The Kursk operation by the Ukrainian Armed Forces brought an unexpected turn to the ongoing war. At the time of writing, within just over a week, the Ukrainian Army has successfully captured more land than the Russian armed forces were capable of since the outset of their offensive in Kharkiv region early May 2024. As per the Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukrainian forces were holding nearly 1,000 km2 of territory in Kursk region as of 12 August 2024, and were pursuing further gains.
Unlike the March 2024 lower-scale raid into Russia’s Belgorod region, executed by a number of ethnic Russian units fighting alongside Ukraine’s regular Army, which lasted about a month, the current stunt by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Kursk region bears signs of a classic military offensive, run by a regular army, involving a large number of personnel, armoured vehicles, engineering troops, and air defence capabilities.
As the practice of Ukraine’s previous successful offensive attempts to recapture its own territory has shown, in a modern war against an enemy force with a numerical advantage in both manpower and equipment, success is possible when unconventional solutions are applied. This is precisely the case with the Kursk raid, as it caught the Russians totally off-guard. Consequently, the pace of Ukraine’s advance into Russia can be compared to that of the liberation of parts of the Kherson and Kharkiv regions back in 2022.
The Ukrainian operation exposed how unprepared the Russian Armed Forces were to engage in full-scale combat on their own territory, which has already led to another reshuffle top brass – namely in the form of Putin’s appointment of FSB Chief Alexander Bortnikov to lead the operation in the Kursk region, taking on the task from Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. Allegedly, all of the most combat-capable units had been thrown into the offensive effort in the Donbas, in order to announce the capture of several important settlements in eastern Ukraine as soon as possible.
However, this left Russia’s own border weakly-guarded, mainly by conscripts and border guards, over 100 of whom were captured by Ukrainian troops. This led to the rapid expansion of the Ukrainian bridgehead in the first days of the offensive in Kursk region. Russian social media covering the war reported, among other things, that Ukrainian air defences were highly active in the area, limiting Russia’s ability to strike the Ukrainian grouping. This led to the Russian military being often forced to employ high-cost Iskander ballistic missiles on lower-value targets.
At the time of writing, the objectives behind the Kursk operation, and its outcome remain unclear. Some statements by Ukrainian officials have claimed that the operation aims to bring war back to Russia, to lay down a fairer basis for potential peace talks somewhere along the line. It remains possible that the offensive in Kursk region is only one stage of the broader operation, and that the zone of hostilities may deepen and expand, and may also spill over into other poorly-defended areas of the border, such as in the Belgorod or Bryansk regions.
The operation’s consequences remain unclear. However, interim assessments suggest a mixed bag. The Ukrainian command will soon be facing two main challenges: reserves and logistics of both sides. Since the start of the Ukrainian Kursk operation, the Russian army has been slowly transferring reserves from some frontline areas to defend Kursk region, such as the Kharkiv offensive, relieving pressure on that front. However, at the same time, Ukrainian forces will need significant replenishments to defend territory seized in Russia. At the same time, in eastern Ukraine, the need to hold the line against the ongoing Russian onslaught remains urgent.
However, at this stage, Ukraine has proven that it is capable of seizing the initiative from Russia and forcing the Kremlin to review its operational and strategic assessments. It is also important that Ukraine’s allies have practically endorsed its raid. Moreover, such success stories from the Ukrainian Armed Forces can further strengthen the allies’ confidence in the need for further supporting Ukraine. After all, Russia has long retained the initiative across the theatre, slowly but steadily advancing in Donbas. Now at least on one of the new frontline axes, the Ukrainian Armed Forces went on the offensive, achieving major territorial gains. At the same time, reputation-wise, the significance of occupying Russian territories is higher than Russia’s effort to capture towns and villages in eastern Ukraine, since for the first time since World War 2, a foreign military force is pursuing a major combat mission on Russian soil. The only difference is that Ukraine, unlike Moscow, has no intention of permanently occupying Russian territories. The main task is to launch processes that would lead to the liberation of its own lands, and the Ukrainian command will continue exploiting Russia’s weak points in order to achieve these goals.
Alex Horobets
