Protected mobility in a post-GWOT world

With Western militaries increasingly re-orienting themselves toward peer conflict, what role will protected mobility vehicles play in this post-global war on terror (GWOT) world?

Western militaries involved in the GWOT from 2001 found themselves adapting from the high-intensity warfighting stance that they were built around to low intensity, long lasting campaigns. A series of deployments took western troops to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021, Iraq from 2003 to 2011, and again from 2014.^[1] French forces headed to Mali in 2013 and were soon followed by a coalition of European and African states as well as the US.^[2] With the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), US troops were deployed to Syria in 2014 alongside the aforementioned deployment to Iraq.^[3] Turkish troops were sent to Syria from 2016 and re-entered periodically to combat insurgents and Syrian proxies.^[4] In Egypt, a deadly counter-insurgency campaign in the Sinai peninsula has consumed forces and limited resources since 2011, and the Saudi-led coalition’s deployment to Yemen from 2015 saw heavy fighting against the well-armed Ansar Allah (Houthi movement).^[5]

All of these conflicts have shared characteristics; most involve the use of heavy armour and airpower to overwhelm the opponents – often referred to as ‘sub-peers’ – before a prolonged period of deployed forces trying to locate and defeat their opponents, as well as stabilise the security situation in the country. Every force that has found itself in this scenario has adopted protected mobility platforms as the primary means of battlespace mobility. At one end of the extreme, the US mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) programme procured more than 27,000 vehicles from 2006 to around 2012, and led to the development of the M-ATV and its successor the JLTV.^[6] At the other end, militaries have placed small but notable orders for protected mobility platforms from companies that specialise in these vehicle types, such as Nurol Makina and Nimr.

Vehicles in this class dominated procurements for land forces during this period of counter-insurgency warfare. The need for them was clear; an IED blast against a Land Rover or HMMWV would almost always produce fatalities. Especially if it included an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) as was the case in Iraq from 2005.^[7] Those vehicles capable of withstanding larger IED blasts as well as the small arms fire of the ambushes that often attended them were deemed too threatening, too damaging for wars that were as much about winning over the population, as they were about killing enemies. Out of these requirements came protected mobility platforms of many different shapes and sizes, they were pivotal to ensuring survivability of land forces during extended deployments that could involve frequent firefights and IED strikes. However, the world that is now emerging after the GWOT is different. The potential for war with Russia in Europe requires a wholesale return to the conventional war-fighting equipment and force postures of the early 1990s. The US Marine Corps is adapting a unique approach to the spectre of a war with China in the Pacific, as Washington considers a drawdown of its land forces in the Middle East. So, what role do protected mobility platforms play in the new world they inhabit? There appear to be three; rear echelon mobility in a high intensity war, reconnaissance and networking functions, and the patrols and counter-insurgency for which they were designed.

Design basics

It is worth considering the design principles of protected mobility platforms. Unlike a tank or infantry fighting vehicle, the ‘iron triangle’ is skewed heavily to favour mobility and protection. Lethality is a distant consideration and in many cases is provided either by the infantry inside the vehicle, or a remote weapon station (RWS) on its roof. The protection levels vary, but are limited by end user requirements and physics to ballistic protection up to 14.5 mm heavy machine guns (HMGs) and underbody blast protection up to an explosive mass of 10 kg. The number of troops a vehicle has to carry, and the way in which it is protected from these threats dictates its size and weight, which in turn impacts its mobility and the steps that have to be taken to provide the required levels of on-road and off-road mobility. Some designs favoured protection over mobility; the MaxxPro Plus for example, was developed to have increased engine power and additional load bearing wheels on its rear axle so that the Frag Kit 6 EFP armour could be fitted.^[8]

The eight troops that a Cougar 6×6 MRAP is designed to carry results in a vehicle 7.5 m long with a turning circle in excess of 8 m.^[9] Its survivability against the threats encountered in Iraq was more than sufficient, however its length made turning in some cities a challenge. The majority of protected mobility platforms employ a V-shaped hull to reduce the effects of an underbody blast on the vehicle’s occupants. The V-shape is typically built using hardened steel that provides a mix of hardness and strength, allowing it to absorb blast energy without cracking or deforming too significantly. The V-shape itself disperses the energy of a mine or IED blast, which can help prevent the vehicle from tipping or rolling and reduces the amount of force imparted to those inside.

