Collaborative Combat Aircraft: Buy ‘em cheap and stack ‘em high

During the latest Air & Space Forces Association (AFA) Warfare Symposium in Aurora, Colorado on 12 February 2024, USAF Secretary Frank Kendall presented his plans for a deep restructuring of his department. Kendall and Air & Space Force leaders announced sweeping changes to the USAF’s whole organisation, including its manning, readiness and weapons development. These changes are aimed at increasing overall readiness, gaining a competitive edge in warfare, and primarily seem geared toward China.

To be precise, with regards to the “re-optimisation for intensifying great power competition with China”, as Kendall emphasised during a conversation with AFA President and CEO Lt Gen (ret.) Bruce ‘Orville’ Wright, “The goal is to strengthen overall operational readiness and ensure that we have the right capabilities to fight against US adversaries.” He pointed to a theoretical, though still possible conflict – either from a Chinese military attack on Taiwan, or from mutual miscalculations that could escalate – and said such changes were long overdue. “We are running out of time,” he repeated. Subsequently, operational squadrons are now set to be reorganised into ‘action units’, each designated a ‘Deployable Combat Wing’, ‘In-Place Combat Wing’ or ‘Combat Generation Wing’. “We will ensure our deployable wings have everything they need to fight successfully as a unit,” Kendall stressed.

Initially outnumbered

On the first day of a hypothetical air war with China towards the end of the 2020s, things do not look pretty for the USAF. The US’ next-generation fighter jet, now in the final stages of a competitive selection process under the USAF Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) programme, or the US Navy’s FA/XX programme, could well have made progress by then, but would likely still not be operationally available for some years. Worse, a Chinese Air Force (PLAAF) operating close to home has a fleet with advantages in numbers and perhaps quality in certain key capability areas.

To regain this advantage, US airpower strategists are turning to a new type of aerial weapon system – the so-called ‘Collaborative Combat Aircraft’ (CCA), often referred to as ‘loyal wingmen’. By accompanying and supporting US fighters and bombers as a kind of stealthy ‘vanguard’, this family of low-observable unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) with varying capabilities and costs, and featuring advanced autonomy, could help to offset China’s definite advantages in initial numbers and partial advantages in quality. Thus, the second realisation is that this business is, or will be primarily focused on air-to-air combat, and therefore primarily about taking out the PLAAF’s force multipliers.

These – currently a handful of each – are Il-78 MD/TD tankers, Tu-154M and Y-8- and Y-9-based electronic intelligence (ELINT) aircraft, as well as their airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) fleet, including the propeller-driven KJ-200 and KJ-500, as well as their four jet-powered KJ-2000 aircraft. Towards the end of the 2020s, a new Chinese AEW&C aircraft based on the new Y-20 transport aircraft platform is likely to be in service.

Of course, the PLAAF will presumably defend these key assets with their many J-10, J-11, J-15, J-16 and J-20 fighters, along with their naval J-35 fighters. Additionally, these fighters would be expected to target the equivalent US opposing force AEW&C aircraft with their J-20 fighter using its PL-17 ultra-long-range beyond visual range (BVR) missiles. As such, these would make good targets for targets for CCA UCAVS carrying AIM-120C/D AMRAAMs. CCA strikes against ground-based threats are likely in a secondary SEAD/DEAD capacity, but would probably be primarily for lower-cost CCA types, or those operating in a loitering munition capacity. However, for loyal wingmen to stay ‘loyal’, they will need to be secured against cyber-attacks to avoid being neutralised, turned around, or captured, as was the case when Iran successfully captured a US RQ-170 over its airspace on 5 December 2011, purportedly the result of a cyber-attack.

Wargaming CCA

The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies recently gained some interesting findings regarding the concept of these CCAs. Under its dean, former Operation Desert Storm air campaign planner, Lt Gen (ret.) David Deptula, 60 players from the AFA, USAF, industry and scientific fields, conducted a wargame in early February 2024 named The Need for Collaborative Combat Aircraft for Disruptive Air Warfare. Its rules were framed around Beijing seeking to match the capabilities of the most established aerospace powers and focused on developing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, with an eye toward negating any possible threat to their dominance in the Western Pacific.

