From Russian missile barrages in Ukraine, to Houthi drones and US programmes the author explores how stand-off weapons are changing modern warfare, and the shape of things to come.
A carefully planned and successfully delivered strike with stand-off weapons can change the trajectory of a war. For example, the pressure on Ukraine to withstand Russia’s invasion changed dramatically on the 22 March 2024 when Russia launched 151 missiles and drones in a significant mass strike targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Many Ukrainians awoke to find that they had no water, no power, and no heating. The 22 March strike was the start of a concerted campaign and by June, the country had lost almost 50% of its energy production capacity, according to Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky.[1] The Russians have continued to employ their stand-off weapons in this way, leading to further strikes against hydroelectric plants and substations. Those strikes are interspersed with others against Ukraine’s defence industry, training sites and troop concentrations. The prospect of scheduled blackouts into the winter and insufficient power to meet the needs of Ukraine’s citizens will increase the pressure on the populace and reduce its willingness to continue the war, it also pressures Ukraine to move air defences away from the frontline and into Ukraine’s urban centres to protect the latter. Already, 44% of surveyed Ukrainians thought it was time to negotiate, and 32% felt it was time to cancel Zelensky’s 2022 decree that prohibited negotiations with Putin.[2]
This is not the only example of stand-off weapons shaping a war’s trajectory, the two conflicts fought against Iraq, or the 2018 use of cruise missiles to reinforce Western red lines in Syria come to mind as other examples.[3] As a category of weapons, stand-off systems have rapidly evolved in the past decade and will evolve again in the next. This article will explore three technology approaches that help understand the current and future trajectory of stand-off weapons, which are defined here as a guided missile or drone with a range exceeding 150 km. The first approach can be considered as a blend of conventional cruise and ballistic missiles launched from all domains and is represented here by Russia’s arsenal of stand-off weapons employed against Ukraine. The second consists of one-way attack (OWA) drones and a collection of artisanal missiles that can be combined into large strikes to threaten actors in new and inventive ways. This approach is represented here by the Houthis and to a lesser extent by their state sponsors, Iran. The third approach involves the development of new technologies that stretch the limits of what is physically possible in a bid to counter air defence networks and cover long distances at speed to limit an opponent’s time to respond. This approach is represented by the US and its various hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), and hypersonic cruise missile (HCM) programmes.
So, what enables stand-off weapons to contribute to a conflict in this way? This ultimately depends on the relative fragility of the target nation. The March 2024 attacks are not the first on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure – over 50% of its energy generation capacity was damaged in 2022, but the impact has been mitigated by the country’s determination to continue and external support.[4] Secondly, an opponent must have infrastructure worth striking with stand-off weaponry, this can also vary from critical national infrastructure (CNI), to the facilities used to build or upgrade rockets or missiles in Lebanon, or command and control (C2) centres.
Typically, the risk posed by the target, or the potential military benefits from striking it, must justify the cost of a stand-off weapon. A Block V Tomahawk costs the US around USD 2 million and hardened targets or large physical infrastructure will require much more than a single missile to achieve effect.[5] From this it follows that the stand-off weapon user must be able to secure sufficient intelligence on the targets in question to hit them, which often requires good satellite imaging capabilities for some missile designs, and effective access to a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) in almost all cases, as well as granular data. For example, Russia’s strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure tend to be advanced in what they target, with the potential effects magnified by striking substations or specific buildings within a power plant.[6] In sum, if an opponent has targets worth striking that are critical to the functioning of its society, and the attacker can secure targeting data of sufficient granularity, there is the opportunity to inflict conflict-altering damage upon an opponent using stand-off weapons, although the confounding factor of resolve and resilience has to be accounted for somehow, and will likely extend a stand-off strike campaign rather than shorten it.
