The long road to Altay

Launched in 2007 as an ambitious Turkish programme for domestic tank production, the Altay has faced years of delays due to powerpack procurement challenges and contractor changes. This article traces the complex journey from concept to the New Altay variant unveiled in 2023.

Over the last few decades, Türkiye’s defence industry evolved and improved in many areas, reflecting the country’s strategic priority of shifting towards self-sufficiency in defence materiel. The Altay programme is one of the standouts of this effort. Launched in 2007, the Altay programme aims to deliver a domestically-developed main battle tank (MBT), using Türkiye’s growing expertise in armoured vehicle production. While it has experienced significant issues including powerpack procurement difficulties and an unexpected change in prime contractor from Otokar to BMC Otomotiv, the programme has nonetheless progressed, with the New Altay variant unveiled in 2023 showcasing a design with an increasingly greater share of domestic production. This article traces the historical, political, and technical journey of the Altay programme culminating with the most the recent iteration of the design.

The foundations of the Turkish arms industry

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and its immediate consequences represent the most significant catalyst for the development of Türkiye’s defence industry. In response to the invasion and subsequent occupation of northern Cyprus, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Türkiye. Although the embargo was lifted in 1978, its lasting impact was profound: it underscored to the Turkish state the necessity of reducing reliance on Western arms manufacturers and fostering a robust domestic defence industry to safeguard its regional interests independently.

This presented a formidable challenge, requiring multi-generational planning and sustained effort. It necessitated transitioning the Turkish military from its reliance on purchasing surplus American equipment at favourable prices, which had enabled Türkiye to maintain a large standing army. At the time, Türkiye possessed limited expertise in developing weapon systems and platforms. Apart from minor experiments during the interwar period and a brief attempt to develop a domestic armoured personnel carrier (APC) in the 1950s, the abundance and affordability of foreign equipment made it difficult to justify allocating funds and resources to indigenous designs.

In the late-1970s, regional developments, notably the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent Iran-Iraq War, significantly enhanced Türkiye’s strategic importance to the United States’ interests in the region. The 1980 military coup, led by General Kenan Evren, ended a prolonged period of political violence and instability. With the military in control, redirecting resources towards defence became more straightforward. Economic reforms aimed at opening Türkiye’s economy to foreign investment were accompanied by legislation enabling private enterprises to collaborate with international partners to license-produce or co-develop defence materiel. The establishment of the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı; SSM – now known as the Savunma Sanayii Başkanlığı (SSB)), a state agency responsible for overseeing competition, contracting, production, and delivery of major defence programmes, combined with sufficient state funding, created a conducive environment for numerous license-produced products and technology transfers. This facilitated development of new weapons and platforms across all domains. The flagship achievement of this era was undoubtedly the F-16 production line, licensed from General Dynamics, alongside a joint venture with General Electric for the F110 engines.

The production of a tracked APC marked a significant milestone in Türkiye’s experience of manufacturing armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs). This began with the ZMA-15, more commonly known as the Armoured Combat Vehicle-15 (ACV-15). This vehicle resulted from a consortium between FMC Corporation and Nurol Holding, forming FNSS Savunma Sistemleri, with technology transfer based on the Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle (AIFV), a derivative of the widely-produced M113 platform. The choice of such a platform was likely motivated by the fact that the Turkish Army was already a user of the M113 and was thus familiar with its design and operational usage.

 

This initiative provided Türkiye with critical expertise in constructing tracked AFVs. With the base design established, it enabled local efforts to enhance the platform and develop indigenous subsystems and components. Combined with numerous other licensed-production agreements and technology transfers, this fostered the emergence of a domestic defence ecosystem.

On the road to domestic tank production

In contrast to the prevailing trend of the 1990s and early-2000s when the ‘peace dividend’ led to the reduction or cancellation of programmes aimed at modernising or procuring new equipment, Türkiye sustained its investment in its armed forces.

The initial step towards developing a new MBT was taken in January 1997, with a request for information inviting proposals to supply up to 1,000 MBTs to the Turkish Army through a decade-long programme, later named ‘Tank-2000’. The selected bidder would supply 250 MBTs, with an additional 750 to be produced in Türkiye under a licensing agreement. The four final contenders were the Leopard 2A6, M1A2 Abrams, Leclerc, and T-84-120 Yatagan.

