Towed artillery and dismounted mortar use in Ukraine

Artillery of all kinds plays one of the most devastating and important roles in modern battle and while armoured, self-propelled (SP) platforms are increasingly being procured, towed guns, together with tubes of dismounted infantry mortars, continue to play a critical part in current conflicts.

This article shares thoughts on towed artillery and mortar systems primarily in the context of the battlefields of Ukraine.

Setting the scene

Lulled into a false sense of security after fall of communism, NATO, with its growing number of members, has experienced a relaxed and relatively peaceful period. For more than 20 years, while towed artillery and mortars played their parts in various confrontations and coalition-based encounters, they were eminently survivable, with friendly platforms facing little in the way of serious peer-to-peer counter-battery capabilities. As a result, this meant mobility of weapon platforms was not a decisive factor linked to survivability. Control of airspace also meant the unhindered deployment of towed guns via helicopter was possible, and it was reasonable to assume they could be placed in positions where they would remain for a long duration. Even after Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, then annexing Crimea and unleashing devastating counter-battery fire against Ukrainian artillery positions in the Donbas, the West’s response has been dangerously slow in recognising that the potential for a major peer-to-peer conflict in Europe was, once again, a reality. Over the past five years or so, however, a realisation has driven a fresh analysis of artillery in the context of divisional warfighting against a peer adversary in Europe. The ongoing war in Ukraine confirms the need to confront this reality, urgently, and not simply with strategy and latest tactics, but also with the right equipment.

While the need to support small- or medium-sized troop deployments will remain, whether as part of a coalition or unilaterally, the threat now posed to Western Europe and NATO’s eastern flank by a numerically and technologically formidable – and belligerent – Russia, means that support for divisional deployments from the most effective artillery assets, as well as other systems, is where focus is required. Deployed forces will need all the support they can get to be able to manoeuvre effectively, with longer-range guns destroying threats at range, as well as infantry needing the confidence of their own mortars providing effective fire support at shorter ranges and closer to the front.

The death of the gun line – lessons from Ukraine

For some qualified thoughts regarding artillery in modern operations and on the use of towed artillery and mortars on Ukrainian battlefields, ESD turned to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and Major Patrick Hinton RA, former Chief of the General Staff’s Visiting Fellow in the Military Sciences Research Group at RUSI. Hinton shared his thoughts about what he calls, “the death of the gun line”, noting: “There has been a disaggregation and federation of how fires are happening from previous static gun positions. Today, dispersal and mobility are absolutely key, calling on whatever asset is in position and/or available at any one time, and in whatever way is best matched to engage a particular, designated target. So, rather than necessarily responding as a six or eight-gun battery, calling for fire is a lot less rigid. And when it comes to Ukraine, where there is a massive front on both sides and where so many different things are happening, differently, all the way along, it’s hard to speak categorically; units have different bits of kit, there are different risk elements, command and control issues, and the use of artillery and mortars is largely based on the experience of on-the-ground commanders and battlefield realities.”

One of the most important of those realities, according to Hinton, which is also something that was learned the hard way by Ukrainian gunners in 2014 in the Donbas, is, “you’ve got to do your fire mission and be prepared to move fast, which is where the infantry’s dismounted mortars – the lighter ones at least – have the advantage over towed guns of the artillery, which need to be hitched and un-hitched, and wheeled in and out of action. That’s one immediate difference between the two”. He added that trying to learn more about into- and out-of-action times, rather than sitting static in a forward operating base, is on “everyone’s agenda”, with the ability to ‘shoot and scoot’ critical for survivability of both weapon platforms and crews.

Hinton noted that another issue highlighted by the war in Ukraine, no matter what the platform, is that, “Everything around the systems has changed. Loads of towed guns and mortar systems have been gifted to the country and what has developed around them – such as the use of UAVs/quadcopters for targeting and adjustment of fire – has been a step change from the norm. In the UK, for example, using UAVs/quadcopters is something we’ve not really done; we only have a few UAVs, as we insist on them being highly certified and technical. As a result, we’ve not undertaken adjustment-of-fire training off the likes of a DJI Phantom-type of commercial drone platform.”

