The sale of Pakistani fighter jets to Azerbaijan has been the subject of recurring speculation since 2007; the story resurfaced on 21 February 2024.
The information initially circulated on social media and was soon picked up by mainstream outlets. This author was able to independently confirm the credibility of the story with sources in both Baku and Islamabad. For the first time, and after years of speculation, the stars seem to have aligned for this deal: Azerbaijan urgently needs a jet fighter and Pakistan’s offer is convincing, with the value of the deal widely shared as being USD 1.6 billion.
The Russian vacuum and the Pakistani offer
According to the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), Azerbaijan’s largest supplier of arms has historically been Russia. That can no longer be the case. The war in Ukraine means that every country around the world with a fleet of vintage Soviet era and Russian jet fighter frames is looking for replacements. Azerbaijan has repeatedly upgraded its fleet of MiG-21s, MiG-29s, SU-24s, and SU-25s. The median airframe age of this fleet is well above 30 years old, and Russian can no longer be relied upon for either spare parts or ammunition. In this context, investing in Russia’s fifth generation of Su-57 or Su-75 aircraft is highly unlikely.
The JF-17 Block III (Thunder) is a joint venture between China Aviation Industry Corporation (AVIC) and the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC). Chinese systems make the aircraft a system with a claim to 4.5 generation credentials. Pakistan’s offer appears to be a qualitative leap forward compared to Azerbaijan’s current fleet and will transform the nature of aerial combat in the Caucasus.
Credit: PAC
The latest Block III version of the ‘Thunder’ entered service in 2023; Pakistan claims improved capabilities, not least due to a wide-angle holographic head-up display system. Furthermore, there are several features contributing to beyond-vision capability. The fighter is equipped with a KLJ-7A X-band 3D active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. The second version of this radar allows the pilot to lock on to multiple targets at over 150 km in range. Finally, the Thunder is able to carry long-range (220–300 km) guided missiles such as the PL-15, which change the profile of the platform. In the words of former Vice Chief of the Pakistani Air Force Saeed Khan, “close aerial combat is no more a matter of comparison any more between fighters; today it is not Fox 1 [semi-active radar guided] or 2 [infrared homing] that are important, but Fox 3 [active radar homing] that is going to decide the fate of the battle”, referring to the beyond-visual range capability of the platform.
Another important detail is that the Thunder also features an Aselpod targeting pod on its centreline hardpoint made by Turkey’s Aselsan. According to Professor of International Relations at Kadir Has University (Istanbul), Serhat Guvenc, Turkey may be the future supplier of the jet fighter’s engine.
The Thunder has already been sold to Nigeria and Myanmar and there are apparently advanced negotiations with Iraq. The Arab state has been offered 12 jet fighters for USD 664 million, which means that for USD 1.6 billion, Azerbaijan would be able to renew its whole fleet and establish the infrastructure required and train a new generation of pilots.
It is clear that buying a fighter platform is all about a relationship, and not just a one-off sale. Pakistan is offering an aircraft that is competitive in a range of fighting environments, at a good price, with guarantees of supply chain resilience against the threat of possible sanctions.
The Three Brothers and the JF-17 stopgap solution
The sale of Pakistani fighters to Azerbaijan has been at the heart of recurring speculation for over a decade. The relationship is diplomatically strategic. Pakistan was the second country (after Turkey) to recognise Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991. The three states have since been referred to as “The Three Brothers.” Characteristically, Armenia blocked Pakistan’s association with the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2017 due to Baku’s close ties to Islamabad.
Credit: SSB
Pakistan has also been a fervent supporter of Azerbaijan vis-à-vis Armenia, particularly over the question of Nagorno-Karabakh. Islamabad dispatched military advisors to Azerbaijan during the 44-day Second Karabakh War of 2020 that changed the territorial status quo. Pakistan’s Army Chief General Syed Asim Munir visited Baku in November 2023, where he met President Aliyev. According to the former Royal United Services Institute Southeast Asia analyst, Umer Karim, this ‘out-of-protocol’ meeting was a tell-tell sign that a major deal was brewing.
Azerbaijan is of course committed to Turkey’s TAI Kaan 5th generation fighter. Launched in 2010, the programme is currently Ankara’s indigenous jet fighter programme and its sole option. Following its removal from the US F-35 programme in 2019, Turkey has been unable to secure a 4.5 to 5th generation jet fighter. Neither Turkey nor Azerbaijan can turn to France for a fighter; Sweden is also an unlikely choice and Germany has blocked the sale of the Eurofighter to Ankara. Consequently, Turkey and Azerbaijan will need a stopgap solution to cover the period from approximately 2024 to 2033, by which time the first lot of Block-1 Kaan aircraft are due to have been delivered.