Ballistic protection is provided by the armoured steel used to make the hull in most cases. Where further protection is required, a combination of ceramics and statistical armour are likely to be used. Ceramics such as Light Improved Ballistic Armour (LIBA) from Mofet Etzion can be added at a relatively low increase in weight and provide multi-hit protection from the venerable 14.5 mm HMG.^[10] Through a combination of armour types and considered design, protected mobility vehicles can survive 12.7 mm (.50 cal) rounds from all angles, the Cougar is one example of this. However, non-state actors are often armed with 23 mm air defence cannons used in a ground fire support role, which were proven to be effective against M-ATVs in Yemen.^[11] It is common for protected mobility platforms – especially lighter ones – to employ a protected crew capsule. This concentrates the armour around the crewed areas of the vehicle and leaves little to no armour around the engine and stowage at the rear of the platform. Doing so minimises the vehicle volume that must be protected, which keeps the vehicle weight down. The Eagle IV from what is now General Dynamics European Land Systems (GDELS) typifies this approach. It allows for the crew to be protected from 7.62 armour piercing ammunition fired from Dragunov sniper rifles, and 6 kg mine blasts at a total weight of 8.5 tonnes.^[12]

A further consideration in the design of protected mobility is the chassis or hull construction. Again there are two clear design schools; the hull on chassis, and the monocoque hull. Monocoque hulls are hulls that support the loads and weight of the vehicle using only the structural skin from which it is built. This means that the armour used provides both protection and structure. Automotive components such as the suspension and engine are attached to the monocoque hull. The alternative is to use a chassis to support the loads of the vehicle. The Dingo 2 from KMW uses the Unimog U5000 chassis for instance, whereas the Nurol Makina NMS employs a monocoque hull.^[13] Along with this comes consideration for the engine and suspension, the former are usually diesel and provide a power-to-weight ratio in excess of 20 hp/tonne, and the latter is often independent to allow increased travel and off-road mobility.

Rear echelon survivability

As the fighting in Ukraine settled around the current frontlines, a number of videos began to emerge online showing the results of mine blasts and artillery strikes on unprotected civilian vehicles in the rear of the Ukrainian lines. It is estimated that 107,000 km² of Ukraine are contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance. Russian forces are also known to have mined routes that they expected Ukrainian forces to use as they withdrew from certain areas. Russian artillery is also used to target Ukrainian attempts at force rotation. There is further video evidence to suggest that some rotations were done using civilian vehicles, with unfortunate consequences. Other videos show small teams of Russians ambushing Ukrainian soldiers on quiet roads away from the front. All of this points to the role of protected mobility platforms in rear-echelon security and survivability.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine were familiar with the need for protected mobility in patrolling their borders and operating in what was known as the Anti-Terrorist Operation zone, prior to the invasion. This led to the development of vehicles such as Varta and Novator from Ukrainian Armor, or the Kozak from Practika. Varta was developed in 2014 in response to the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine. It is a 4×4 protected mobility platform originally built using a chassis from Belarusian company Maz, which the company worked to replace with Czech and Ukrainian alternatives. The body is built using hardened steel to provide ballistic protection from 7.62 mm rounds and mine blasts up to 6 kg in explosive mass. The seats and the vehicle design reduce the gravitational acceleration transferred to the crew from 313 g to 16 g, according to the manufacturer. Varta has been continuously revised and developed further into an ambulance variant that entered service and over 200 vehicles had been delivered to the AFU by 2021. Two further variants were explored; one as a drone command vehicle and another called ‘Smereka’ as a mortar platform. Smereka had not entered service by the time Russia invaded, however, Varta has been used extensively during the fighting in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Armor also designed and manufactured the Novator, a smaller 4×4 based on a reinforced Ford F-550 chassis, which entered service in 2019 with Ukraine’s National Guard. Novator is a much lighter vehicle than the 17.5 tonne Varta, and comes in at a total weight of 8 tonnes. It has a top speed of 120 km/h and correspondingly lower levels of armour. Ballistic protection is provided to STANAG 4569 level 1 – protecting against 7.62 × 51 mm NATO ball ammunition fired from 30 m and blast protection from DM51 hand grenades. Nevertheless, it has been used to provide protected mobility and transport for anti-tank guided missile teams using the Ukrainian Stugna-P tripod-launched anti-tank guided missile (ATGM).^[14] In October 2023, the company released an image of a Novator that had been damaged in an anti-tank mine blast.^[15] The crew survived within the armoured capsule and the vehicle was later taken for repairs, the company stated. A revised Novator was presented at the MSPO 2023 exhibition; it used thinner but harder armour to provide greater payload and featured revised blast protection.^[16]