Before starting, the wargamers agreed that CCAs should be additive and complementary to next-generation crewed combat aircraft, but should not replace them. They also agreed that CCAs will be needed at a large scale in a peer conflict, because typically, only one-third of a deployed inventory of manned combat aircraft will be available 24/7 to execute missions. Applying those numbers to the USAF’s F-22 inventory (after former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates capped their numbers in 2009) of 100 combat-coded ‘Raptors’, illustrates how an air warfare commander could have about 30 of these low-observable fighters ready for missions at any given time, assuming all 100 would be deployed. Of course, there would also be a larger number of F-35s available by US and allied forces, with better sensors, but a lesser focus on air-to-air combat than the ‘Raptor’. These would be callud upon to face many hundreds of PLAAF fighters on the opposing side.

It is therefore no wonder that the USAF is planning to field an initial tranche of up to 1,000 CCAs, though that number could grow. Initial plans envision a thrust range of 1,361-3,629 kgf (3,000-8,000 lbs) for them to fly and fight alongside manned fighters, to augment combat operations, conduct surveillance and likely – as some are considered expendable – to draw enemy fire. Kendall said he wanted their production to start by FY 2028 and on 24 January 2024, it was disclosed that five companies had been contracted to design and build CCAs: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, General Atomics and Anduril.

The players at the Mitchell Institute were divided into five groups. Three ‘blue teams’ represented US forces with different detailed tasks, but the same operational goal – preventing PLA forces from securing and maintaining air superiority over the South China Sea. A ‘red team’, which deployed Chinese forces and responded to the attackers’ moves on the first day, while a ‘white team’ awarded points to either side. The ‘blues’ were provided with a considerable CCA stockpile from 10 different classes, either air-launched in their tens from three B-52s, or later from B-21s, as well as two released from 10 F-15EXs, and a further 60 took off from ground bases on islands. All of these flew together or ahead of eight F-22s and 16 F-35s. The most surprising conclusion was: “Buy ‘em cheap and stack ‘em high.”

Given the choice between generic CCA types and a notional budget, all three ‘blue teams’ in the first waves opted for 100+ lower-end CCAs that were barely larger than cruise missiles, though large enough to carry two AMRAAMs or GBU-53/B StormBreaker bombs. These had a range greater than 1,204 km (650 NM) at high subsonic speeds, and it was not expected that many of the aircraft (notionally with a price-tag of USD 2–15 million each) would return. By contrast, the most sophisticated and expensive (notionally costing USD 30–40 million) two or three CCA types in the exercise, featuring advanced active and passive targeting sensors, were not requested in the first phase at all!

In the end, the ‘reds’ could not establish their denial-umbrella. Overall, the wargame was therefore claimed to have substantiated recommendations for developing a CCA force that would disrupt and defeat Chinese operations to control the air. It also became clear that new concepts are required to operate CCAs alongside crewed and other uncrewed aircraft for counter-air missions. Limiting CCAs to performing only as adjuncts to crewed aircraft could constrain their combat potential. Moreover, those ‘cheaper’ CCAs carrying two air-to-air missiles (AAMs) should be designed with at least enough survivability and mission systems to ensure they will be able to complete their kill chains in highly contested environments. The larger and costlier systems with what is called ‘affordable combat mass’ – carrying up to six AAMs – can no longer be regarded as ‘expendable’.

A realisation has evidently arrived, that any UCAV with sufficient performance to be a ‘wingman’ is too costly to be sacrificed in numbers, so the suggested approach has changed from just accepting their losses to managing procurement and operating costs. However, in general the wargame confirmed that advances in autonomy and other uncrewed technologies have created a unique opportunity to augment the lethality of 5th and 6th generation fighters with various CCAs designed to disrupt and defeat counter-air operations, such as those expected to be rolled out by China.

A common trend

The shift towards collaborative UCAVs is of course not only happening in the US. The Franco-German-Spanish SCAF and the Italian-Japanese-UK-led Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), have both committed to a ‘system of systems’ approach, with manned fighters operating alongside unmanned companions equipped with sensors and effectors, in ways that previous combat aircraft have not been capable of doing.

In this context, BAE has revealed a new version of its ‘Concept 2’ UCAV, and there are also the recently flown Turkish Anka-3 low-observable UCAV or Saab’s wind tunnel-tested UCAV design with internal weapons bays, as well as the Chinese GJ-11 or India’s ‘Ghatak’. With regards to India, at the November 2023 Dubai Air Chiefs’ Conference, Indian Air Force (IAF) Air Marshal R. Radhish warned attendees he would be ‘lying’ if he said his country’s vision for a family of combat-teaming drones would be realised sooner than 10 to 20 years from now. Perhaps he was referring to India’s overly-complex acquisition processes, but at the same time, this timescale might also provide a reality check for the ambitions of the USAF and others.

Georg Mader