Almost three years since Russia invaded Ukraine, the rules-based order that once governed security on the European continent lies entirely in shreds. Yet, one European security organisation, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was created during the Cold War to deal with precisely the threats that the European continent is faced with today.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, no security body or international organisation proved itself capable of averting the conflict, with the UN, NATO, and the EU all but helpless. However, the Vienna-based OSCE – with Russia and Ukraine as members – was established during the Cold War with the singular objective of preventing conflicts and resolving crises among its participating states; the OSCE too failed to intervene in the months prior to the invasion. The OSCE’s consensus-based decision making, always regarded as its most prized asset, had now become its principal disadvantage. Looking ahead to Trump’s second term, as well as the uncertainty surrounding Ukraine joining NATO, this article assesses the impact of the current situation on the OSCE and its mandate to maintain peace and security across the European continent.
The OSCE’s approach to security
Three ‘dimensions’ comprise the OSCE’s comprehensive security approach, in which it takes pride: the political-military, economic-environmental, and human dimensions. This broad-brush approach still seeks to prevent tensions, handle and mediate crises, and encourage dispute resolution.
- In the politico-military, or First Dimension, the OSCE contributes to arms control, confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), and military transparency. Adopted mechanisms that include the Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty illustrate the efforts undertaken over the decades to reduce tensions and avoid armed conflict.
- With its economic and environmental programmes, the Second Dimension, primarily through the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA), the OSCE addresses issues such as preventing and combatting corruption, connectivity, water management and energy security.
- Respect for the rule of law, freedom of speech, and human rights are all promoted by the human, or Third Dimension. The OSCE’s Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), is arguably the Organisation’s most well-known body, thanks to its election monitoring role, overseeing elections throughout the OSCE region.
50 years on
The OSCE faces a multitude of obstacles as it marks the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, a set of ten core principles (the so-called ‘Decalogue’) that established the framework for its later operations. These principles include respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, abstaining from the use or threat of force, and protecting human rights. The OSCE’s role and added value are now called into question due to ongoing geopolitical tensions, not least thanks to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and elsewhere.
This 50th anniversary might therefore offer a glimmer of hope, a chance to consider the accomplishments of the Organisation, its guiding principles, and the many difficulties it faces. It could also offer a chance to discuss the OSCE’s very relevance in a tumultuous geopolitical landscape that is continuously changing.
- Geopolitical divisions: The OSCE faces increasing polarisation among its members, especially between Russia and Western ‘like-minded’ countries, exacerbated, but not exclusively, by the Ukraine conflict. Elsewhere in the OSCE area, the unsettled (or ‘frozen’) dispute in Moldova over Russia’s support for the breakaway Transdniestria region remains unresolved, despite OSCE’s formal mediation role and presence of one its 12 field missions. Russia’s spoiler role inside the OSCE is further cemented by Moscow’s support for the two Georgian separatist republics: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Elsewhere in the Caucasus, following Azerbaijan’s military action to regain sovereignty over its ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, resulting in the entire population of roughly 120,000 ethnic Armenians fleeing to Armenia proper, this long-running conflict — for which the OSCE also had a long-standing mediating role under the 1992 Minsk Process has largely vanished from international attention.
- Institutional weakness: The OSCE operates without any formal legal personality and unlike most international organisations, it has no agreed charter, meaning it relies on the political (good)will between its members and of course, its consensus-based approach. The lack of a vigorous enforcement framework restricts its ability to implement agreements reached or react effectively to emerging tensions and crises.
- Funding: 2025 is also pivotal due to budgetary and operational challenges the OSCE faces. Since the consensus-based approach applies equally to financial matters, this means that the adoption of its budget routinely faces delays due to disagreements among its members. In fact, no budget has been adopted since 2021, with expenditure since then being dispensed on an allotment basis – hardly a secure or stable footing for robust and impactful engagement.
To survive therefore, the OSCE must urgently address its structural funding issues as a matter of priority. Since 2021, successive OSCE ‘Chairs’ (presidencies), with Malta presiding over the Organisation in 2024, have unsuccessfully sought consensus to overcome the impasse; options on the table, but not agreed upon, might include reforming the consensus rule itself (a dangerous opening of the Pandora’s Box) to prevent budget blocking or exploring alternative funding models, such as voluntary contributions or partnerships with other international organizations. Without meaningful and decisive action, the OSCE’s financial uncertainty could undermine its overall mandate, leaving it ill-equipped to address Europe’s pressing security challenges. In 2025, its capacity to adapt and secure sustainable funding will likely determine its long-term viability.
The impact of a second Trump presidency
The second Trump presidency could significantly alter the dynamics of European security and by extension, any meaningful role for the OSCE. US support for the OSCE may decline as a result of Trump’s ‘America First’ policy, which places a strong – declaratory at least – focus on potentially cutting back US participation in international organisations such as NATO. This change could worsen already-existing financial issues and make it more difficult for the OSCE to react to security threats. However, less US engagement could also present an opportunity for European countries to assert more leadership within the OSCE, fostering a more unified European approach to security issues.
Ukraine’s NATO aspirations and potential OSCE role
Ukraine’s ‘non-membership’ in NATO presents a unique dilemma for both the OSCE and European security overall. In a classic ‘Catch-22’ situation, without the overarching protection of NATO, Ukraine will remain exposed and vulnerable to Russia’s aggressive actions, while Kyiv’s ambitions to join NATO only heighten tensions with Moscow. The OSCE, once so heavily invested in Ukraine through its now defunct Special Monitoring Mission from 2014 until 2022, has seen its role in Ukraine massively diminished since the invasion in 2022. As a result, the OSCE’s ability to fill the security vacuum in Ukraine is limited, given its dependence on consensus among its members, including Russia and Ukraine.
As the OSCE navigates these complex challenges, several approaches could enhance its relevance and effectiveness:
- Strengthening European Unity: A more unified European approach to security would reinforce the OSCE’s credibility and safeguard a stronger response to emerging threats.
- Engaging with Russia: Despite the obvious challenges, preserving a constructive dialogue with Russia is key to preventing further geopolitical escalation.
- Varying Funding Sources: To decrease dependency on a few key member states, the OSCE should seek other funding mechanisms, including through partnering with other international organisations.
Looking ahead
The OSCE held its 31st Ministerial Council meeting on 5-6 December 2024 in Valletta, Malta, with its foreign ministers, including Russia’s Sergei Lavrov, meeting to discuss current challenges, including the lack of senior leadership and the aforementioned budgetary crisis. In a positive move, however, a rare sign of consensus was reached on the appointment of the OSCE’s four top-level positions, including senior Turkish diplomat, Feridun Sinirlioğlu as the new Secretary-General, though no agreement was reached on overcoming the budgetary crisis.
With the OSCE’s future place in European security far from certain, there are still many observers that see a role for the Organisation, given its broad membership and mandates provided by its 57 states. With a smart approach, drawing on its extensive Balkan post-conflict experience, and building on positive steps coming from the Valletta meeting, the Organisation could role to play in promoting and fostering dialogue above all, but also on the ground when a ceasefire is ultimately reached to end the war in Ukraine. In 2025, under Finnish leadership, the OSCE has an opportunity to reaffirm its core principles, strengthen its capabilities, and navigate the complexities of a fragile geopolitical landscape, ensuring its continued relevance in the 21st century.
Lincoln Gardner