Unfortunately, Ukraine’s dire situation has meant that protected mobility platforms have been put into roles that they are not suited for, including offensive operations across challenging terrain against emplaced and heavily-armed enemy forces. In an action to try and retake the village Novodarivka in 2023, Ukraine committed a mixed company of tanks and MaxxPros. The village was defended by a well-emplaced Russian infantry company supported by at least a company of tanks. As the Ukrainian tanks advanced, they damaged the soil that had been weakened by heavy rain. The MaxxPros following in their wake were unable to traverse the terrain and became bogged down. The vehicles were travelling through a breach in a minefield that meant no vehicles could go around the MRAPs – the column was stuck and vulnerable. The Russians committed their armour at this point, which was able to knock the Ukrainian vehicles out.^[17] Ukraine did not have much choice but to use its MaxxPros in this way, the loss of infantry would have been much greater without them. However, this vignette is useful in demonstrating why tracked platforms can be better suited to offensive operations as their greater off-road mobility should allow them to keep pace with heavy armour even when soil strength is degraded.^[18]

Specialised platforms

Protected mobility clearly has limited use cases when applied to direct engagements within a high-intensity conflict. Their survivability designs are plenty for small arms and mine blasts, which is necessary for rear echelon activities. Against large-calibre high explosive (HE) rounds or ATGMs, however, they are heavily overmatched, and the likelihood of the crew surviving is low.^[19] Nevertheless, they can be developed into effective reconnaissance platforms. For instance, the Swiss Army employs the Eagle V 6×6 platform as the carrier for the Taktische Aufklärungssystem (TASYS) reconnaissance system. In this configuration, the vehicle is fitted with an optoelectronic sight mounted on a telescopic mast and a data processing computer.^[20] An alternative use-case is the indirect fire platform; Nurol Makina has worked on a variant of its Ejder Yalcin that carries the 120 mm Ragnarok mortar from Rheinmetall.^[21] This type of capability would provide rapid indirect fire support, it can be very valuable for units when large calibre artillery is an in-demand asset required by all units and is not immediately available. UAE forces deployed to Aden in 2015 made extensive use of their RG-31 Agrab 120 mm mortar carriers in this role, which provided vital close support to Yemeni units fighting the Houthis.^[22]

There is, however, one additional role in high intensity warfare that protected mobility platforms are very well suited for, and that is sensor networking. The salient example of this is the US Army’s Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node (TITAN), which is a JLTV-based sensor fusion platform. It is designed to provide the tactical element of the programme, a higher echelon service will be provided by an FMTV (Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV)-based platform. TITAN will use artificial intelligence (AI) to provide sensor fusion of assets that would normally be fed into a formation at an operational or strategic level. It is expected to fuse the outputs of multiple layers of sensor data using AI and help in the distribution of targeting recommendations. The system will have the, “ability to access national and commercial space data through Direct Downlink and network connections,” The US Programme Executive Office – Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, Sensors states.^[23] In this role, TITAN will support the ‘deep fight’ by providing targeting recommendations against targets well beyond the battlespace of an infantry battlegroup.

