cases.”
The Palyanytsya is essentially a small cruise missile weighing 320 kg that can deliver a roughly 100 kg warhead to a range of 650 km. Zelenskyy announced on 24 August 2024 that the weapon had been used for the first time.
Secondly, Zelenskyy noted in his conversation that Ukraine’s Ruta missile had been used for the first time to strike a Russian offshore oil installation at a range of 250+ km. The Ruta system, which is claimed to have a maximum range of 300 to 500 km (sources differ on this), was confirmed by Zelenskyy to have been successfully tested in December 2024, but its recent strike on the Russian offshore oil platform appears to have been its first operational use.
Thirdly, Zelenskyy referred to the “greatest success” recently being the mass use of up to 300 Liutyi bomb-laden drones in what the president called “a serious operation”. The Liutyi is a relatively simple drone with a twin-boom, low-wing fuselage and a wingspan of 6.7 m that is powered by a pusher propeller. However, the system is stated to be able to now carry a 75 kg warhead to ranges exceeding 1,000 km – and possibly up to 2,000 km.
Zelenskyy additionally referred to the recent paired use of Neptune and Flamingo missile systems.
“Last week – I won’t say how many – our Neptune and Flamingo pair was used. You can analyse the corresponding results yourself. We are not saying that this is a massive use of this pair. We are simply saying that there is use, and there are the first tangible results of this particular weapon of ours,” Zelenskyy told journalists.
Initially developed as an anti-ship missile that was in service with the Ukrainian Navy by the time of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the R-360 Neptune system has been adapted to incorporate land attack capabilities. The land-attack variant was reported as first fielded and used in 2023.
The FP-5 Flamingo, meanwhile, is a six-tonne ground-launched, turbofan-powered cruise missile that can carry a 1.15-tonne warhead to ranges stated as being up to 3,000 km. On 20 August 2025 Zelenskyy announced that serial production of the weapon had begun.
According to Ukrainian sources, Flamingo missiles were used in combat for the first time on the morning of 30 August to strike a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) outpost in occupied Crimea. Satellite imagery appeared to show the outpost’s main building was destroyed, while independent Russian news outlet ASTRA reported that the attack damaged six hovercraft and killed one serviceman.
Ukrainian manufacturer Fire Point, which makes the Flamingo system, stated in August 2025 that it could produce one missile per day and hoped to have that output up to seven missiles per day by October.
Ukraine’s ability to indigenously produce long-range strike systems, and in increasing numbers, has the potential to significantly alter the strategic landscape of the Ukraine War.
Most obviously the fielding of the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile, with its 3,000 km range, means that Russian bases and military-industrial facilities across at least the westernmost third of Russia’s territory can now be targeted by missiles launched from inside Ukraine. This, at the very least, creates a significant dilemma for Russia’s air defence network.
Secondly, the increased targeting of Russian critical infrastructure such as oil refineries, on which Ukraine has increasingly focused its attention in recent weeks, serves to further expose the falsehoods stated to the Russian populace by the Putin regime that the ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine is generally going to plan.
Lastly, Ukraine’s ability to produce its own deep strike capabilities makes entirely redundant the argument, continually pressed by Moscow, that Western provision of deep-strike weapons to Kyiv would be a provocative escalation of the war.