Despite extensive trials in both Türkiye and the contenders’ countries of origin, the tender was ultimately cancelled, primarily due to cost constraints. The programme also represented an opportunity for Türkiye to acquire expertise in modern tank production, an opportunity lost with its cancellation. To address the ongoing need for armoured vehicles, Türkiye instead secured a smaller purchase of surplus Leopard 2A4s from Germany in 2005.

Concurrently, Türkiye sought to modernise one of the most numerous types in its tank fleet, the M60 Patton. As one of the largest operators of this platform, Türkiye aimed to upgrade a portion of its M60A1 fleet. In 2002, a contract was awarded to Israel Military Industries (IMI) for the modernisation of the M60A1, enhancing the vehicle’s protection, firepower, powertrain, and sensors.

Designated the Sabra Mk II internationally and the M60T in Turkish service, the majority of these upgraded tanks were fitted out at the Turkish Army’s 2nd Main Maintenance Factory Directorate in Kayseri. Technology transfer agreements enabled Makine ve Kimya Endüstrisi (MKE) to produce the IMI 120 mm smoothbore gun and its ammunition under licence, while Aselsan acquired the technology to manufacture the tank’s FCS.

By the mid-2000s, the foundational requirements for domestic tank production were gradually taking shape. Türkiye had accumulated over a decade of experience in producing tracked AFVs through the manufacture of the ACV-15 and its derivatives. Although unsuccessful, the Tank-2000 tender provided valuable exposure to the most technologically advanced MBTs available for export at the time, each exemplifying distinct approaches to modern tank design. Additionally, the M60T upgrade facilitated the transfer of critical technologies and expertise essential for tank production.

Beyond the accumulation of limited expertise, other factors in the 1990s and 2000s provided impetus for the development of a domestic tank programme. While much of Western Europe benefited from a ‘peace dividend’ following the end of the Cold War in 1991, Türkiye faced escalating violence in its longstanding conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and engaged in several skirmishes with Greece. It also was closely situated to conflicts occurring in the Levant, the western Balkans, and the southern Caucasus. The continued PKK conflict significantly hindered Türkiye’s ability to procure military equipment from some Western partners, notably Germany, which would later go onto to have an impact on the Altay programme.

The victory of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party in the November 2002 general election marked a transformative era for Türkiye, particularly for its economy, which experienced a robust boom as apart of economic liberalisation policies. Strengthened by economic growth, Erdoğan’s administration pursued ambitious national megaprojects to elevate Türkiye’s global standing and galvanise domestic support, projecting the nation as a revitalised, dynamic regional power. Despite the challenges and costs of domestic tank production, such an endeavour aligned with the assertive and ambitious character of Erdoğan’s leadership.

The birth of the Altay programme

In 2005, the SSM tasked local industry with assessing the feasibility of a domestic tank design. The selected companies were BMC Otomotiv, FNSS Savunma Sistemleri, and Otokar Automotive and Defence Industry. At that time, only FNSS had experience in producing tracked armoured vehicles. By April 2005, the feasibility study concluded that, while domestic tank production was achievable, it would require significant technical support from abroad to make up for a lack of domestic expertise. In February 2006, the SSM issued a request for proposals to local industry to explore potential designs and their scalability through state funding, with the aim of selecting a prime contractor by February 2007.

On 30 March 2007, the Defence Industry Executive Committee, chaired by then-Prime Minister Erdoğan, officially announced the National Tank Production Project (NTPP), with Otokar Automotive and Defence Industry appointed as the lead contractor for the USD 490 million project, tasked with delivering four prototypes. Otokar collaborated with other local companies, including Roketsan, which would develop the armour package, MKE, which would produce the 120 mm smoothbore gun, and Aselsan, which would design the FCS and command-and-control (C2) system. Notably, the SSM, representing the Turkish state, retained intellectual property rights for all outcomes of the NTPP.

Despite the project’s ambition, it was recognised that foreign expertise was essential for success. Türkiye’s options were limited due to prior challenges with European manufacturers and concerns over potential restrictions on US technology, which could constrain the final product. Consequently, Türkiye pursued a fully indigenous design supported by expertise free of political constraints. In the summer of 2008, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the Turkish and South Korean governments to facilitate technical assistance for the NTPP, with Hyundai Rotem, developer of the K2 Black Panther MBT, selected to provide technical support. Indeed, Altay would end up bearing quite a few external similarities to K2, although Altay features a longer hull with seven (as opposed to six) roadwheels, along with being significantly heavier due to more passive armour.