Palantir was awarded a USD 178 million contract for ten of the TITAN ground stations, five each in the JLTV and FMTV configurations in March 2023.^[24] It will integrate technology from Northrop Grumman, Anduril, and L3Harris among others and Palantir has designed the soft- and hardware solution for the programme. The total cost of the project is immense, with USD 486 million in research and development funding allocated between 2022 and 2026.^[25]

The US Army has set itself the goal of long-range precision sensing and is pursuing several programmes in this vein. One example is the High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System (HADES), part of its Multi-Domain Sensing System (MDSS). HADES will be a jet aircraft designed to operate at mid-tier altitudes up to the stratosphere (up to around 12 km in altitude) and it is expected to replace the legacy RC-12 Guardrail platform in providing SIGINT capabilities.^[26] To provide high-altitude sensing segment of MDSS, the Army has launched the High-Altitude Platform-Deep Sensing (HAP/DS) programme. HAP/DS will comprise the high-altitude layer of MDSS, notionally consisting of low-observable high-altitude platforms such as balloon and/or solar fixed-wing aircraft, and operating in the stratosphere (from around 12-50 km in altitude).[27]

On the ground, the US Army is developing the Terrestrial Layer System (TLS) at two echelons, which will provide further long-range sensing capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum. Altogether, these programmes combined with TITAN indicate that the US Army is aiming to develop advanced deep-sensing capabilities through multiple domains and fuse those outputs – where relevant – at the tactical level. TITAN’s AI will include the capacity for automatic target recognition, identification and geolocation, which will help reduce the operator’s burden and improve the speed of decision making against what will surely be a veritable flood of data.

If the programme is realised as envisaged, it would provide the US Army with a potent capability in terms of battlefield situational awareness and target engagements. However, much of its success in combat would rely upon the availability of effectors such as the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) and GMLRS. Without them, or similar precision strike assets, there will be no usable outcome to ‘sensing deep’. Furthermore, the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, and Ukraine’s 2023 counter-offensive indicate that ‘deep strikes’ must be paired very closely with the close fight. For example, Ukraine has proven more than capable of conducting strikes deep into Russia’s rear; from ammunition depots in Ukraine itself, to the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, and against factories located deep into Russia. However, unless those strikes are coordinated with operations on the frontline, it is possible for an opponent to adapt and become resilient to them. This is in part exemplified by Russia’s adjustments to artillery ammunition storage and use of air defence in protecting installations from HIMARS strikes.^[28] Without these adjustments, Ukraine was able to reduce Russia’s artillery advantage by removing ammunition from the supply chain. It is perhaps the case that the scale of deep sensing and striking must match the scale of the opponent; a limited approach combined with a limited offensive may be unlikely to return success. This suggests that the scale of TITAN procurements will have to match the availability of effectors if it is to modernise the US Army’s way of war.

More of the same

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI’s) 2023 yearbook recorded a total of 56 armed conflicts, five more than in 2021. Many of them are regarded as “low intensity” by SIPRI, which the institute considers to be a conflict with less than 1,000 deaths per year.^[29] It recorded several high-intensity conflicts with deaths between 1,000 and 9,999 per year, this category included Brazil and Mexico, as well as large portions of Africa. High intensity conflicts are differentiated from the wars in Ukraine and Myanmar, which are regarded as major armed conflicts. The data indicate the level of violence prevalent in the world as well as its nature. A major war is very much the exception at present, most conflicts – even those leading to a significant loss of life – involve non-state actors and criminal gangs.

It follows that the primary purpose of protected mobility platforms now and in the future will be much the same as it has always been: protect infantry against blasts and IEDs, as well as small arms ambushes as they conduct patrols and operations amongst the population. The smaller platforms, epitomised by the JLTV, will likely dominate unless a large-scale deployment necessitates the broader resumption of duties by platforms in the MaxxPro or Cougar class. There is, of course, the wider question around the skills needed to conduct those types of operation, and the ability of any military to retain and improve upon them while it simultaneously builds and develops its forces to face true existential threats. However, if protected mobility platforms are at least kept within the core equipment of a force, there should be a less dramatic learning curve when forces deploy into low-intensity scenarios.

