Is the future of engineering vehicles unmanned?

Military engineering has been a crucial element of land warfare for hundreds of years, providing essential capabilities that support operations at the tactical, operational, and even strategic levels. Ever since warfare evolved into combined-arms operations heavily dependent on mechanised ground forces, engineering vehicles have appeared on the battlefield and quickly become indispensable in a wide range of roles. Today, as ground warfare continues to evolve, engineering vehicles have once again demonstrated their importance – but they also face a number of emerging challenges. One potential path forward is the increasing automation of engineering equipment, which raises an important question: Is the future of engineering vehicles unmanned?

The US Army’s Field Manual FM 3-34 states that military engineering exists to ‘provide freedom of action and apply combat power to gain, retain, and exploit the initiative in order to achieve and maintain a position of relative advantage’.^[1] In turn, NATO defines military engineering in accordance with MC 560/2 Policy for Military Engineering as a ‘function in support of operations to shape the physical operating environment’.^[2]

Engineer troops operate at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, across various combat and non-combat scenarios and in diverse operational environments. These factors shape a broad spectrum of engineering tasks ranging from counter-mobility and breaching operations on or near the battlefield to demining and support to civil authorities in rear areas. These tasks are executed through three major engineering disciplines – General, Geospatial (Ancillary), and Combat Engineering, as stated in both US and European doctrines.^[3]

The nature of many engineering tasks often involves labour-intensive work and requires operating close to, or in direct contact with, the enemy. Yet most of these tasks are critical to mission success.

Dull, dirty and dangerous

The major drivers behind the adoption of unmanned platforms by engineering units are generally the same as those motivating their use across the wider military.^[4] These include:

• The need to preserve increasingly limited engineering manpower following post-Cold War force reductions;
• The need to mitigate human fatigue and extend operational endurance;
• The need to reduce personnel exposure in high-risk missions.

These factors fall under the “dull, dirty, and dangerous” category defined in the Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007–2032 released by the US Department of Defense.^[5] The document provides long-duration sorties as an example of a ‘dull’ mission, exposure to radioactive materials as an example of a ‘dirty’ mission, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) as the primary example of a ‘dangerous’ task.

As a result, engineers were among the first branches to adopt and widely introduce unmanned platforms in the 2000s. The imperative of ‘keeping human personnel out of harm’s way’ led to a rapid increase in the number of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) deployed by the US Army for EOD missions in Iraq – from 162 in 2004 to more than 4,000 in 2006.^[6]

The trend toward wider adoption of autonomous platforms was reinforced by modern conflicts in the Middle East, Gaza, and Ukraine, where large-scale ground combat has returned, featuring the extensive use of mechanised formations, fortifications, minefields, counter-mobility measures, and complex terrain.

In addition, land warfare has evolved, further expanding the spectrum of ‘dull, dirty, and dangerous’ missions for military engineers. For example, the tasks of building fortifications or obstacle belts in the rear have become increasingly dangerous due to the extension of the combat and close-rear zones, as well as the proliferation of long-range precision weapons capable of striking to depths of 80 km or more. There are multiple instances in which engineering vehicles – excavators, loaders, and trucks – were targeted by precision-guided or loitering munitions while carrying out construction work far from the line of contact.^[7],[8]

 

In theory, the experience of ongoing conflicts should have prompted the rapid adoption of unmanned systems by engineering troops. Surprisingly, despite the proliferation of unmanned systems in other branches of the military, the broader introduction and combat employment of autonomous systems within engineering units remains limited and largely tied to specific missions.

Autonomous engineering in modern conflicts

The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated the full spectrum of engineering operations on a scale unprecedented since the Cold War. Both sides have employed engineering units for laying massive minefields, demining, wet-gap crossings, route and area clearance, breaching during mechanised assaults, and large-scale infrastructure construction, to name a few. Yet, after three and a half years of war, the use of autonomous engineering vehicles remains limited and often confined to specific tasks.

One of the first recorded deployments of autonomous systems was the use of the Uran-6 UGV in April 2022 for demining operations in the rear zone. To date, the Uran-6 remains the only member of the Uran UGV family known to have been employed in Ukraine, according to publicly available information.^[9] Ukrainian civilian and military organisations also use similar unmanned platforms, such as the Božena 5+, for demining operations in rear areas.^[10] There are claims that in 2022 Russia deployed a heavy remotely controlled Prokhod-1 system equipped with a TMT-S mine trawl in Ukraine; however, these claims remain unverified and details are scarce.^[11]

There are documented cases in which both Russian and Ukrainian armed forces have used remotely-operated armoured vehicles, such as the MT-LB, to deliver demolition charges onto enemy strongpoints or to clear minefields. The same technique was reportedly employed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in Gaza, where remotely controlled M113 APCs were used to deliver explosive charges.^{[12] [13]} However, such instances are relatively rare and, at least in the case of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, largely disappeared following the wider introduction of glide bombs by the Russian Air Force (RuAF).

