If you came here looking for a simple explanation of how the current war in the Middle East began and how it is likely to end, we are sorry to disappoint you! There is never a simple explanation for a war in the Middle East and the roots of this current conflict could, if you wanted, be traced back to the seventh century. What we are seeing here is the clash of history, religion, ideology and the desire to be the dominant regional power. Imagine if there was to be one dominant regional power in the Middle East, one with the ability to effectively dictate the price of oil and gas. A country that could interrupt global oil and gas supplies and interfere with Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) in the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea and even the Indian Ocean. Such a country would have immense power regionally and indeed globally.
Current events mark the end of a historical arc, one where a country sought to change the strategic picture in the Middle East and beyond. One where a country was working towards making itself the dominant regional power. All we know for certain is that those dreams of making Iran the dominant regional power, for the moment, lie in ruins, ruins created by US and Israeli airpower. What we cannot know is what happens next, what regime will emerge in Tehran or perhaps what regime will be allowed to emerge in Tehran. There is also a possibility that a unitary Iran might break apart, as ethnic minorities such as Arabs, Azeri, Baloch and Kurds amongst other seek to break away from repression they have experienced from the Tehran regime.
The thing is everything could have been completely different, if you go back to 2023 circumstances seemed to favour Iran and appeared to point Tehran and its proxies gaining power and momentum across the Middle East. The Biden Administration appeared wedded to the failed appeasement policies of the Obama era, sanctions were relaxed and the Iranian nuclear programme continued untroubled by US pressure. As for Europe, they were happy to follow the US lead on appeasement of Iran, with some looking to boost trade relations while ignoring the appalling human rights record of the Tehran regime.
Elsewhere Tehran had become a major oil supplier to China and in return was a significant customer for Chinese exports. This arrangement suited both parties Iran gained a secure customer for its oil and Beijing provided some diplomatic cover for Tehran. It was a win for China, as they met their oil demands and gained an essentially captive market for their goods and services. Iran also purchased Chinese defence equipment. Russia was another critical partner for Iran; they shared strategic goals principally sustaining the Assad regime in Syria and both looked to keep the US out of the Middle East. Russia was also an extremely useful source of defence equipment and defence technology for Iran. Other more unusual partners for Iran included the Maduro “Narco” regime in Venezuela and North Korea, a key source of missile and defence technology for Iran, both of whom one would hardly associate with a strictly religious regime!

US Navy F/A-18F aircraft launches from the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) during Operation Epic Fury on March 1. (Image: US Central Command)
The Fundamental Nuclear Issue
Despite never admitting it in public Iran has been engaged in a long-term programme to develop nuclear weapons and in parallel it has also been developing a range of ballistic missile delivery systems. From the perspective of the regime in Tehran the possession of nuclear weapons and an effective delivery system was an essential strategic goal. They looked at the fate of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and came to the conclusion that the Iraqi regime would never have fallen if they had a nuclear capability. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent, who would take the risk of directly confronting a nuclear-armed Iran?
A nuclear-armed Iran would be incredibly destabilising to the security situation in the Middle East, the inevitability of Iran utilising nuclear blackmail to achieve its objectives is not difficult to see. Hiding behind its nuclear umbrella it could either directly, or via the use of surrogates such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthi, seek to destabilise the Gulf States with the resultant spike in global oil prices and the economic damage that could cause. It could finally seek to act on the eliminationist rhetoric it has used against Israel for years and use nuclear weapons, such a step would also be legitimised by Iranian religious authorities.
A nuclear-armed Iran could remake the strategic map of the Middle East. Clearly a nuclear Iran would be totally unacceptable to Israel, it would also be totally unacceptable to Saudi Arabia, who would have no option but to obtain their own nuclear deterrent. Other regional states would seek to follow and a nuclear arms race in the Middle East would become a reality. The implications of a nuclear-armed Iran are not difficult to fathom.
Efforts by the US and the international community to halt the Iranian nuclear programme failed to deliver results. Despite extensive diplomatic efforts, policies of appeasement and even sanctions, Iran continued with its nuclear programme in violation of international norms. It would be fair to assume that the Iranian regime believed that it would be able to manipulate diplomatic efforts, make minimal and/or meaningless concessions to continue endless negotiations until they would officially declare they were a nuclear power.