Mass, precision, and speed
Mass, precision, and speed are the three words that characterise Russia’s approach to the use of stand-off weapons in Ukraine. It has deployed tiered capabilities that are represented by the 9M723 Iskander-M quasi-ballistic missile at the shorter-range end of Russia’s conventional stand-off toolkit, with a range of 500 km, and the 2,500 km range Kh-101 in the upper range limits. Russia has increased its missile production and stockpiles since the war began, and has coupled its missile capabilities with production and procurement of the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 OWA drones (respectively known as Geran-1 and Geran-2 in Russian service), which are typically added in waves to Russian missile strikes. Conventional cruise capabilities that are essentially represented by missiles such as the air-launched Kh-101 and air/sea-launched 3M-14 Kalibr family are paired with short-range ballistic missile launches from Iskander. Additionally, this mix is increasingly supplemented by Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles.
Russia has also started employing the 3M-22 Zircon HCM, with the Kyiv Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Expertise stating such a missile was used in an attack on Kyiv which took place on 7 February 2024, based on evidence from gathered missile debris.[7] Russian President Vladimir Putin later affirmed Russia’s use of the missile in his state of the nation address on 29 February 2024.[8] This adds a further and potentially significant new threat into Russia’s existing mix.
Many of Russia’s missile strikes have proven to be very accurate, which indicates that Russia is not only able to access granular intelligence for its strikes in Ukraine, but that the underlying guidance technology is suitable for long-range strikes against infrastructure. The mix of missiles varies, but Table 1 provides an indication from the 22nd March and 26th August strikes. At least 40% of the strikes consisted of Shaheds, and the interception rate of conventional cruise missiles such as the Kh-101 and 3M-14 is relatively high – 83% and 86% for the March and August strikes respectively. However, Iskander and Kinzhal prove difficult to intercept when combined with other missiles, as does the Kh-22, an anti-ship missile which flies at around 4,000 km/h, and typically climbs to very high altitudes before diving onto its target.[9]
Table 1: Breakdown of Russian missiles used on 22 March and 26 August 2024. | ||||
Missile | 22nd March | Intercepted | 26th August | Intercepted |
9M723 | 12 | 0 | 6* | 1 |
Kh-47M2 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 1 |
Kh-101/Kh-555 | 40 | 35 | 77 | 99*** |
Kh-59 | 2 | 2 | 10** | – |
Kh-22 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 1 |
3M-14/3M-54 | 0 | N/A | 28 | – |
‘S-300’**** | 22 | 0 | 0 | N/A |
Shahed/Geran | 63 | 55 | 109 | 99 |
Total | 151 | 92 | 236 | 99 |
*May have included KN-23. **Included Kh-69s. ***99 cruise missiles were intercepted, no distinction was provided between Kh-101, Kh-59, and 3M-14. 115 missiles were fired between these three types in total. ****Exact missile models were not specified, but presumably comprised 5V55R and/or 48N6 series missiles.Source: Ukrainian Air Force Command (22 March 2024[10] and 26 August 2024[11]) |
The missiles themselves – with the possible exception of Zircon – represent a mix of conventional long-range strike capabilities that are on a par with most large militaries in the world.
