Publishing its Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 on 19 March 2025, the European Commission stated from the start that “Europe faces an acute and growing threat” and that, although the EU states have the “potential to unleash vast resources and latent technological and industrial power”, they are starting from a position in which their defence readiness “has been weakened by decades of under-investment”.
In light of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the White Paper acknowledged that the “political equilibrium that emerged from the end of the Second World War and then the conclusion of the Cold War has been severely disrupted” and “is not coming back”.
“Against this backdrop,” the White Paper stated, “Europe faces a fundamental choice about its future” and that “The moment has come for Europe to re-arm.” This, the paper conceded, requires “a massive investment over a sustained period” in which the EU states “must accelerate work on all strands to urgently ramp up European defence readiness to ensure that Europe has a strong and sufficient European defence posture by 2030 at the latest”.
The purpose of the White Paper, it stated, is to provide “a framework for the ReArm Europe plan, laying out the case for a once-in-a-generation surge in European defence investment. It sets out the necessary steps to rebuild European defence, to support Ukraine, address critical capability shortfalls and establish a strong and competitive defence-industrial base.”
Explaining the rapidly deteriorating strategic context in which Europe now finds itself, the White Paper pointed out that, even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the continent’s “proximity to North Africa and the Middle East makes Europe a receptacle for the spill-over of the wars, migration, and effects of climate change that have afflicted these regions. The paper also stated that the Artic to the north “is becoming a new arena of geopolitical competition” while diplomatically noting that “the United States, traditionally a strong ally, is clear that it believes it is over-committed in Europe and needs to rebalance, reducing its historical role as a primary security guarantor”.
Russia
Asserting that, at least in the short term, “the future of Europe is being determined by the fight in Ukraine”, the White Paper stated that Russia “will continue to scale up its war economy, supported by Belarus, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Iran. Russia has been massively expanding its military-industrial production capacity with an estimated spending in 2024 of 40% of the Russian federal budget and up to 9% of its GDP (up from 6% in 2023) on defence.”
The White Paper warned that “If Russia is allowed to achieve its goals in Ukraine, its territorial ambition will extend beyond”, adding that Russia “will remain a fundamental threat to Europe’s security for the foreseeable future”.
Noting that Moscow “is exploiting a network of systemic instability, including through close co-operation with other authoritarian powers”, the White Paper asserted that Russia “is persistently fuelling tensions and instability in Europe’s neighbourhood, whether it is in the Western Balkans, Georgia, Moldova or Armenia, and has a growing destabilising influence in Africa.”
European readiness
While stressing that individual EU member states will always retain responsibility for their own troops, doctrine and deployments, the White Paper noted how the EU brings added value by facilitating greater collaboration.
The EU also provides a framework for a unified response; the White Paper, for example, will be followed by the publication of two EU strategies: the Preparedness Union Strategy, which will set out an integrated all-hazards approach to preparedness for conflicts and crises; and the EU Internal Security Strategy, which will provide a comprehensive and unified framework to prevent, detect and respond effectively to security threats.
Meanwhile, the White Paper laid out seven critical capability gaps that EU member states most urgently need to address:
- integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) against the full spectrum of air threats;
- artillery systems, including the capability for deep precision strike;
- ammunition and missiles, including a strategic stockpile of munitions and the capacity to ensure timely replenishment;
- drones and counter-drone systems, including aerial, ground, surface and underwater vehicles that can be controlled remotely or operate autonomously;
- military mobility, involving an EU-wide network of land corridors, airports, seaports and support elements and services that facilitate the seamless and rapid transport of troops and military equipment across the EU and partner countries;
- artificial intelligence (AI), quantum, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities that can ensure the unhindered use of the electromagnetic spectrum for land, air, space and naval forces while denying its use by an opponent, along with a similar freedom to operate in cyber space;
- and strategic enablers in combination with critical infrastructure protection, including but not limited to strategic airlift and air-to-air refuelling capabilities, intelligence and surveillance, maritime domain awareness, use and protection of space and other secure communications assets and military fuel infrastructure.
Military support for Ukraine
Noting that, since February 2022, the EU and member states have provided around EUR 50 billion in military support to Ukraine, the White Paper acknowledged that Ukraine’s defence needs “will continue to be high well beyond any short-term ceasefire or peace agreement” and that Ukraine “will remain at the front line of European defence and security”.
