Protecting NATO’s East European flank

Despite decisions made during the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius, Europe’s eastern flank remains threatened, and the Russians continue their hostile actions. If the Kremlin achieves its military plans, the situation will become even more challenging.

There is noticeable unease and uncertainty on NATO’s East European flank. This arises from several fundamental reasons. Firstly, despite significant losses and minimal strategic accomplishments, the Russians do not intend to end the war in Ukraine and are prepared to continue fighting. The Ukrainians are running out of ammunition, while the Russians have a decisive advantage in the air and in electronic warfare. This is in addition to their superiority in artillery, which is greatly helped by their ammunition availability. According to CNN, Russia produces approximately 250,000 artillery shells per month, almost three times more than the United States and Europe yield for Ukraine. “The Ukrainians are not running out of courage and tenacity. They’re running out of ammunition, and we’re running out of time to help them,” warned CIA director William Burns during a hearing in Congress.

Secondly, Central and Eastern Europe perceives the lack of decisive rearmament among Western allies as alarming. A concern is – should Donald Trump be re-elected as the next US President in November 2024 – that Europe might lose at least part of the US security umbrella. This concern is bolstered by his announced willingness to make concessions to Russia. Thirdly, Central and Eastern Europe is observing with concern the waning interest of Western Europe and raising challenges in the United States with regard to the military support for Ukraine. There are already voices asking whether, in a crisis situation, American politicians will vote to support Eastern Europe? Or, will Germany change its cautious policy and actively support its allies?

The region is trying to mobilise the West once again, as Russia will not give up its aggressive ambitions. The lack of Western action is perceived by the Kremlin as weakness, and as an opportunity. “The Kremlin is playing with open cards when it comes to its own goals, both towards Kyiv and – more broadly – the international order in this part of the world,” warned Wojciech Konończuk, a political scientist at the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW). “Official statements confirming this fact could be quoted at length, but the most striking example may be the words of Dmitry Medvedev – once the personification of Western hope for the liberalisation of Russia – stating that there was and will be no Ukraine.

An good example of current moods in the region can be seen with recent events around Lithuania. In March 2024, Vilnius questioned whether, in the event of a conflict, Poland – its closest ally with significant military potential – would be able to send rapid military assistance due to legal constraints. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk avoided giving a clear answer, which is significant in itself. During his visit to Vilnius, he only assured Lithuanians of Polish solidarity. The Polish Ministry of National Defence stated that “There are no regulations prohibiting support for any NATO ally.” The uncertainty on the Lithuanian side remains unresolved.

An important topic in the region is the selection of a new NATO Secretary General, who will replace Jens Stoltenberg this year. This is a significant disappointment for Eastern Europe: the region had hoped for a candidate from outside Western Europe, but this seems unlikely to happen. “NATO was supposed to mature to the point where someone from our Eastern Flank would finally lead it,” said Polish journalist Jerzy Haszczyński from the Rzeczpospolita daily. “First, we were second-class when it came to sending Western soldiers and equipment to the Eastern Flank. The big war changed that. However, we remained second-class when it comes to leading the Alliance.”

Former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who did not even seek any support from Central and Eastern Europe states (CEE), is seen as a candidate chosen only because he will not be controversial for Russia. Candidates from the region were Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas and Latvian Foreign Minister Krisjanis Karins. They are decidedly more resolute towards Russia than Rutte, who has support from the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Presumably, this is why they were not even considered at all by NATO ambassadors in the informal process parallel to consultations with leaders.

However, this choice may be blocked by Hungary. Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó openly admitted that Budapest would not support Rutte, who has long been a critic of Viktor Orban’s government. More opposition from CEE countries to Rutte’s candidacy is anticipated. According to Stuart Lau, Correspondent for POLITICO Europe, “the Baltic countries are unhappy about Rutte’s lack of commitment on Dutch defence spending, while Romanian President Klaus Iohannis is displeased with the Netherlands’ long-standing resistance to his country’s joining the Schengen zone. Last month [February 2024], Iohannis told allies he had decided to challenge Rutte”.