The 9M723 Iskander quasi-ballistic missile is 7.3 m long, using solid propellant and capable of carrying a 480 kg to 700 kg warhead that can be high explosive, cluster, or nuclear.[12] Russian sources indicate that it can be fitted with a seeker including optical and synthetic aperture radar to provide precise targeting of vehicles and command posts, video footage from Ukraine seems to confirm this.[13] The missile includes a datalink that is used to upload coordinates from the 9P78-1 transporter erector launcher (TEL) prior to launch, and is understood to have an additional satellite datalink in the base of the missile that allows for further course adjustments in flight. It is also fitted with radio frequency countermeasures that are designed to confuse and complicate target tracking and engagement. Iskander missiles are ground-launched and equip the Missile Brigades of the Russian ground forces, they are typically paired with reconnaissance assets such as long-range drones as well as human intelligence. Their use in strikes on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure declined as Russian units were pushed away from Kyiv, however, they are frequently employed against battlefield targets, and may have been responsible for the 3 September 2024 attack against a building used for training Ukrainian communications specialists, which killed more than 50 and wounded at least 200 more.[14]
The Kh-101 is an air-launched low-observable cruise missile with a range between 2,500 and 2,800 km. It is 7.45 m long and carries a 450 kg conventional warhead. It can fly for up to 10 hours and travel as low as 30 m from the ground with a cruising altitude of 6,000 m. The missile navigates using a combination of GLONASS – Russia’s satellite navigation constellation – and inertial navigation. Inertial navigation works by measuring changes to the missile’s acceleration and orientation in space over time to understand the missile’s position and velocity. As it derives its data from the sensors on board the missile – using instruments such as gyroscopes and accelerometers – inertial navigation provides a reliable form of navigation in the event that satellite navigation is denied or degraded. When the two are combined with the Kh-101’s optoelectronic mid-course terrain matching navigation system, its terrain following radar, and its infrared/TV seeker for guidance in the terminal phase, the missile can reliably strike within 10 m of a given target.[15] It can be launched in salvos from the Tu-160, Tu-95MS16, and Tu-22 strategic bomber aircraft used by the Russian aerospace forces.[16]
The 3M-14/3M-54 Kalibr is a family of sea-launched cruise missiles, with 3M-14 series being for land-attack, and the 3M-54 series for the anti-ship role. The Kalibr family has been the mainstay of Russia’s naval modernisation, with almost every ship receiving a Kalibr launch capability during upgrade and modernisation processes. The missiles are vertically launched from the 3S14 launch complex and have an estimated range of 1,500–2,500 km. They have been launched from the Caspian Sea against targets in Syria, which indicates a range of around 1,500 km.[17] Like the Kh-101 and Iskander, it carries a 450 kg high explosive warhead, although there is also understood to be a nuclear variant.[18]
The Kalibr family is also joined by the 3M-22 Zircon HCM, which are designed to be sea-launched and employ a solid propellant booster and scramjet for the cruise phase. While little hard data is available, it likely cruises at speeds in excess of Mach 5 which would technically make it 500% faster than the Kh-101 for portions of its flight. The Kh-101 has a top speed of Mach 0.78 (833 km/h), whereas Mach 5 places a missile’s speed at around 6,000 km/h for portions of the flight. This drastically limits the reaction time of an opponent, if a Kh-101 travelled at Mach 0.78 for the entire flight of a 1,500 km engagement, it would take 108 minutes to reach the target. The same distance would be covered in 15 minutes at Mach 5. Neither missile is likely capable of travelling at top speed for the entirety of a flight, however, this calculation serves to illustrate the difference that the speed of an HCM provides over conventionally-powered cruise missiles.
The Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile is slightly different in that it is carried by a MiG-31K and their take-off seems to provide Ukraine with some warning that a Kinzhal strike is imminent. However, that warning is still brief, indeed, stay in Kyiv for long enough and it may become apparent that the only air raid warnings that are taken seriously are those that involve Kinzhal. The 8 m missile also carries a 480 kg warhead and has a range of 1,500–2,000 km, essentially an air-launched variant of the 9M723 with a redesigned rear section. Once launched the missile accelerates to Mach 4, from the initial acceleration of the MiG-31K, which can reach Mach 2. The missile may reach Mach 10 for some portions of its flight, but this is difficult to confirm. In any case, if a MiG-31K took off from the Savasleyka airfield in Nizhny Novgorod and flew 300 km before launching a Kinzhal, the missile would take 7.5 minutes to travel the 600 km to Kyiv if it stayed at Mach 4. That time would be reduced considerably if it is indeed capable of reaching Mach 10. A MiG-31 has a cruising speed of 2,500 km/h, and could theoretically travel 300 km in around 7 minutes at that speed.[19] This indicates that an overall engagement time with a Kinzhal launched from Russian airspace at a target in Kyiv – a distance of 960 km – could occur within 20 minutes of the aircraft being ready to take off.