That solution may not be the same for both states. The Pakistani JF-17 Block III (Thunder) is often referred to as an evolution of the J-7 Chinese platform (MiG-21) and is heavily reliant on Chinese systems, while Turkey is dependent on NATO compatible platforms. As noted by the military analyst and war correspondent in Baku, Heydar Mirza, the reliance of the JF-17 Block III on Chinese systems is not politically problematic for Azerbaijan.
The Three Brothers and the Kaan Platform
As noted by Professor Guvenc, the Three Brothers have a different “path dependency.” Pakistan can look to China more so than Turkey. In significant ways, the baseline expectations of Turkish and Pakistani pilots are laid on the foundation of their common workhorse, the US-made F-16. For different reasons, neither Pakistan nor Turkey have been able to upgrade their F-16 platforms, although in the beginning of 2024 Turkey formally penned a deal with Washington for the upgrade of 70 F-16s to Block-70, as well as the acquisition of 40 new units. Still, this stopgap measure could be problematic as delivery may yet be delayed for years.
Credit: PAC
Pakistan is taking a different path, creating a platform that has more scope for customisation, allowing states that buy into the JF-17 Block III programme to make use of missile systems they have in stock. In line with Pakistan’s non-aligned defence culture, Azerbaijan is making a bigger break with tradition, acquiring a non-Russian platform for the first time. Baku is gaining a cheaper platform appropriate for the theatre where it will be deployed. However, the added value of the JF-17 deal is that it deepens the multi-layered relationship of the military-industrial complex emerging between Pakistan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.
Discussing the Azerbaijan deal with former Vice Chief Saeed Khan, one understands that the JF-17 Block III platform has been informed by the experience of fighting the Indian Air Force. Pakistani pilots have primarily been facing Indian, and to a lesser extent, Iranian adversaries, acquiring experience vis-à-vis a fleet of French and Russian jet fighters, but also dealing with an array of indigenous and Russian legacy surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. This experience is part of Pakistan’s sales pitch.
Pakistani pilots have both flown and engaged many fighter platforms that Azerbaijani pilots are likely to come up against. Pakistani pilots have also encountered many of the SAMs that Armenian or Iranian pilots would be likely to use against Azerbaijani pilots. Finally, the training of Azerbaijani pilots will be more cost-effective, as the Pakistani platforms are not only cheaper to acquire, but also to fly, allowing operators to build up more flight hours.
The contribution of Pakistani developers in the Kaan project has been widely publicised. Turkey’s Deputy Minister of Defence Celal Sami Tüfekci stated in an announcement on 2 August 2023 that as many as 200 Pakistani officials and engineers were already involved in the Kaan programme. Another implicit advantage of this specific procurement is that the ‘Three Brothers’ have been integrating their tactical and strategic practice with the use of Turkish drone systems. Turkey’s Kaan programme is now experimenting with the idea of a ‘loyal wingman’ drone. This can now be tested in a range of different terrains and against a range of technologies, acquiring data to improve performance.
The strategic significance of the sale
Buying into a fighter platform is buying into a relationship. Although Baku has always recognised Russia’s claim to regional power status, Azerbaijan is not a member of CSTO and remains fervently non-aligned. The country prefers the plurinational “3+3” diplomatic framework. Azerbaijan is not alone in this approach and in this context the acquisition of the JF-17 may be seen as a test case. As Russia’s procurement infrastructure withers, Uzbekistan and other members of the Organisation of Turkic States are seen as possible next-in-line clients.
Credit: PAC
The JF-17 platform is designed to provide significant beyond-vision capability and a first-target edge in theatres that do not have the resources to acquire state-of-the art Western systems. Pakistan is looking to fill a widening Russian vacuum and is providing a sanctions-resilient value chain that can be customised to accommodate a wide range of ammunition. The JF-17 platform has generally been offered to states that are politically non-aligned, have moderate or limited economic means, and see the possibility of Western sanctions as a real possibility. Myanmar and Nigeria were the first two clients, Iraq looks to be next, and according to two Pakistani sources, Argentina was also a possible client until the recent change of government.
Like all modern platforms, the JF-17 platform is modular, with potential for ever-increasing Turkish input. The Turkish modules are tested and evolve within the platform without compromising the integrity of NATO’s data ecosystem, as noted by Professor Guvenc. Furthermore, the Pakistani deal contributes to the deepening of the emerging military-industrial complex emerging between the three states. The platform may indeed be a stopgap solution in anticipation of the Kaan 5th generation fighter. For the moment though, it is a timely stopgap filling the ever-widening Russian vacuum in an increasingly multipolar world, where plurinational cooperation without multilateral strings attached may become the new norm.
Ilya Roubanis