The Russian threat

Russia is consistently perceived as an existential threat by majority of states located on NATO’s Eastern flank (the exceptions are Hungary and, since the end of 2023 Slovakia, while Bulgaria’s approach remains mixed). For example, in February 2024, Lithuania – which shares a direct border with Belarus – warned that “Russia is preparing for a long-term confrontation with NATO and has embarked on a major reform of its Armed Forces. Its full implementation will take from at least several years to a decade.” The same perception is shared by Romania, which considers Russia a threat to the entire Black Sea region, including Moldova. Bucharest has been concerned with a scenario in which Russia occupies Ukraine and then moves into Moldova; for context, in 2022, when the Russian offensive against Ukraine collapsed, there was an idea to send American, Polish, and British troops to Moldova – with the consent of the local government. Romania is expected to spend EUR 8 billion on defence in 2024, which is 25% higher than in 2023. Since Russia’s military attack on Ukraine, Bucharest has committed to allocate 2.5% of its GDP to defence.

NATO’s Eastern flank remains threatened, and the Russians continue their hostile actions. For instance, in February 2024, Poland again experienced significant disruption to GPS. A few days earlier, Estonia reported similar disruption in the Baltic Sea region. Both Lithuania and Latvia reported the same problem. In 2023, Russian Tu-22M3 strategic bombers conducted five flights over the Baltic Sea, compared to none in 2022. Another issue observed in the region is the reported deployment of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia to Belarus. According to unconfirmed reports, in late 2023, Belarus received tactical nuclear bombs that could be carried by Su-24M tactical bombers (Belarus previously withdrew these in 2012). Minsk has also prepared the infrastructure required for intercontinental RS-12M ‘Topol’ missiles, although it is believed that if such weapons were to appear in Belarus, this would only be under the control of Russian military forces.

Earlier, in December 2022, Belarus received 9K720 Iskander launchers from Russia (with at least two types of missiles: ballistic 9M723 and cruise 9M728). Taking into account the range of Iskander systems (at least 500 km), the threat of tactical nuclear strike from Moscow will cover the western part of Ukraine and Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and partially also the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova.

Both Russia and Belarus have increased direct military pressure against Poland. Russian aircraft are intercepted by NATO jets on a regular basis. In 2023, NATO fighters were scrambled more than 300 times to intercept Russian military aircraft approaching Alliance airspace, with most intercepts occurring over the Baltic Sea. One of the most recent incidents occurred in March 2024, when two French Mirage 2000-5 aircraft intercepted two Russian Su-30M jets and one An-72 transport aircraft in international waters north of Poland.

Finally, another important aspect of the threat as perceived in the region is the migration pressure artificially created by Russia and its ally Belarus. Warsaw reacted in mid-2023 deploying over a thousand additional soldiers to Podlasie in northeastern Poland, mainly from the 12th and 17th Mechanised Brigades. Additional vehicles, including ‘Poprad’ wheeled anti-aircraft missile systems and ‘Rosomak’ wheeled APCs/IFVs, were also deployed. Another 500 police officers, along with horses, dogs, and special units (BOA), were sent to reinforce the Polish Border Guard (SG), which already had 5,000 officers in the region. The SG is increasing the number of weapons at its eastern outposts – patrols are now equipped not only with handguns but also with larger firearms. This was a response to media reports about the deployment of the Wagner Group to Belarus. Even manipulated photos surfaced on the internet, purportedly showing members of the Wagner Group posing near Polish border markers.

Recent activities

An important moment in building security in the region was the NATO Summit in Vilnius in July 2023. Defence plans were adopted for three regions, including the Baltic Sea and Central Europe. NATO plans reportedly also contain details of defence for the so-called Suwałki Gap and the Brzeska Gate. The former is a narrow strip of land between Poland and Lithuania, sandwiched between Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast and Belarus. Its maintenance is crucial for NATO to provide ground support to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The Brzeska Gate, on the other hand, is a stretch of land about 80 km wide in Poland and Belarus. It is a strategically important area that separates Belarus from Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave.