The mass in Russian missile strikes is arrived at through a combination of the Shahed-136 OWA drones procured from Iran and manufactured domestically as the Geran 2. The delta-wing design has a two-blade propeller at the rear of the fuselage that provides a range of 2,000 km with a top speed of 185 km/h. The drone is launched from a catapult from one of three primary launch sites in Crimea, Rostov-on-Don and Belgorod. They typically fly circuitous routes into Ukraine rather than a straight line to their intended target, with some Gerans flying around 580 km from Yeysk Airport in Crimea to strike a target near Zaporizhzhia, a straight line distance of around 280 km.[20] The warhead has a weight of 40–50 kg and may be high explosive or thermobaric in nature, at least one example has been found with a warhead using a fragmentation sleeve at either end, and multiple small explosively-formed penetrators (EFPs) comprising the middle section.[21] Russia has launched upwards of 60 Shaheds or Gerans in a single strike, they are typically arranged in salvos and arrive on a target within a strike window along with the cruise and ballistic missiles. The primary tactic of Russia’s strikes appears to be the combination of effects to complicate the air defence challenge for Ukraine, as well as wear those air defences down. A Geran is sufficiently accurate and effective that Ukraine must take action against it, potentially depleting its valuable air defence missile stocks yet further, although much of the task of tackling Gerans has been provided by mobile air defence teams with heavy machine guns.
Russia’s conventional strikes reveal the limits of conventional stand-off strike capabilities. Even when large salvos of 100 plus missiles and drones have been launched in a short space of time, it is common for Ukraine to achieve a relatively high interception rate. Even during Russia’s relatively successful 22nd March strike, Ukraine was still able to intercept 92 of the stand-off weapons launched against it, leaving 59 to reach their targets.[22] HCMs such as Zircon and ballistic missiles such as 9M723 and Kinzhal have higher rates of success, which is indicative of the future of stand-off precision strike for conventional militaries.
Low complexity, high impact
Between the 19th October 2023 and 2nd September 2024, the Yemen Conflict Observatory has tracked 130 Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Yemen, 120 of them against vessels trying to transit the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait between Yemen and Djibouti.[23] Ansar Allah (Houthi) attacks employ a range of stand-off weapons that reflect the third approach that will shape the future of this class, and that is those weapons that are relatively low in complexity but potentially high in impact. For example, a remotely operated OWA boat is technically less complex than an air-launched cruise missile such as Kh-101, however, as Ukraine and the Houthis have shown, they can be remarkably effective against surface vessels. The Ukrainians have used sea drones and missile strikes to drive the Russian fleet out of the Black Sea and open a grain corridor. Ukraine is understood to have damaged or sunk at least 12 Russian ships using its sea drones, which have ranges up to 800 km and can carry up to 250 kg of explosives.[24]
The Houthis have used similar technology to drive merchant shipping out of the Red Sea and around the African continent. Ansar Allah had attacked at least three ships with sea drones within a few weeks of first using them in July 2024, and they contributed to the sinking of the MV Tutor.[25] These attacks have increased the cost of shipping and insurance, as well as the time taken for many journeys, and incurred financial costs on the US, UK, France, and others in intercepting their missiles.[26] Whether their actions have hurt the Israeli economy is unclear, but it is clear that despite the relatively low complexity of the Houthi arsenal, they have had an impact on bulk shipping at a strategic level, and at a tactical level have succeeded in sinking ships despite vessels with sophisticated air defence systems operating in the area. The arsenal is best viewed through three categories; the anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), the anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), and long-range drones – both air and sea-based. Moreover, while the focus for this section of the article is on the Houthi sea-denial campaign, it is important to note that many of these capabilities have also been employed in long-range strikes against Saudi Arabia and Israel.