Other challenges faced by towed guns and mortars in Ukraine, is that of ammunition, logistics and resupply. According to Hinton, “Ukrainian Forces are being given many different types of systems, and some ammunition works with some platforms, though not with others, and this has made their logistics chain incredibly complicated. It seems they now have at least 14 different artillery systems, from 155 mm and 152 mm towed, e.g., M777 and 2A65 Msta-B, respectively, to smaller calibres, like the towed 105 mm Light Gun, but each with different operational and maintenance requirements.”

Hinton added, “This is where the simplicity of mortars offers effective advantages; slightly more disposable, with lots of them available and more able to adapt on the go. And whilst these advantages might come with the loss of a bit of range, it’s not that significant. There is, of course, a logistics chain for the mortars, too, but this will be somewhat smaller than for towed guns. Whilst 61 mm and 81 mm mortars are man-portable, they’re not light by any means, as anyone who has ever had to carry a mortar baseplate will attest.”

Towed boost for Ukraine, but not without challenges

When it comes to towed systems on a real peer-to-peer battlefield, challenges have been highlighted through the use of the M777 155 mm towed gun in Ukraine, gifted in quantity by the US, Australia and Canada. In one major tranche of equipment from the US, cited by the DoD, were 126 155 mm M777s, along with 126 ‘tactical vehicles’ to tow them, accompanied by up to 411,000 155 mm artillery rounds. For crews in Ukraine, just five days of training has made them proficient on the system, in part due to their existing gunnery skills using legacy systems such as the 152 mm 2A65 Msta-B, and others, but also, from interviews with crews, because many seem to have found the M777 relatively easy to master. Not only that, the system’s accuracy and range – reaching out beyond 20 km with conventional rounds, or 30 km with extended-range shells – has also boosted the morale of Ukrainian infantry relying on indirect fire support at the front.

The M777 has been very effective in hot spots and expeditionary conflicts where adversaries have not been as capable as the Russians. In terms of counter-battery and detection capabilities in Ukraine, however, the gun’s positives have made it a priority target for the Russians, who have had a degree of success in destroying a fair number of them. Indeed, its towed nature and lower mobility compared to SP systems has highlighted this weakness as an existential problem against a peer adversary, despite it being a formidable system when firing optimally. Reports suggest that more than 50 of the roughly 190 M777 howitzers gifted to Ukraine since the start of the conflict have been destroyed, although some of these were in a storage facility awaiting dispersal to operational units. Major Hinton argued that, “Whilst manufacturers might profess to the system’s prowess on the testing grounds, on the real battlefield these guns simply may not survive contact. In fact, in Ukraine some one third of the Ukrainian Forces’ artillery, including M777s, is out of the line for repair at any one time, which is a significant number”.

Towed effectiveness in Ukraine

That said, the M777 has nonetheless proven popular with its Ukrainian crews and been extremely effective on many occasions during the conflict to date, including in scenarios such as the Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives. Hinton’s RUSI peers, Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, in their report, ‘Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive’, include a discussion and description of Ukraine’s counteroffensive against Russian forces along the defensive Surovikin Line, including tactical actions around the villages of Novodarivka and Rivnopil, bordering Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, and in which Ukrainian M777s played an important role. A short extract describes the Ukrainian offensive beginning in late May:

“…with a protracted period of preparatory artillery fires. For the Rivnopil sector, batteries of M777 155 mm howitzers had been assigned to support the effort, setting up their firing positions to the northwest. Usually, Ukrainian howitzers would have to displace 2–15 minutes from opening fire, depending on their distance from different threat systems. This time it was clear that Ukrainian intelligence had accurately marked down Russian firing positions, and with the greater range afforded by the 155 mm guns, the Ukrainian gunners quickly caused Russian artillery to be pulled back. Since the targets in this phase were largely in the close, the Ukrainian artillery established a steady rhythm of strikes with little need to displace. There was a sense of elation among the crews and the infantry watching the fire. For months, each gun was strictly limited in the number of rounds available. Ukraine had been trying to conserve its ammunition to stockpile for the offensive. Now there was freedom to fire and when calls for resupply were made additional rounds were promptly delivered.”