 

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are using UGVs for various engineering tasks, such as delivering demolition charges, laying mines and smokescreens, and conducting engineering reconnaissance. Furthermore, Russian and Ukrainian sappers, in addition to UAV operators, frequently employ aerial drones in support of demining and route clearance operations.^[14]

Materials released by both Russian and Ukrainian sources suggest that both sides are experimenting with small and medium unmanned platforms in various auxiliary and engineering roles. Available information indicates that the range of tasks performed by UGVs is gradually expanding, and the number of deployed ground robotic systems is continuing to grow. Recent examples include a Russian UGV used for trench digging and cable laying.^[15] This is presumably the first instance of a UGV performing such a task. Significantly, in this case the UGV was operated under the surveillance of a UAV, which is standard practice for both sides in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

Another example is an unmanned vehicle-launched bridge, reportedly developed in Russia. According to the source, the UGV is remotely operated and carries a deployable light bridge, providing gap-crossing capability for light vehicles. However, the details and current status of the programme remain unclear.^[16]

These observations suggest that, in most cases, unmanned vehicles are deployed in controlled environments – often in the rear areas – operated by a human, and are typically small platforms with limited capabilities. Another observation from the Ukrainian conflict: the variety of UGV models suggests that field experiments are underway, while neither side has adopted any unmanned ground platform for large-scale serial production.

There are, however, no known cases of heavy or medium unmanned engineering vehicles being deployed in combat in Ukraine for standard engineering tasks such as breaching, mine clearance, or obstacle removal. In the case of the IDF, the unmanned version of the Caterpillar D9 bulldozer, dubbed ‘Robdozer’, has seen only limited deployment in 2025.^[17]

The constraints

What are the possible reasons for the slower adoption of heavy unmanned engineering vehicles?

First, while autonomy allows personnel to be kept away from ‘dull, dirty, and dangerous’ missions, it does not guarantee mission success. Unmanned engineering vehicles share the same vulnerabilities as their manned counterparts – for example, they can be immobilised by an anti-tank mine – but they also carry additional risks, such as loss of control due to enemy jamming in the case of radio-controlled systems, or loss of connection in the case of cable-controlled systems.

The second issue relates to technological limitations. The vast majority of unmanned systems currently employed in combat are remotely operated, with only a small number incorporating elements of artificial intelligence (AI) that enable limited autonomous functioning in specific scenarios. At the same time, the land domain remains the most complex environment for autonomous systems, and engineering tasks are among the most demanding within it. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that UGV technology has not yet reached full maturity, or requires additional time to adapt to the rapidly evolving conditions of contemporary land warfare.

Third, many engineering operations are highly complex and must be carried out in increasingly hostile environments, often in close coordination with other elements of combined-arms formations such as infantry and armour. These tasks demand quick judgement, adaptation, and flexibility — qualities that are difficult to automate. As a result, unmanned engineering vehicles will require a certain level of human oversight, at least at the current stage of technological development.

Finally, the wider introduction and combat deployment of heavy unmanned engineering vehicles requires developing formal procedures, doctrines, and training programmes. Although work on these is underway, armed forces need time to absorb operational experience and adapt accordingly.

There are also operational considerations. Breaching, mine-clearing, and other engineering assets are limited in most modern militaries, while the number of threats – including precision-guided weapons and tactical reconnaissance systems – has increased. As a result, a concentration of heavy engineering vehicles would likely be detected, and an adversary would almost certainly target these assets, whether they be manned or unmanned.

Complex combined-arms operations involving engineering support – such as breaching or wet-gap crossings – must be thoroughly planned, synchronised, rehearsed, and supported to succeed.^[18] However, employing unproven unmanned technology in such operations may be viewed by some military leaders as an unnecessary risk. As a result, heavy unmanned engineering vehicles so far tend to remain confined to proving grounds rather than being deployed operationally.

Concluding thoughts

So, is the future of engineering vehicles unmanned? The short answer is almost certainly yes, but with caveats.

The general trend toward wider adoption of autonomous vehicles will continue across all branches, including military engineering. However, this shift is likely to be gradual, limited in scope, and initially focused on specific, well-controlled tasks such as construction or demining.