The Houthis showcased an ASBM named Asif in 2022, closely resembling the Iranian Khalij Fars. The latter is an anti-ship version of the Iranian Fateh-110 ballistic missile, equipped with an optoelectronic infrared seeker for ship targeting.[27] The Fateh-110 is a solid fuel missile with a 650 kg warhead and a top speed of 1,029 m/s in its terminal phase. It reportedly achieved a hit within 8 metres of a moving target in 2013. However, uncertainty remains about whether it possesses a manoeuvring re-entry vehicle, crucial for ASBM accuracy. The Houthis claim their Asif has a 400 km range and a 550 kg warhead. They have also displayed a missile called Falaq-1, similar to the Khalij Fars, offering a 200 km range with an optoelectronic seeker.
Optoelectronic seekers often have a narrower field of view than radar seekers, requiring more precise target cuing but they are typically less susceptible to decoys or jamming. The primary challenge in using an ASBM is accurate, real-time intelligence on the target’s location because the missile seeker has a limited window to search for and acquire a target before engaging. If the ship moves between launch and engagement, the missile may not find its target. The difficulties of targeting with an ASBM are illustrated in Table 2, which shows the breakdown of missiles and drones launched between July and August and their success rate. Nevertheless, the missiles represented a significant challenge to US vessels in the area; the commander of the USS Carney reported that his crew had between 9 and 20 seconds to detect an ASBM launch and decide whether or not to engage.[28]
The ASBM threat represents the most complex missile available to the Houthis, however, the way in which the missiles were employed often lacked complexity – with one or two missiles launched at a time in concert with a selection of drones. The US and industry reporting of Houthi attacks indicate that they tended to unfold in sequence, allowing each threat to be handled in turn rather than simultaneously, which would logically have been more challenging.
Table 2: Reported breakdown of missiles and drones used by Houthis against commercial vessels in the Red Sea. | ||||
Weapon type | July 2024
|
Reported hits | August – September 2024 | Reported hits |
ASBM | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3 |
‘Anti-ship missiles’ | 9 | 2 | 6 | 0 |
Aerial drones | 9 | 1 | 11 | 1 |
Sea drones | 19 | 3 | 6 | 1 |
Note: Reporting on Houthi missile attacks lacks detail. Events are frequently reported as “an explosion near the ship” without indicating the cause.[29] This data reflects those reports with sufficiently clear indications of the weapon type to track.
Source: Yemen Conflict Observatory[30] |
The Houthi attacks tend to involve small densities of missiles and drones compared with Russian strikes, which has enabled interceptions to be conducted effectively by western ships in the area with relative ease. They are notably more successful against individual ships that are outside of the protective zones of the air defence assets in the area. The ranges of Houthi strikes are also much reduced compared to those involved in Ukraine; a lot of cruise and ballistic missile strikes occur in the Gulf of Aden, which is between 220 km and 330 km across from the coast of Yemen to Somalia, the Red Sea is between 21 km and 300 km wide. The range of the Houthi missiles enable them to launch from Sanaa, which is believed to be their main missile base, as well as Dhamar.[31] Some successful strikes with ASBMs indicate that the Houthis have a relatively capable targeting set up that enables them to identify and hit dynamic targets with ballistic missiles. However, the frequent misses indicate that this remains a challenging feat to achieve.
Ansar Allah have a range of ASCMs available to them, and have displayed many different types of missiles claiming to possess longer range or capabilities. However, one missile that they are understood to possess and use is the called Al-Mandeb 2, which is believed to have evolved from the Chinese C-802, an export variant of the YJ-82 ASCM developed by the China Electro-Mechanical Technology Academy and sold to Iran in the 1990s. The C-802 is powered by a solid fuel accelerator that detaches after launch, before a turbojet engine takes over, providing a range of 120 km. The missile has a semi-armour piercing high explosive (SAPHE) warhead weighing 165 kg. The missile can fly 20–30 m above sea level and descend to 5–7 m for the final approach. The top speed is around 300 m/s and it employs a radar seeker. It is not clear how closely the Al-Mandeb 2 is based on the C-802, however the Houthis are understood to have launched two missiles at the UAE’s HSV-2 Swift logistics vessel in 2016, causing extensive damage. Missiles of both types appear to be the preferred method of attack for targets in the Gulf of Aden, although not exclusively.