On mortars

Of the many systems gifted by overseas nations, mortars and towed guns have been amongst some of the most crucial. However, as Major Hinton told ESD, while the platforms might have arrived, not every package (unlike the DoD-cited tranche mentioned earlier) contained ammunition for the weapons. While perhaps an oversight, but more likely this was due to the lack of stocks in the West. On training aspects of these donated systems, Hinton added, “with all the towed platforms and mortar systems gifted to Ukraine, training, (as well as maintenance), in their technical and operational use has been an essential requirement; as you would expect. For mortars, with their smaller crews and being much less complex systems with fewer moving parts than towed guns, like the M777, training is a much simpler process and takes less time. Tactics for both, on the other hand, have been left largely to Ukraine’s in-the-know troops on the ground”.

Hinton’s final thoughts on these two weapon systems in the Ukrainian theatre offered certain differences regarding their use: “Don’t forget, with mortars, their highest firing angles enable rounds to be dropped just a few hundred metres in front of the firing position, though with potentially lengthy times of flight, and their range capabilities overall are much less than towed artillery. And whereas towed guns will provide indirect fire over typical ranges to targets between 10–20 km using conventional ammunition, it can also be used, should the need arise, as a direct-fire weapon, something for which the [towed] mortar is unsuited. Indeed, in Ukraine, tanks have sometimes been used for indirect fire and howitzers for direct fire,” he said, concluding, “so lots of operational and tactical variations and inventive use of weapon platforms has been going on, as needs must, and orthodoxy has, effectively, melted away”.

While infantry-portable mortars are generally unsuited for direct fire, exceptions to the rule exist. In this vein, Poland has supplied the LMP-2017 60 mm light mortar to Ukraine, including just prior to the invasion. This was designed to be handheld and hand-aimed, although low-angle, almost-direct fire would only be considered in the most extreme circumstances.

Homegrown mortar footnote

While many nations have donated dismounted mortars of various calibres together with appropriate ammunition to Ukraine since the start of the war, it is worth mentioning a homegrown Ukrainian development, first seen in early 2023 and more recently mentioned by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and reported on the Ukrainian Militarnyi Military Portal in late November.

The weapon in question is a Ukrainian-made 30/40 mm, bi-calibre ‘mini-mortar’, made by an unnamed private company, which can launch both 30 mm and 40 mm grenades used by automatic grenade launchers. While not a ‘true’ mortar, it nonetheless provides Ukraine’s soldiers with an option for close-range indirect fire support. Prior to being handed over for operational use, the weapon was tested by Ukraine’s 108th Territorial Defence Brigade, and deemed successful, including in terms of consistent accuracy.

Final thoughts

Artillery remains the most effective means of bringing down a huge weight of fire onto a target, or target area, and has been a battle-winning asset in many conflicts. While the towed component may be more vulnerable than armoured, SP systems, which are steadily taking over, their advantages include low cost, simplicity, and a relatively small mass. This also makes them more readily transportable by air, as well as deployable to final gun positions by helicopter, where circumstances permit. So, while there has been significant attrition of towed systems in Ukraine, their contribution has still been immense and there remains a place for them, even in an extremely harsh battlespace. Mortars, too, play an essential role and can, with their high firing angles, can reach targets within closer ranges than artillery rounds. Their relative simplicity, versatility and ability to lay down high rates of fire, are just some of the attributes making them an essential complement to an effective fighting force.

Tim Guest