As Ukraine’s surprise offensive into Russia’s Kursk Oblast, which began on 6 August 2024, moved through its third week, the Ukrainian forces there have shown no signs of an intent to withdraw.
Having captured around 1,000 km2 of Russian territory and encountered no significant resistance, the Ukrainians had by 19 August destroyed the third and final bridge over the Seym River, which runs westward from the northwestern extent of the territory captured, complicating any attempts by Russia to reinforce its forces on the Ukrainians’ left flank. Pontoons subsequently erected by the Russians over the Seym River have also been destroyed by the Ukrainians using US-supplied High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS).
Regarding the objectives of the Ukrainian offensive into Kursk, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy initially said on 10 August that Ukraine intended “to drive the war onto the aggressor’s territory”. On 18 August Zelenskyy added that the Ukrainian offensive aims to create “a buffer zone on the aggressor’s territory” to prevent further attacks by Russia. Official Ukrainian sources have also suggested that Kyiv intends to use the captured Russian territory as a ‘bargaining chip’ in a bid to force Russia into meaningful negotiations.
The Ukrainian offensive has been a significant fillip to Ukrainian morale, showing Kyiv to have taken the initiative and put Russian forces on the back foot. It has also drawn Russian forces out of position to stem the Ukrainian advance. However, the longer the operation continues, the greater the danger that Ukrainian battlefield losses could erode any sense of success. For Russian territory to have been invaded by regular forces for the first time since the Second World War is extremely damaging for Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose February 2022 invasion of Ukraine was originally meant to succeed in three days. Putin can also no longer pretend that operations against Ukraine are just a ‘police action’ when hundreds of thousands of Russian civilians have been evacuated from their own towns and villages.
While no consequential erosion of Putin’s political power is likely, the Ukrainian offensive is the largest embarrassment to the image of Putin as the guarantor of Russian security since the June 2023 mutiny of Russian mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin over the Russian High Command’s conduct of the war in Ukraine. It thus seems clear that Putin will stop at nothing to ultimately expel the Ukrainian forces in Kursk.
To mount its Kursk offensive the Ukrainian Army effectively assembled a specialist battlegroup, drawing some of its most effective units for the operation and employing some of its most valuable land systems, including UK-supplied Challenger 2 main battle tanks as well as US-supplied HIMARS launchers, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and Stryker armoured vehicles. Ukraine has thus committed troops and materiel it can ill afford to lose during an operation that looks increasingly precarious the longer it goes on.
Meanwhile, despite the success – thus far – of its Kursk offensive, the Ukrainian military continues to lose ground to the Russians elsewhere. For example, at Pokrovske in Ukraine’s Donbas region – a city that acts as a key logistics hub for forces on Ukraine’s eastern front – the Ukrainian authorities had by 19 August been forced to order a civilian evacuation as Russian forces increasingly threaten the city.
The Ukrainian offensive into Kursk thus remains a high-stakes gamble, with ultimately no guarantee of a meaningful return.