In contrast, many of the attacks in the Bab-El-Mandeb Strait and Red Sea are conducted by aerial and sea drones. Houthi uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) – or weaponised USVs as they are sometimes known – come in a variety of forms and are believed to have been supplied as kits from Iran that were used to convert old Yemeni interceptor or fishing boats. They are often remotely piloted and even require a human to physically pilot them for a portion of their journey to a target, according to analysis from H.I. Sutton at Covert Shores.[32] Converted boats may be fitted with mannequins to give them an innocuous look and armed with the warheads from Soviet anti-ship missiles or packed with high explosives. The Houthis also have a series of purpose-built USVs with warhead weights between 150 kg and 500 kg, all are powered by outboard motors and appear to require a human pilot for a portion of their approach to target.[33] The range of the Houthi USVs is unclear, however they do appear to have been relatively effective so far with around 16% of the identified attacks having resulted in a hit against the target vessel.
Aerial drones have formed a significant component of the Houthi strike patterns, constituting around 40% of the total events in the Red Sea, according to data collected by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data team.[34] The group also states that 75% of drone attacks were intercepted, which is in line with the data provided above. The group’s drones provide it with the greatest range, the Samad-2 and Samad-3 are typical of the types used by the Houthis, and these carry explosive payloads up to 18 kg. The latter has a range of 1,500 km, which is greater than the Samad-2, and they are believed to have a top speed of 250 km/h. Long-range drones such as the Samad family have been used in strikes on Saudi Arabia and Israel and often combined with ballistic missile strikes. Between 2015 and 2021, the Houthis are understood to have launched 430 ballistic missiles and 851 armed drones at targets in Saudi Arabia, leading to damage on critical national infrastructure and oil production facilities.[35]
Overall, the Houthi arsenal of missiles and uncrewed attack vehicles in multiple domains are indicative of a possible future in the sphere of stand-off weapons. With the exception of ASCMs and ASBMs, which are most likely the result of Iranian technology or expertise, much of Ansar Allah’s stand-off weapons are produced using commercially-available components and expertise. It indicates that non-state actors are now capable of developing their own stand-off weapon capabilities and that this technology could proliferate to other actors that are suitably motivated. It suggests that long-range precision strikes are no longer the preserve of advanced Western militaries and can be expected as a tool of terrorism and state-on-state combat alike.
Speed and reach
The US armed forces’ ambitious efforts represent the leading edge of stand-off precision strike. This approach is best represented by the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) concept, which are new units being developed by the US Army to employ multi-domain effects including cyber and electronic warfare, as well as kinetic long-range effects that are designed to degrade an opponent’s air defence assets and critical infrastructure.[36]
The US Air Force and US Navy also have their own air-launched HCM programmes in development, respectively known as Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) and Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 2, while the US Marine Corps (USMC) has obtained a ground-launched configuration of the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) subsonic ASCM for use in the Indo-Pacific. One of the driving factors for the US development is the increase in opposing air defence assets and stand-off weapons. The aforementioned Russian weapons provide an example of the ability of an opponent to hold US assets at risk from stand-off distances. For the US, it is necessary to provide air defence against these threats as well as their own long-range capabilities that can hit an opponent’s strike assets before they can hit their US equivalents. This prioritises the speed and range of the missile.
The MDTFs are due to be equipped with the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), which has been developed by Lockheed Martin to be fired from a trailer carrying two missiles. The weapon consists of a two-stage rocket booster armed with the Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB), which provides a range of at least 3,200 km and a speed of at least Mach 5 (1,715 m/s), and probably higher. The C-HGB is propelled out of the atmosphere and released from the booster stages before returning back to the atmosphere and transitioning into a glide trajectory. Once within the Earth’s atmosphere, the glide body generates lift, enabling the HGV to manoeuvre, and glides to its target at hypersonic speeds. The US Army hopes to field its first operational LRHW missiles in 2025.
