Letter from London: A Declining Capability

It is difficult to exaggerate the current sorry state of the British Army. In the 1990s, a Chief of the Air Staff moaned that the UK got more international kudos from deploying a single  Warrior MICV battlegroup than the entire Royal Air Force. And the British Army was seen as a “reference army” for many allies in the 1990s and 2000s (especially France) – this is not the case now. So, what has happened?

Putting an exact date on the start, or the awareness of the decline is also difficult – and debatable. But the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ land warfare expert, Brigadier (Ret’d) Ben Barry’s recent – and very readable – book, “The Rise and Fall of the British Army, 1975-2025” sees the start of the decline coming in the late-2000s, and accelerating thereafter. Some might see this as strange, as the British Army was, in the early-2010s, active on two operations, Iraq and Afghanistan, so should have been accumulating vast amounts of valuable combat experience. So, how does this decline manifest itself? Despite rising defence spending – with the Army budget reaching GBP 13.25 billion (EUR 15.3 billion) in 2024–25, larger than the defence budgets of many NATO countries – the Army is able to do less and less, and is operating ever-ageing equipment, while seeing serious problems in procuring new capabilities.

When operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army generated up to four combat brigades per year, although this dropped back to two when there was only Afghanistan to cater for – but this capability has seemingly been lost. Those operations saw complete brigade formations exercised, not just the combat elements, but also the full Combat Support (artillery, engineers etc) and Combat Service Support (logistics, maintenance etc), as well as the headquarters, Since the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the UK has never exercised a full, NATO recognisable, brigade.

 

On the 2024 NATO Exercise Steadfast Defender, despite the Ministry of Defence lauding the thousands of troops that were deployed, it was carried out in packets, at most a battlegroup at one time, and some of those were composite, lacking their CS/CSS elements.

The British Army’s Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup in Estonia has not seen a coherent force, based on a complete infantry battalion or an armoured regiment, but has seen individual companies/squadrons deployed – and this lack of doctrinal coherence has been noted by the hosts… Equally noticed in Estonia is that the decision to up the NATO battlegroups to brigades, has seen the UK say that it will do so, but by leaving the extra forces in the UK, with a promise to move them to Estonia when required. It is noted, locally, that Germany has started moving, and rotating, entire brigades to Lithuania, and is spending over EUR 800 million on infrastructure for this larger formation.

A regional source said, “you have some very motivated troops, they are very keen to learn about operating in the region, but you equip them with last century’s weapons”. Which brings one to equipment, and the far-from-satisfactory performance of the British Army…

Lack of Equipment

The last time that significant new equipment – and one is talking about armoured vehicles here, artillery, and the like – arrived into British Army service was the 1990s, when Challenger 2 was delivered, along with the AS90 155 mm self-propelled artillery system. Since then? A stream of programmes, but with no deliv- eries. The upgrade for the Warrior MICV started in the mid-1990s, went through various competitive stages, and eventually saw a contract to Lockheed Martin in 2011, but was cancelled in 2021.

The Challenger Capability Sustainment Programme/Life Extension Programme started in 2005, again saw change after change to the requirement, some very quiet phases, and eventually became the Challenger 3 programme in 2021 – 15–16-years after things started. But initial operating capability (IOC) isn’t until 2027–28 – and there still isn’t a production contract to deliver vehicles.

To compound matters, despite there being a “not to exceed” battle weight for Challenger 3 of 76 t, current reports say that it has risen to over 80 tonnes, as the Army has changed the specifications, and has added tonnes of extra armour. At this weight, it won’t be able to use the British Army’s battlefield bridging, and will be unable to use a range of road bridges in Europe.

The Boxer 8×8 APC ought to be the bright, shining light of successful procurement for the British Army. But the procurement has already seen cuts in offtake, the rate of delivery was scaled at as low as 55 per year (there is a chance that for other armies, Boxer production could hit as high as 800+ in 2026–27), with the whole 650+ programme taking over a decade to deliver. And while not as bad as Ajax AFV, the Army has continued to demand engineering change requests from ARTEC, which drives up costs, risks, and time.

And finally, Ajax… By 2019–20, serious noise vibration problems had been identified with the vehicle family, serious enough that troops operating the vehicles were having to receive medical care, and some were discharged as medically unfit. The programme was halted, while investigations were set in motion to work out what was going on – and programme payments were halted. “Mitigations” were identified, and embodied – but not engineering solutions… And in late-2025, days after the Defence Procurement Minister announced that Ajax had passed its IOC, it was announced that on a series of exercises in 2024 and 2025, there had been further noise/vibration injuries reported. The 589-vehicle programme is currently on hold.

Since 2012, the Army has spent over GBP 15 billion/EUR 17.5 billion on AFVs, and has received 14 Archer 155 mm SP guns, an interim capability; about 30 Boxer 8×8s; 150 Ajax, only to renounce their acceptance; and no upgraded MBTs. It is difficult.

 

It is true that for Iraq/Afghanistan, there were what, in UK parlance, called “urgent operational requirements” (UORs), mainly mine-protected vehicles, but these were of highly mixed performance and satisfaction, and many of these were rapidly disposed of once those missions came to an end.

What has caused this worrying decline in the capabilities of the British Army?

The first thing might be the influence of Afghanistan on the management and outlook of the Army. At the time, the focus was on “The War, not A War”. This meant that “The War” was Afghanistan, and the Army should focus on the capabilities, the equipment, the organisation that allowed it to fight in Helmand province.

But what this meant is that during that time, capabilities – armour, MICVs, 155 mm artillery, air defence – that were not seen as being of relevance to “The War” were completely de-prioritised, ignored, even. So, less and less depth maintenance, preventative maintenance on Challenger 2 and Warrior, the AS90 fleet allowed to wither and die due to a lack of support.

A lack of realism could also be seen also as a cause for the British Army’s current malaise. Until quite recently, the upbeat talk was that the British Army was “a reference Army”, that is one to be emulated by other armies. But this talk was at its peak in the post-Afghanistan phase, when the worst of the decline was happening, accelerating, even. But no-one high in the chain of command seemed willing to tackle this false exuberance.

Constant changes to the perceived end state of British Army can also be seen as a key reason why things have been so dire. “Future Army” documents since 2015 have seen changes to the perceived ORBAT of the Army about every 2-3-years at most – there has been little or no stability. Concepts such as the (Ajax-equipped) Strike Brigades have arisen, then been radically changed, and have then partially faded away. A process of constant – and disruptive – change in how the British Army sees itself and its future have not been a help.

The current Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Roly Walker, was brought in to turn the British Army oil tanker around, away from the rocks where was headed. He has been trying – but it will be a very long time before success can be announced. At best, the British Army will reach its end state – two deployable, war-fighting divisions – by 2035. But many in Europe/NATO doubt that this will be achievable by that date.

Francis Tusa

Author:  Francis Tusa provides a unique insight into the British and European defence scene. His newsletter Defence Analysis is absolutely “must read.”

Click here to read the latest issue of ESD.