Outside of patrols and low-intensity warfighting, protected mobility platforms will need to adapt to the needs of a force preparing to fight against peer opponents. In effect, protected mobility platforms will have to adjust to this new context in the same way that conventional heavy armour adapted to the GWOT. This will include adjustments to the mission systems they carry, as is the case with TITAN, it will also require militaries to reconsider how their troops navigate a battlespace.

Overall, it is clear that protected mobility will remain an important and central capability for modern armed forces, regardless of their focus. As a result, the following decade should yield further developments for this platform type. The most challenging in terms of design will be survivability. The design requirements covered above were established before the technology to produce drones had been democratised and when non-state actors were generally organised at a section level. ISIS made extensive use of drones, and was able to coordinate its actions at a company level. Russia, Ukraine, and now Syria are also deploying FPV drones, and many insurgents now have access to ATGMs, all of which raise the risk to protected mobility platforms. All of these threats can be countered, but it is not clear how this will be achieved within the narrow space, weight, and power limits of common protected mobility vehicle designs.

Sam Cranny-Evans

^[1] U.S. withdrawal and the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) | Britannica

^[2] France sets up anti-Islamist force in Africa’s Sahel – BBC News

^[3] America Is Planning to Withdraw From Syria—and Create a Disaster

^[4] Turkey sends tanks into Syria against ISIS; rebels reportedly capture town | CNN

^[5] The Egyptian Military’s Terrorism Containment Campaign in North Sinai – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Yemeni Civil War | Map, Houthi, Saudi Arabia, & Israel | Britannica

^[6] Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Family of Vehicles (FoV)

^[7] Soleimani’s Quds Force saturated Iraq with EFPs, a deadly and advanced IED – The Washington Post

^[8] M1224 MaxxPro MRAP American 4×4 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)

^[9] COUGAR 6X6; COUGAR ISS

^[10] Light Improved Ballistic Armor (LIBA) – Defense Update:

^[11] https://www.amazon.com/25-Days-Aden-Arabian-Forces/dp/1800815093

^[12] Janes Armoured Fighting Vehicles: Wheeled, 2021 – 2022

^[13] DINGO 2 HD Command Post (CP) – KNDS; Nurol Makina Developing New NMS Variants

^[14] Ukrainian Military Demonstrated the Use of the SBA Novator and Skif for the Swift Elimination of Occupiers | Defense Express

^[15] https://tinyurl.com/mr3vvppt

^[16] ​Ukrainian Armor Presents Modernized Novator Armored Vehicle Adapted for New Conditions | Defense Express

^[17] Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive

^[18] The Role of Wheeled Vehicles in Peer Conflict and the Tracks vs Wheels Debate

^[19] Putting Medical Boots on the Ground: Lessons from the War in Ukraine and Applications for Future Conflict with Near-Peer Adversaries

^[20] Switzerland Orders EAGLE V 6×6 Reconnaissance Vehicles | Joint Forces News

^[21] Nurol Makina Demos Ejder Yalçın 4×4 with Ragnarok Mortar

^[22] The Saudi-UAE War Effort in Yemen (Part 1): Operation Golden Arrow in Aden | The Washington Institute

^[23] TITAN Brings Together Systems For Next Generation Intelligence Capabilities – PEO IEW&S

^[24] Palantir wins $178M Army deal for TITAN artificial intelligence-enabled ground stations | DefenseScoop

^[25] Army realigns funding for TITAN, its next-generation ground station for deep sensing | DefenseScoop

^[26] HADES modernizes aerial military intelligence | Article | The United States Army

[27] https://peoiews.army.mil/2024/01/23/the-future-of-army-deep-sensing/

^[28] MLRS and the Totality of the Battlefield | Royal United Services Institute

^[29] 2. Trends in armed conflicts | SIPRI