LRHW is complemented by the Mid-Range Capability (MRC), also known as Typhon, which employs a Mark 41 Vertical Launch Cell from the Arleigh Burke class ships that has been repurposed by Lockheed Martin into a ground-based launch system to launch the Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile with a range of 1,600 km, and the SM-6, with an estimated range from 240 km to 460 km.[37]
The MDTF will also be able to employ the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) with a range of 499 km, which is designed to be launched from the M142 HIMARS. The US will eventually wrap a number of air defence and targeting networks around these capabilities that enable many different sensors to be connected to provide targeting outputs at strategic depths. The total missile complement of an MDTF is indicated in Table 3. It indicates that the bulk of the strike capability is provided by the Tomahawk in terms of ready-to-launch missiles. However, the survivability of Tomahawks against a layered and prepared air defence network could be relatively low and force greater reliance upon the LRHW for initial operations against an opponent’s air defences.
Table 3: Missile complement of an MDTF | ||
Missile | Number of launchers | Number of missiles ready to fire |
LRHW | 4 | 8 |
Tomahawk | 4* | 16 |
SM-6 | 4* | 16 |
PrSM | 6 | 12 PrSM; 36 GMLRS |
*The MRC can carry four missiles and is designed to launch both the SM-6 and Tomahawk. It is possible therefore that an MDTF could have 16 ready to fire missiles of either type.
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS). |
The US Air Force is developing the HACM HCM in partnership with Raytheon and Northrop Grumman. Flight tests are expected between 2025 and 2027 before a production decision is made. The design is expected to employ a rocket booster with a scramjet, and to be launched from tactical aircraft such as the F-15 and F/A-18. It is complemented by the Navy’s OASuW Increment 2, also known as the Hypersonic Air-Launched OASuW (HALO) under development for the US Navy for use from F/A-18s to provide near-hypersonic strike capabilities against an adversary’s vessels. Both designs are in a relatively early phase of development, although they are expected to be rapidly prototyped and brought into service. It is understood that the adversary around which these weapons are built is China, and that they are expected to address the very significant distances involved in a conflict in the Indo-Pacific as well as fill gaps in the existing US long-range strike arsenal.
The final stand-off weapon of note is the USMC’s Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, or NMESIS, which pairs the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) with the Oshkosh Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary Fires (ROGUE-Fires), a remotely operated JLTV 4×4 fires platform.[38] NSM is being produced for the USMC and US Navy by Raytheon, which has partnered with Kongsberg to offer the Norwegian missile in the US. It provides a range in excess of 185 km and contributes to the US Navy’s concept of distributed lethality, which is designed to make its surface vessels more lethal and enable them to perform as hunter-killer surface action groups that can disperse over a wide area, thereby complicating an opponent’s own targeting process, as well as seizing maritime areas for force projection.[39]
NSM is designed to strike ships as well as land targets, and is fitted with an automatic target recognition system for engaging ships as well as a high resolution imaging infrared (IIR) seeker that enables the missile to select a hit point on a target.[40] It is described as being high subsonic in speed with the ability to manoeuvre to evade air defences. The warhead weighs 226 kg in the naval version and is programmable.[41] The USMC has also adopted the principle of distributed lethality in its Force Design 2030, as it reconfigures its forces to create multiple dilemmas for an opponent and bring more lethality to bear at stand-off ranges.[42]
Looking ahead
The approaches explored here provide an indication of the future of stand-off weapons and long-range strikes. Most countries will have to fall within one of these brackets in terms of the weapons that they choose to employ. However, it is apparent that there is a general trend towards faster missiles, and that ballistic designs can be more difficult to intercept. This may drive future design decisions as many countries debate how best to counter the increasingly capable air defences that have proliferated as hypersonics are a costly and far from proven technology, that may not offer a marked improvement in performance over existing ballistic missile designs. It is also clear that many of these weapons either already are, or will have to be procured in large quantities as a prepared opponent can enjoy significant success against certain missile and drone types. Finally, stand-off weapons will continue to form an important element of arsenals, however, it is clear that achieving war altering effects with them – even when used in their thousands as Russia has – is not straightforward. It may be that hypersonic missiles shift the balance away from the air defender, but it will remain essential to identify the nodes that are truly critical and strike them decisively while exploiting the effects they provide with other forces.