Others were not content to see Iran inexorably move towards a nuclear weapons capability, Israel, who would be one of the primary targets of a nuclear-armed Iran, would run an extensive campaign of intelligence gathering on and direct action against the Iranian nuclear programme. In this they would be assisted by anti-regime forces in Iran. Over the years Israel would acquire and smuggle out of Iran a complete cache of documents detailing the Iranian nuclear programme, they would also be blamed for the unexplained deaths of a large number of persons linked to the Iranian nuclear programme in senior positions. Year after year Israeli intelligence would build a complete picture of key players in Iranian political and military circles, who they were and where they were, as well as critical locations for Iran military efforts.
The Iranian leadership had always assumed that it could support, plan and fund operations against Israel, the US and Western interests both within the Middle East region and internationally, without consequences. It was to discover that it was mistaken in this regard as Israel undertook Operation Rising Lion in June 2025, in what was later called the “Twelve Day War” from 13 to 24 June. Targets included nuclear facilities, chemical weapons production, military headquarters, missile production centres and bases, other defence industrial targets, air bases and ground-based air defences. Also targeted were senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iranian Armed Forces leaders, intelligence and Special Forces operatives and nuclear-programme involved scientists.
That was not all though, on 22 June 2025, the US military commenced Operation Midnight Hammer an attack on major Iranian nuclear facilities, these were the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, the Natanz Nuclear Facility and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and substantial damage was inflicted. The US then pressured Israel to halt Operation Rising Lion and ceased its own operations, presumably believing that the Iranian leadership would get the message and see that there was no way that they could continue with their nuclear weapons and accompanying delivery systems programmes. That assumption proved wrong.
It would appear that in parallel with agreeing to talks on the nuclear issue with the US on the one hand, on the other Iran was starting work on resurrecting the nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. Then in early February, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had a stockpile of 440 kg of highly enriched uranium. It then became apparent that despite the strikes on its nuclear infrastructure, Iran had managed to separately secure a total of 10,000 kg of nuclear material and still had a viable uranium enrichment capability!
What defies belief is that Iranian negotiators later admitted, according to senior US negotiators that they had 460 kg of 60% enriched uranium, that could be enriched to 90% weapons grade uranium in seven to ten days, which they asserted would be enough for 11 nuclear devices! They also stated that they had 1,000 kg of 20% enriched uranium that could be enriched to weapons grade within 21 to 28 days. Whether this was supposed to frighten the US negotiators into making a deal that favoured Iran is unclear, what is clear is that Iran totally misread what the US was prepared to accept. Arguably this lit the fuse that led to Epic Fury and Roaring Lion.
After some 30 years of Iran successfully running rings around US and European diplomats to protect their nuclear programme, they finally made a grotesque misjudgement. To admit that you were on the verge of having a full nuclear weapons capability within weeks, added to the fact that you demonstrably had a delivery system capability, could be seen as nothing more than an intolerable provocation. You did not need to be a genius to work out that provoking Trump would end badly.
Where do we go from here? Continuing airstrikes against regime leadership targets have been extremely successful, it is clear that US and Israeli forces have access to a significant intelligence picture of the Iranian regime, its key personalities and their locations. However, this will not stop Iranian attacks on targets throughout the region or attempted attacks by Iranian proxy forces.
Iranian missile and drone (UAS) forces are under the control of the IRGC, the Praetorian Guard of the Iranian clerical regime. They will continue to fight. The power and prestige of the IRGC and the survival of its members depends on their willingness to continue fighting and to sustain the regime. Apart from missiles and UAS systems, the IRGC also operates combat aircraft and has its own naval force. The IRGC can continue to fight for quite some time, it has access to ample missile and UAS supplies. There might not be a strategic plan behind what they are doing at this point, but they have a target list and will continue their attacks.
The IRGC was also the umbrella organisation for Iranian overseas operations, over the years Iran has conducted assassination attempts against regime opponents across Europe, while Iranian surrogates have attacked Israeli-linked targets in Europe. Hamas and Hezbollah cells exist in Europe, for example Austria discovered a Hamas weapons cache last year, these could provide the basis for terrorist attacks in Europe. Iranian agents have also fostered links with organised crime syndicates to conduct operations and such links could be activated to action terrorist incidents.
Unless governments in Europe are very careful, what is happening today in the Middle East will not stay in the Middle East. The economic implications are already starting to be felt, but in the worst case Iranian-sponsored terrorism could reach Europe. Whether it likes it or not, Europe is a part of this conflict.
David Saw

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