With foreign technical assistance secured, a contract was signed with Otokar, outlining an ambitious 78-month development programme. At this stage, the project was officially named ‘Altay’, after General Fahrettin Altay, who commanded the Fifth Cavalry Corps during the Turkish War of Independence.

Initial Altay programme development

With the programme now funded and aided with Hyundai’s expertise, the programme was set out into three phases with an initial completion date of 2012 for the final prototypes. Below were the phases, their activities, and timelines:

• Phase I (2009-2010): Focused on conceptualising the base design. Otokar signed a contract with MTU and RENK for five units of the EuroPowerPack required to develop five prototypes.
• Phase II (2010-2012): Involved detailed design of the platform and construction of two test rigs – Mobility Test Rig (MTR) and Firing Test Rig (FTR) – completed in 2012.
• Phase III (2012-2016 (est.)): Utilised test rig data to develop two Altay prototype vehicles (PVs): PV1 and PV2. In addition, a ballistic hull and turret rig were produced and used in ballistic tests.

As mentioned in the testing phase layout, initially five Altay prototypes would be developed, with one being a used for ballistic testing (not included below):

Altay MTR (Mobility Test Rig)

The Altay MTR was the first prototype of the Altay tank, developed and tested during Phase II of the Altay programme. Completed in late 2011, the MTR began testing in early-2012. Initially, the MTR was tested without a turret, using weights to simulate the final configuration, as the final working subsystems and the main gun were not ready at this point. It would eventually be publicly unveiled with an earlier turret design that had more rounded turret cheeks.

 

The Altay MTR was powered by the EuroPowerPack, comprising an MTU MT883 KA-501 diesel engine delivering 1,500 hp and a RENK HSWL 295TM transmission system. This would be the same for other mobile prototypes.

Altay FTR (Firing Test Rig)

The Altay FTR, the second prototype of the Altay tank, was also developed and tested during Phase II of the Altay programme, with production of the FTR carried out concurrently with the MTR. In 2012, at Otokar’s Arifiye facility in Sakarya province, the FTR and MTR made their public debut. A year later, in 2013, the FTR conducted its first live firing tests, marking the successful integration and operation of the Altay’s main gun. The FTR had one unique element from the MTR in that it had received the 7.62 mm SARP remote weapon station (RWS) from Aselsan as a part of its firing trials.

Altay prototype vehicles 1&2 (PV1&2)

The Altay PV1 and PV2, the two detailed prototypes of the Altay, were developed during Phase III of the Altay programme after tests of the preliminary MTR and FTR. Authorised by Otokar, these identical prototypes were delivered in 2016 and underwent testing, including live firing, off-road mobility, and hot/cold weather trials. PV1 focused on driving and harsh/cold weather tests, completing a 10,000 km endurance test across varied terrains across Anatolia while PV2 conducted live-firing tests using its 120 mm MKE smoothbore gun and the Aselsan-developed VOLKAN-II FCS.

 

Programme delays

The Altay programme, ambitious given Türkiye’s limited experience in MBT production, initially aimed to deliver a finalised prototype design by late-2012 or early-2013, with serial production commencing in 2015. The development required mastering advanced technologies, including armour materials, gun and ammunition systems, engine and transmission units, and establishing a production facility capable of manufacturing significant numbers of MBTs annually for both domestic and potential export orders. Consequently, delays were not unexpected. Apart from two prototype Altays delivered in 2023, with only a further three expected in 2025, these delays have prolonged Türkiye’s reliance on ageing platforms, including the Leopard 1, Leopard 2, M48, and M60.

The primary causes of these delays were twofold: the absence of a suitable powerpack and a change in the prime contractor. The powerpack issue stemmed not only from limited local expertise in engine and transmission production but also from deteriorating relations with foreign partners, previously key suppliers of military equipment. The change in prime contractor, though ambiguous and beyond the scope of this article, further delayed the programme by several years. It would also be reasonable to suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 may have also contributed to lesser degree in the Altay programme delays, given the effect it had on global supply chains.