Optionally manned medium and heavy combat engineering vehicles will likely be introduced for testing and limited operational deployment. Nevertheless, human oversight will almost certainly remain essential for engineering vehicles, as well as for armed combat UGVs.

The protection of engineering vehicles will be significantly increased, following recent trends in protection suites already widely implemented on heavy and medium combat vehicles.^[19] Combat engineering vehicles are expected to receive multi-layered protection similar to that of main battle tanks.

Many functions of engineering vehicles will likely be automated to reduce crew size and minimise risks to personnel. Another possible development is the emergence of multi-platform solutions similar to the MGCS, in which a manned command-and-control (C2) vehicle operates in cooperation with one or more unmanned engineering vehicles.^[20]

The level of autonomy will increase over time. Eventually, manned and unmanned combat, engineering, and aerial vehicles may be connected within a single network, coordinating their actions as part of an integrated operational system.^[21]

In general, engineering capabilities have recently come to the forefront and received increased attention in many militaries around the world. There is a growing trend toward enhancing engineering capabilities and upgrading existing engineering vehicles, which will likely drive active procurement of a variety of engineering vehicles in the short term.

 

[1] FM 3-34 Engineer Operations: https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1021427

[2] Military Engineering Center of Excellence: https://milengcoe.org/milengcoe/Pages/MILENG-in-NATO.aspx

[3] Military Engineering Center of Excellence: https://milengcoe.org/milengcoe/Pages/MILENG-in-NATO.aspx

[4] Is drone-based resupply viable? Alexey Tarasov: https://euro-sd.com/2025/10/articles/armament/47250/is-drone-based-resupply-viable/

[5] Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C, 20301-1000, page 19

[6] Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C, 20301-1000, page 19

[7] An excavator destroyed by a Krasnopol precision-guided munition, July 2024: https://t.me/brigada83/40

[8] An excavator destroyed by a Lancet loitering munition, October 2025: https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/26281

[9] Footage Suggests first recorded use of Russian UGV in Ukraine: https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/uv-online/first-recorded-use-of-a-russian-ugv-in-ukraine/

[10] Slovak defence industry’s products are in demand by and of valuable assistance to Ukraine. 14.07.2023 –https://www.mosr.sk/53075-en/slovenske-produkty-obranneho-priemyslu-su-pre-ukrajinu-cennou-pomocou-aj-ziadanou-komoditou/

[11]Новейший робот-сапер “Проход-1” впервые задействовали в спецоперации на Украине. 20 июля 2022 –  https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/15259901

[12] Israeli Army deploys booby-trapped armoured vehicles into Gaza City amid heavy bombardment: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israeli-army-deploys-booby-trapped-armored-vehicles-into-gaza-city-amid-heavy-bombardment/3689582

[13] Israeli robotic defence firm sees ‘big change’ in unmanned combat. 6 Aug 2025: https://breakingdefense.com/2025/08/israeli-robotic-defense-firm-sees-big-change-in-unmanned-combat/

[14] Route clearing using UAV. RU MoD. 29 Nov 2025: https://t.me/mod_russia/58953

[15] Cable-laying UGV of the East Army Group. RU MoD. 30.11.2025: https://t.me/mod_russia/58994

[16] Проходной створ: в войсках начали применять роботов-мостоукладчиков. 24 октября 2025-  https://iz.ru/1977759/timofei-volkov-andrei-fedorov/prohodnoi-stvor-v-voiskah-nacali-primenat-robotov-mostoukladcikov

[17] Israel’s new unmanned bulldozers ‘changing the paradigm’ of war in Gaza. 20 April 2025:  https://www.timesofisrael.com/israels-new-unmanned-bulldozers-changing-the-paradigm-of-war-in-gaza/

[18] Blocked and Bloodied: Lessons from the Combined Arms Breach during the 2023 Ukrainian Counter-Offensive: https://www.army.mil/article/286857/blocked_and_bloodied_lessons_from_the_combined_arms_breach_during_the_2023_ukranian_counter_offensive

[19] APS and ERA developments. Alexey Tarasov: https://euro-sd.com/2025/01/articles/42132/aps-and-era-developments/

[20] MGCS status update. Alexey Tarasov: https://euro-sd.com/2025/08/articles/exclusive/45998/mgcs-status-update/

[21] Андрей Белоусов: В 2025 году планируется значительно увеличить поставки наземных робототехнических комплексов в ВС РФ- https://t.me/mod_russia/51061