Engine problems: The industrial dysfunction degrading Russia’s strategic bomber force
Maxim Starchak
Russia’s strategic aviation plans face critical bottlenecks as engine manufacturer Kuznetsov struggles with quality control, sanctions and technological obsolescence – undermining Russia’s modernisation efforts for its strategic bomber fleet.
On 16 April 2025 United Engine Corporation (UEC) subsidiary Kuznetsov filed a lawsuit with the Moscow Arbitration Court to recover RUB 425 million (EUR 4.51 million) from the Tupolev aircraft manufacturing company. Despite the fact that the essence of the lawsuit was not disclosed, given the general problems with engine production, Kuznetsov appears to be trying to shift part of the responsibility for problems with testing and using its engines to Tupolev.
The powerplant sector remains the weakest link in the entire Russian aircraft industry. Very few truly breakthrough projects have been implemented during the entire period of UEC’s work, despite the fact that UEC regularly reports on its current successes. This contrasts with the failures that are not commonly talked about in Russia. For example, in 2021 China decided to abandon purchases of Russian AL-31F aircraft engines for its fifth-generation fighters due to their inadequate quality.
After the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022, additional problems appeared in Russia’s engine industry. Over the past three years UEC and its plants have begun to receive lawsuits worth several billion rubles due to the lack of engine supplies within contract periods and inadequate quality. In turn, UEC plants began to justify their problems in the arbitration courts by citing the sanctions imposed against them.
In particular, there are problems with engines for strategic aviation. On 11 March 2024, when a Tu-160M Ilya Muromets aircraft (tail number 801) was preparing for take-off, one of its NK-32 engines caught fire and subsequently burned down. As a result of the fire spreading, three more engines were destroyed and the aircraft was significantly damaged. This was notable because just weeks earlier, on 22 February 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a propaganda flight on precisely that aircraft.
The fire and explosion in the NK-32 engine on 11 March 2024, according to Temp Company, was the result of a defective support for the engine turbine. Temp Company is a developer of hydromechanical and electronic fuel supply systems for these engines. As Temp Company informed in its open letter, the Aerospace Forces Commission has discovered up to 10 more faulty NK-32 engines.
The NK-32 faces delays
The NK-32 is a Soviet-designed engine developed in the 1970s that was discontinued in 1993 and resumed production in 2014. According to Michael Jerdev, a Russian independent military expert, “UEC-Kuznetsov, having lost all technical competencies and personnel in the 1990s, could not quickly implement even such an old project as the NK-32.”
Production of the NK-32 engine is an important part of the Tu-160 reproduction programme. Therefore, in 2014, it was decided to reproduce the Soviet-designed engine with some improvements as the NK-32-02. According to UEC itself, the main technical characteristics remained the same. Afterburner thrust is 25,000 kgf, but, due to various improvements, it was possible to reduce fuel consumption by about 10%, which is why the flight range of the Tu-160M increased by 1,000 km, and, depending on the mode, the engine life has been increased from 2,000 to 2,500 hours.
However, the production of NK-32 engines depends on production of the Tu-160. In 2011, when mass production of the NK-32 was being discussed, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) did not want to order dozens of engines at once, as the production and modernisation of Tu-160M aircraft was a slow process. As a result, engines were ordered in small batches and producing them became a long and expensive process for the Kuznetsov plant. To illustrate the problem, in 2016 a contract was signed for the production of an initial batch of six NK-32-02 engines, followed in 2018 by a contract for the serial production of 22 engines, and one in 2021 for a further 24 units, eight of which were to be transferred within two years. The first batch of Kuznetsov engines was delivered only in 2020 and by the end of 2022 Kuznetsov was able to supply only 20 engines – enough for just five aircraft.
Kuznetsov’s production woes
Modernisation of the Kuznetsov plant was supposed to help the production of engines for state defence orders. To create new NK-32-02 engines Kuznetsov attracted RUB 40 billion. As reported by UEC, 15 workshops have been upgraded and work continues on seven more. The plant also received 230 units of new equipment. Another 125 units were supposed to arrive after 2022, although this is unlikely to have happened since the supplier of Western equipment, Galika-Met Company, refused to fulfil the contract in 2022, citing the sanctions imposed on Russia. The non-delivered equipment was valued at RUB 407 million.
According to Jerdev, this is due to decades of underfunding and loss of competencies within the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Aviation Materials, which is meant to develop the relevant materials.