EU military support to Ukraine, the White Paper said, should focus on two mutually reinforcing priorities: stepping up EU military and other forms of assistance to Ukraine; and associating Ukraine with EU initiatives to develop defence capabilities and integrate the respective defence industries.
With the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) remaining at the forefront of the development of more advanced large-scale defence systems and technologies, the White Paper stated that the rapid adoption of the EU’s European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) draft Regulation is a top priority. “Once agreed, it will pave the way for Ukraine’s integration in the European defence equipment market through a dedicated Ukraine Support Instrument (USI) and by opening the programme’s activities to Ukraine’s participation,” the White Paper stated.
EU defence spending
The White Paper noted that EU member states’ defence spending “has grown by more than 31% since 2021, reaching 1.9% of the EU’s combined GDP, or EUR 326 billion, in 2024. Specifically, defence investment reached an unprecedented EUR 102 billion in 2024, almost doubling the amount spent in 2021.”
The paper cautioned, however, that European defence spending still remains far lower than that of the United States and, more worryingly, below that of Russia or China. With this in mind, the paper noted that the EU Commission’s ReArm Europe Plan has identified five pillars to urgently and significantly step up European defence spending:
- a new, dedicated financial instrument to support member states’ defence investments;
- the co-ordinated activation of the National Escape Clause of the Stability and Growth Pact to unlock additional flexibility for higher defence expenditure;
- making existing EU instruments more flexible to allow greater defence investment;
- contributions from the European Investment Bank;
- mobilising private capital, in the acknowledgement that, while boosting public investment in defence is indispensable, it will not be sufficient.
The paper added that the EU Commission will continue to explore additional funding sources for defence at EU level and further elements and options to substantially boost financing for European defence and to strengthen the EDTIB.
Enhanced security through partnerships
Stressing that security challenges often have global implications, meaning that co-operation with international partners is also key to tackle the challenges of European defence, the White Paper identified a number of important partnerships. While acknowledging that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence of its members in Europe and that EU-NATO co-operation is an indispensable pillar for the development of the EU’s security and defence, the White Paper conceded that, notwithstanding the current rift with the US Trump Administration, “a strong transatlantic bond remains crucial for Europe’s defence”. In this respect the White Paper simply stated that the United States “demands that Europe takes more responsibility for its own defence” and that these efforts “shall continue to build on the deep and extensive transatlantic supply chain, which should be mutually beneficial”. The paper thus avoided mentioning any overt criticism or lack of trust in the US Trump Administration, even though EU leaders such as German chancellor-in-waiting Friedrich Merz have clearly articulated that Europe can no longer assume that the United States will always be a dependable ally.
On the other hand, the White Paper stated that the United Kingdom is, indeed “an essential European ally with which co-operation on security and defence should be enhanced in mutual interest”.
The paper also noted Norway being a full partner in EU defence programmes through its contribution to the EU budget and that the EU’s co-operation with Canada has intensified.
The paper additionally mentioned that the EU “should continue mutually beneficial engagement and cooperation in the field of security and defence with all like-minded European, enlargement and neighbouring countries (including Albania, Iceland, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, North Macedonia and Switzerland) and should continue to engage constructively with Türkiye as a candidate country for accession to the EU.
Looking further afield, the White Paper said the EU “should also explore opportunities for defence-industrial co-operation with Indo-Pacific partners, notably Japan and the Republic of Korea, with which Security and Defence Partnerships were concluded last November, as well as Australia and New Zealand”. It also mentioned that security and defence co-operation with India has developed over the past years.
In conclusion, the White Paper emphasised that the EU “is and remains a peace project”, while asserting that it “must be able to protect its citizens, defend its interests and the values it stands for” and that Ukraine “deserves continued military support to defend itself against continued military aggression and to ensure that it can defend itself in the future.
In its final remark, the White paper stated, “A surge in defence investment would have positive spillover effects across the economy, contributing to competitiveness, job creation and innovation in many sectors, from aeronautics to shipbuilding, from steel to space, transport to AI. Harnessed correctly, this could lead to a major leap in European resilience in a world where threats are proliferating.”