Sam Cranny-Evans
[1] Zelensky Says Russia Destroyed Half of Ukraine’s Energy Capacity – The Moscow Times
[2] War or Peace. Ukrainians Want 1991 Borders Back — But Who Can Make it Happen? Results of a sociological survey
[3] Syria: US, UK and France launch strikes in response to chemical attack
[4] Ukraine: Russian Attacks on Energy Grid Threaten Civilians | Human Rights Watch
[6] Bracing for the Hardest Winter: Protecting Ukraine’s Energy Infrastructure | Royal United Services Institute
[7] https://mil.in.ua/en/news/kyiv-scientific-research-institute-of-forensic-expertise-confirmed-the-use-of-the-zircon-hypersonic-missile-during-russia-s-missile-attack-on-kyiv/
[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/highlights-putins-address-russias-parliament-2024-02-29/
[9] Putin’s Missile War Russia’s Strike Campaign in Ukraine
[10] https://t.me/kpszsu/12175
[12] 9K720 Iskander (SS-26) | Missile Threat
[13] https://x.com/Archer83Able/status/1766460798581231953
[14] Ukraine says soldiers among 51 killed in Russian missile attack on Poltava – BBC News
[15] Kh-101 cruise missile – Russian weapon used in attacks on Ukraine [BRIEF]
[16] Kh-101 / Kh-102 | Missile Threat
[17] Russian missiles ‘hit IS in Syria from Caspian Sea’ – BBC News
[18] 3M-14 Kalibr (SS-N-30A) | Missile Threat
[19] MiG-31 (Foxhound) Russian Interceptor/Attack Aircraft
[20] Alabuga’s Shahed 136 (Geran 2) Warheads: A Dangerous Escalation
[21] Multipurpose Iranian drone warheads used in Ukraine
[22] Bracing for the Hardest Winter: Protecting Ukraine’s Energy Infrastructure | Royal United Services Institute
[23] YCO: Attacks in the Red Sea | Interactive Map – ACLED
[24] Navy of Drones » Wavell Room
[25] Houthi explosive drone boat attacks escalate Red Sea danger | Reuters
[26] The Global Economic Consequences of the Attacks on Red Sea Shipping Lanes
[28] USS Carney had ‘seconds’ to respond to anti-ship ballistic missiles
[29] A suspected attack by Yemen’s Houthi rebels targets a ship transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait | AP News
[30] YCO: Attacks in the Red Sea | Interactive Map – ACLED
[31] Under Fire in the Bab al-Mandab: Houthi Military Capabilities and U.S. Response Options | The Washington Institute
[32] Houthi’s Blowfish: Guide To Explosive USV Threat In Red Sea
[33] Houthi’s Blowfish: Guide To Explosive USV Threat In Red Sea
[34] Six Houthi drone warfare strategies: How innovation is shifting the regional balance of power
[35] Houthis have fired 430 missiles, 851 drones at Saudi Arabia since 2015 – Saudi-led coalition | Reuters
[36] The Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF)
[37] Lockheed Martin Delivers Mid-Range Capability Weapon System to the United States Army
[38] OSHKOSH AWARDED $40M ROGUE-FIRES ORDER AHEAD OF MDM 2024
[39] ‘Distributed Lethality’ | Proceedings – January 2015 Vol. 141/1/1,343
[41] Naval Strike Missile | Raytheon
[42] Evolution of the U.S. Marine Corps: A Decade of Transformation | Defense.info