Powerpack selection

The most significant challenge facing the Altay programme has arguably been the inability to secure the German-origin MTU engine used in the initial prototypes. Germany has been vocal in its criticism of Türkiye’s handling of the Kurdish question over recent decades, a concern that surfaced as early as the 2000s during discussions over the sale of Leopard 2A4 tanks to Türkiye, with reservations from the German government.

Türkiye’s increasingly independent foreign policy, which began to take shape in the early-2010s amid the Syrian Civil War and the reignited Kurdish conflict, has drawn public criticism from several NATO allies, with Germany being the most prominent critic. This raises questions about the viability of Türkiye’s initial preference for the EuroPowerPack, given historical challenges with German export licensing. The preference may have been driven by the Leopard 2A4 fleet, aiming to maintain commonality in powerpack maintenance expertise.

As such, Türkiye made numerous attempts to collaborate with foreign partners to identify a suitable powerpack that could be produced domestically with full technology transfer, as detailed in Table 1.

Table 1: Summary of engine partnering attempts for the Altay programme
Partner firm(s)	Nation(s)	Powerpack (if known or estimated)	Result
MTU Solutions + RENK Group	Germany	MTU MT883 KA-501 engine + RENK HSWL 295TM transmission	Failure. Only five units of this powerpack were delivered. No further agreements outside of the initial five were completed.
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries	Japan	Type 10-derived Powerpack (estimated)	Failure. The partnership could not overcome Japan’s strict defence export legislation at the time.
Tümosan Engine and Tractor + AVL List	Türkiye + Austria	Unknown	Failure. Following the 2016 coup attempt, Austria strengthened its conditions on export licences to Türkiye, prompting Türkiye to cancel its contract with Tümosan.
Doosan and S&T	South Korea	DV27K engine + EST15K transmission	Success. Will provide the powerpack for 85 units of Altay T1 that will be delivered from 2025-2028.
BMC Power	Türkiye	BATU	In development. Will provide a powerpack for Altay T2, with 165 units ordered from 2028 onwards.

 

Table 1, ordered chronologically by planned implementation, spans over a decade of efforts to address the powerpack issue. The initial Altay prototypes were designed around the EuroPowerPack, necessitating significant redesign to accommodate the South Korean powerpack and, subsequently, a domestic alternative. This redesign, combined with protracted diplomatic and political negotiations, extended the development timeline by several years.

Change in prime contractor from Otokar to BMC

One of two primary factors contributing to the prolonged development of the Altay programme was the unexpected transition of the prime contractor role from Otokar to BMC. The reasons for this change remain largely undisclosed, with the SSM stating only that BMC provided the most competitive final offer in the second serial production tender. As previously noted, although Otokar was appointed as the prime contractor for the Altay programme, the SSM retained ownership of the design and intellectual property. Consequently, the Turkish state held ultimate authority over the selection of the production contractor, irrespective of the original designer.

Following prototype testing of the Altay PV1 and PV2 vehicles in 2015, the SSM issued a tender to determine the serial production contractor. The main contenders were again Otokar, FNSS, and BMC. As highlighted earlier, FNSS was the only company with experience in tracked armoured vehicle production when the National Tank Production Project (NTPP) commenced in 2007. By contrast, Otokar had developed significant technical expertise in designing the Altay, supported by Hyundai Rotem’s assistance in establishing a tank production facility in Arifiye for serial production. BMC, however, lacked any experience in producing tracked armoured vehicles, let alone an MBT, arguably the most complex and technologically challenging land platform.

 

Despite Otokar’s expertise, the SSM rejected its bid for serial production in June 2017. Within a month, a second tender was issued to select the production contractor. In November 2018, amidst ongoing challenges with the powerpack, BMC was awarded the contract by the now SSB (renamed from SSM to SSB in 2018). The prototype vehicles were transferred to BMC, which made minor design modifications while independently developing its own facilities for full-scale tank production.

The transition from Otokar to BMC is a complex issue, with limited publicly available information distinguishing fact from speculation. As such, this article addresses it only briefly. Nevertheless, alongside the powerpack issue, the change in prime contractor significantly delayed the Altay’s entry into service.