However, the concept of stationing forces in the region, for which the CEE countries were advocating, has not been changed. NATO has maintained its rotational presence of battalion-sized battle groups in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, which can be rapidly – at least according to assumptions – expanded to brigade-size forces. A compromise formula for allocating NATO forces with increased readiness to individual CEE countries was adopted in Madrid in June 2022. Those forces are expected to reach 300,000 troops. CEE states are currently engaged in a dialogue with the framework nations of the NATO battle groups (Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom) regarding their involvement on the Eastern flank. At the same time, a NATO-Ukraine Education, Analysis, and Training Centre is being established in Bydgoszcz, Poland, following a decision made by NATO member states in February 2024. The centre will focus on collecting experiences from the war in Ukraine and providing support to Kyiv.

In the region, much space in the press is devoted to Germany’s difficulties in effectively establishing a brigade in Lithuania (up to 5,000 troops). Germany and Lithuania aim to achieve full operational readiness of a new unit that is to be stationed in Lithuania by 2027 (it is expected to be formed in 2025). For this purpose, extensive infrastructure is to be developed in the village of Rudniki near Vilnius and in Rukla near Kaunas. Currently, Lithuania faces problems in providing adequate infrastructure.

All three Baltic states are increasing their defence expenditures. Estonia reached 2% of its GDP in 2015, while Lithuania and Latvia achieved the same goal in 2018. Estonia plans to spend up to 2.9% on defence in 2024. Latvia and Lithuania are aiming to reach 2.5% by 2025.

At the same time, the media are drawing attention to France’s growing position in CEE (especially in Latvia and Estonia), which is a significant element of President Emmanuel Macron’s strategy. This is quite surprising, as this region had been neglected by France since 1989. Author Marcin Giełzak, highlighted Macron’s assistance to Ukraine: “If we compare the data known from the German press with what the Ukrainians themselves say, it quickly becomes apparent that the real value of the assistance and commitments provided is about 10 times higher than commonly reported in Germany. It is also important to know that market value does not equate to combat value. Caesar artillery or SCALP-EG missiles are invaluable to Ukraine, as is assistance that is difficult to quantify, such as the involvement of French satellites in providing Ukrainian targets of Russian origin. The key now is for Paris to go further and send a second SAMP/T battery or Mirage-2000 aircraft.”

In January 2024, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have signed an agreement to construct bunkers on the border with Russia and Belarus, forming the so-called Baltic Defence Line. A total of 600 bunkers will be built, each capable of accommodating 10 people along with equipment. The project is worth roughly EUR 60 million. Construction work is set to begin in January 2025. A similar plan is announced by Poland, which, despite the ongoing war for two years, has done nothing to create an effective civil defence. Hundreds of shelters built during the Cold War period remain inactive. It was only in March 2024 that initiatives were launched to support the construction of shelters by local governments. Additionally, the Polish military plans to build fortifications on the border.

NATO’s frontline states are increasingly discussing the possibility of mining the border with Russia. Definite voices come, for example, from Estonia. The use of landmines is prohibited under the Ottawa Treaty of 1997. However, there are voices suggesting that the document was signed against a backdrop of completely different international realities, and that minefields would be a significant factor in slowing down any future Russian troop assault. This would be critical, especially for the most vulnerable states that lack strategic depth – Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. It is noteworthy that mines are widely used by both Ukrainians and Russians.

What next?

“From many of our European partners, we hear that they should have believed us earlier when we warned about the Russian threat. Now, it is necessary to maintain this attention and understanding that countries with their history with Russia and knowledge should play the role of experts. We must keep our eyes wide open and cannot return to any illusions, to trading, or befriending with the true aggressor”, Deputy Speaker and Member of Parliament of Latvia Zanda Kalnina-Lukaševica said in February 2024. However, CEE countries are afraid that the administration of Joe Biden (in case of his re-election) will clandestinely pressure the region to support the idea of starting peace talks with Russia. Regional representatives believe that such peace would mean giving Russia more time to rebuild its potential and further divide European unity. As a result, CEE will become even more vulnerable.