Many workers note that, despite the declared billions of Rubles invested in the modernisation of the Kuznetsov plant, the equipment in many workshops is outdated, inherited from Soviet times. Many old machines are not working and have been left idle and unrepaired. There is a lack of modern machines and the new equipment that is available does not have the required tooling. Further factors include the planning department setting unrealistic deadlines for manufacturing parts, while excessive bureaucracy also reduces work efficiency, with paperwork required for every action and process, and a low level of communication between departments further slows down the implementation of tasks. Additionally, working conditions are poor, pipes are leaking in some places, there is no heating, and there are broken windows and rooms that have not been repaired since the 1980s and 1990s.
In addition, according to a process engineer who has been working for UEC-Kuznetsov for five years, the department heads do not differentiate the professional competencies of employees; process engineers are forced to do everything for everyone. According to another engineer, this is due to a lack of qualified personnel.
Despite the Ukraine War and the fact that many finances were channelled into the defence industry, this did not affect Kuznetsov. The promised high salaries turned out to be low in reality, since it is almost impossible to fulfil the conditions for receiving them. Junior employees receive RUB 35,000 after deductions of taxes. Janitors now get the same amount, according to an employee of the plant.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that Kuznetsov has been a deeply unprofitable enterprise for many years. According to the company’s reports, in 2023 Kuznetsov had net losses of RUB 3.391 billion – an increase by a factor of 1.5 compared to 2022. According to Khamovich, “this is largely due to the inexorable growth of accounts payable”. According to the SPARK-Interfax system and the company’s reporting, the total amount of accumulated losses since 2018 has amounted to about RUB 18 billion.
Kuznetsov has also been sued for hundreds of millions of Rubles by its customers due to the improper fulfilment of contracts and has debts on payments to utility companies. Due to losses associated with these, in May 2024 the Kuznetsov Board of Directors recommended withholding dividend payments for 2023 earnings. In addition, in an effort to obtain finances for current activities in order to fulfil state defence orders, in 2023 Kuznetsov issued additional shares worth RUB 42 billion. In December 2024 the plant tried to solve its financial stability problems through mass dismissal of certain categories of employees, such as those past or close to retirement age, along with interns. The reason this situation occurred is that, when the Ukraine War broke out, Russia’s defence industry needed new employees to meet demand. However, due the skills shortages in the labour market, many enterprises were forced to turn to hiring people who had already retired. With demand decreasing, the need for much of this surge capacity has now gone, and so to save on salary costs many personnel who were either beyond or close to retirement age were therefore dismissed, along with interns.
Kuznetsov could fulfil its obligations if it fulfilled state defence orders in a timely and high-quality manner, but this is not happening, said Khamovich. For example, in 2018 a new NK-32-02 engine broke down on its test bench due to a rupture in its turbine blades. Following this, the problem could not be fully resolved and in 2022 the Russian MoD sued Kuznetsov, demanding the recovery of RUB 237 million in penalties. The claim was partially satisfied and the plant was brought to administrative responsibility due to deficiencies in product quality and non-compliance with technical specifications.
In 2022, according to Alexey Sobolev, the managing director of Kuznetsov, one of the problems faced by the plant was the need to find alternative sources of Western components. An electrician and a manufacturing engineer at the plant, on condition of anonymity, reported that the plant is experiencing a constant shortage of components. Prior to sanctions being imposed, many components could be sourced within approximately 10-60 days; now, however, their delivery can take around a year.
All of Kuznetsov’s engines have foreign components and attempts to replace them with Russian equivalents of insufficient quality have led to engine problems. Of course, these problems will ultimately be solved, but it will take additional time, said one engineer.
No alternative
Despite the aforementioned troubles with the production of NK-32 engines, the order for them will not be abandoned since there is no alternative powerplant available for the Tu-160M or the Tupolev PAK DA future bomber. As such, the lack of quality and production delays at the Kuznetsov plant will be tolerated. However, the timescales required for engine production under these conditions remain uncertain.
All of this, of course, has meant an uncertain production schedule for Russia’s Tu-160M strategic bombers. By the end of 2024 the Russian MoD had not received its two required aircraft and, at the current rate, it is unclear when or even if the planned order for 50 Tu-160Ms will be completed.
A chronic problem is thus emerging in Russia’s engine industry, driven by shortages of foreign components, technologies and finances, and plagued by delays and insufficient quality. The overall effect of this is the deterrence potential of Russia’s strategic bomber force is being significantly hindered and undermined.