Changes to production schedule

In November 2018, the SSB outlined its plans for developing Altay in three variants and provided details of the planned quantities (though this would later change):

• T1 – Baseline variant: 40 units
• T2 – Upgraded variant with improved protection and situational awareness: 210 units
• T3 – Further-improved variant with unmanned turret and bustle-mounted autoloader: 1 unit (for testing purposes – final production plans were not unveiled at the time)

Not long afterwards, a T1 prototype configuration was shown at IDEF 2019, however it appears that this would not be the serial production design. At IDEX 2023, BMC unveiled the ‘Yeni Altay’ (ENG: New Altay), which builds upon the Altay T1 prototype shown at IDEF 2019. The ‘Yeni Altay’ turret’s cheeks appear slightly raised compared to the 2019 prototype, seemingly due to larger storage bins on the side and the addition of a hatch on the front-left cheek. Additionally, the configuration was fitted with a camouflage covering.

However, in most respects, the 2023 configuration carried over most key subsystems from BMC’s 2019 prototype. These included Aselsan’s Akkor hard-kill active protection system (APS), SARP remote weapon station (RWS) equipped with a 12.7 mm machine gun, Aselsan’s YAMGÖZ – a domestically produced 360° local situational awareness camera and laser-warning receiver system – and an indigenous battle management system.

In 2023, two ‘Yeni Altay’ examples were reportedly delivered to the Turkish Army for testing. A key decision made for the T1 variant is the use of the South Korean DV27K engine and EST15K transmission, with this due to be replaced by the domestic BMC Power BATU powerpack from the T2 variant onwards. The ‘Yeni Altay’ is therefore understood to be the serial production version of the T1.

 

Amid all these developments, the production plan has been modified somewhat from the original 2018 plan. On 24 February 2025, Professor Dr Haluk Görgün, President of the SSB announced a new schedule, summarised in Table 2.

Table 2: Altay production schedule (Announced February 2025)
Variant	Year	Quantity
Altay T1	2025	3
Altay T1	2026	11
Altay T1	2027	41
Altay T1	2028	30
Altay T2	2028 onward	165

 

While the overall number of tanks has stayed the same, planned T1 production numbers have doubled, while T2 numbers have decreased by 40 units. It is also noteworthy that the SSB’s 2025 announcement made no mention of the planned T3 variant, and it is possible that this project has been pushed to the right for the time being.

An additional requirement that has been mentioned by SSM in 2023 will be the need for support vehicles based on the Altay design, including armoured recovery vehicles (ARVs) and armoured engineering vehicles (AEVs). It appears that currently the Turkish Army’s main tracked ARV is based on the vintage M48 Patton. With the increased size and weight of the Altay, it is questionable such a platform could be relied upon for recovery needs. The development of support vehicles could also increase the appeal of the Altay in the export market. Support vehicles that share the same base design with the Altay would allow users to operate both the MBT and its associated support vehicles while minimising deviation in training and maintenance.

Closing thoughts

The Altay programme is an ambitious one, and 2025 is set to mark a key milestone in the form of the first serial-production Altay T1s being delivered to the Turkish military. This will mark Türkiye’s entry into a relatively small group of countries capable of domestically producing clean-sheet modern MBT designs – a group which includes, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the US. Arguably, both India and North Korea could also be counted here, though at present their contemporary designs lag behind those from the aforementioned countries.

The UK also used to be a member of this club, but has now lost this capability following BAE Systems’ closure of Armstrong Works (now owned by Pearson Engineering) in 2012, then the UK’s only factory capable of tank production. Although Challenger 3 is being produced by RBSL in the UK, it is not a clean-sheet design, but rather a deep upgrade of Challenger 2, using the same hulls and many of the same components. Israel might potentially be in a similar boat to the UK. While it has continued to upgrade its domestic Merkava family, production of Namer heavy APC hulls, which are based on that of Merkava IV, was contracted out to General Dynamics Land Systems’ Lima, Ohio plant (not clear whether partially or wholly), and it remains uncertain whether new hull production is currently active in Israel. Furthermore, no clean-sheet tank designs have publicly emerged since Merkava. Israel’s main future AFV programme of note currently is Carmel, which based on available information envisions something more in the infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) or fire support vehicle (FSV) class, rather than the MBT class. As such, there is uncertainty around whether or not Israel still retains a domestic capability to develop and field clean-sheet MBT designs.

In sum, although the Altay programme has faced delays, it has nonetheless demonstrably progressed, highlighting Türkiye’s ongoing investment in domestic defence capabilities and its intent to enhance its position in the global arms market.

Chris Mulvihill