It is therefore no wonder that CEE countries are modernising their armed forces. For example, Estonia will receive an additional 12 Korean K9 self-propelled howitzers (totalling 36). Lithuania, which already has 21 ex-German PzH 2000s, has also purchased 18 French Caesar wheeled howitzers. These three countries will also receive a total of 20 HIMARS launchers. While Estonia and Lithuania procured Polish ‘Piorun’ short-range portable air-defence launchers, Latvia purchased Swedish RBS-70NG. In June 2022, the defence ministers of Latvia and Estonia signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding joint procurement of short-range air defence systems, and Lithuania is in talks to increase the number of NASAMS batteries it already possesses.

In mid-March 2024, another batch of three K2GF (‘Gap filler’) tanks arrived in Poland from South Korea, bringing Poland’s total to 31 K2s received, out of a total of 180 ordered, with deliveries planned to run between 2022 and 2025. It is expected that Poland will receive a further 53 K2s in 2024. These are critical deliveries, as Poland continues to fill equipment gaps created by the transfer of over 250 T-72 tanks, 30-60 PT-91s, and 14 Leopard 2A4s to Ukraine. Lithuania, which is now discussing the procurement of an additional 120 Boxer/Vilkas wheeled vehicles, will also receive Leopard 2 tanks. Latvia will receive NSM anti-ship coastal missiles.

A key challenge for the future is the fact that despite losses incurred in the war with Ukraine, Russia consistently pursues plans to increase the capabilities of its armed forces. Defeating Ukraine (“demilitarisation and denazification”), as well as preparing a response to Finland and Sweden joining NATO, are priority goals presented by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu in December 2023. NATO, primarily the US, is unequivocally referred to as an enemy of Russia.

It seems that in the near future NATO’s Eastern flank will face additional Russian military units. The Leningrad Military District, which along with the Moscow Military District will replace the Western Military District, will be the location for the 6th Combined Arms Army. The 14th and 44th Army Corps are being formed along the border with Finland, and the 11th Army Corps will operate in the Kaliningrad Oblast. According to Russian propaganda, this is a reaction to “NATO’s efforts to build its military potential near Russia’s borders, as well as the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance to include Finland and Sweden.”

The number of Russian armed forces is expected to increase to 1.3 million soldiers (in 2021, it was 900,000). According to official data shared by the Warsaw-based Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Russian defence expenditures increased by 36% in 2023 compared to 2022. Russia allocated 32% of state expenditures to defence, which accounted for approximately 6% of GDP (in 2021, it was 4% of GDP). In 2024-2025, it plans to allocate 6% of GDP for this purpose, which is the highest indicator since the dissolution of the USSR.

“Russia is systematically preparing for a long-term confrontation with NATO member states, as evidenced by the increasing ideological factor and the ongoing militarisation of society, especially among the youth. Therefore, in the coming years, we should not expect a change in Russia’s foreign and security policy, which will continue to rely on military strength,” predicted Anna Maria Dyner, an analyst focussing on the Russian security policy at PISM. Dyner added, “If Russia succeeds in implementing Shoigu’s reform, and military actions in Ukraine do not result in significant losses, the Alliance may face a confrontation with a mass army in the Soviet style, which will be technologically weaker (except for the ability to conduct electronic warfare and long-range strikes), but will possess significant military potential and relatively good training.”

Therefore, it is crucial for the entirety of NATO – not just its eastern flank – to actually implement defence plans, as well as increase defence expenditures, aimed at a clear enhancement of combat capabilities. The time for inaction has already ended. According to Jacek Siewiera, Head of the Polish President’s National Security Bureau (BBN), “to avoid a war with Russia, the countries of the eastern flank of NATO have 3 years to prepare for confrontation.”

Robert Czulda