Desolate skies: Why GBAD matters

While drones, tanks, and artillery have grabbed headlines, Ukraine’s ground-based air defence (GBAD) has quietly achieved something remarkable: keeping Russian air power mostly out of the fight for over three years. Ukraine’s experience in this sphere offers vital lessons for the future security of European NATO members.

Looking around at the bulk of NATO armed forces over the last few decades, a visible trend is the relative age and small numbers of GBAD systems in operation with many Allies. Concerns over this have been voiced at the highest levels, as during a 9 June 2025 speech at Chatham House, in which NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated that NATO needs “a 400% increase in air and missile defence”.

Neglecting GBAD has been a fairly long-running trend among many NATO Allies since the end of the Cold War, but it was not a particularly concerning capability gap during the era of the Global War on Terror, given the lack of aerial capability from the opponents of the time. Even the US could be credibly accused of slacking during this era, with its army broadly relying on PATRIOT for long-range air defence (LRAD), the Stinger-armed AN/TWQ-1 Avenger for very/short-range air defence (V/SHORAD), and the 20 mm Gatling cannon-armed Land Phalanx Weapon System for point defence of US bases, pretty much entirely in the counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) role. There was little to speak of in the way of medium-range air defence (MRAD) during this period, with I-HAWK being retired, while initiatives such as SLAMRAAM were cancelled, and NASAMS was procured only in small quantities to defend government buildings in Washington DC; though on the other hand, this period also saw the original PAC-3 (now more commonly referred to as PAC-3 CRI) come to fruition.

Granted, in the US’ case these gaps represented little in the way of meaningful weakness when considering that the country had, and continues to operate the two largest air forces in the world – the USAF and the US Navy. The same, however, cannot be said for its NATO Allies. Consequently, GBAD has represented a capability gap that European NATO members have begun scrambling to fix since Russia commenced its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.

In this vein, perhaps the most relevant current example of attempting GBAD procurement at scale is the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), which presently comprises 24 members. What is notable about ESSI is that the effort aims to steer users toward a procuring multiple systems with the goal of ensuring a multi-layer GBAD capability. The effort envisions Skyranger 30 in the VSHORAD role, IRIS-T SLM in the MRAD role, PATRIOT in the LRAD role, and Arrow-3 in the dedicated ballistic missile defence (BMD) role; all of which are systems Germany has selected for its own requirements. While this list lacks a ‘true’ dedicated SHORAD system, which should arguably also be part of any multi-layer system, the ESSI shopping list nonetheless covers most of the key areas. German industry stands to win significantly from this initiative, with the VSHORAD and MRAD components both using German-origin systems, and may also benefit somewhat from the LRAD side, given that Germany plans to domestically produce PAC-2 GEM-T missiles for PATRIOT.

The move represents a significant tonal shift for Europe, whose GBAD purchases pre-Russo-Ukrainian War often consisted of low-quantity purchases to paper over the cracks, without the impetus to drive procurement of a proper, modern multi-layer air defence network. By now, it should be especially obvious to Europe that simply purchasing a couple of MRAD batteries and calling it a day is deeply insufficient. To understand why, one need only look to Ukraine.

Ukraine: Exemplifying the value of GBAD

The Russo-Ukrainian War represents an interesting and fairly unique case study in how near-peer/peer warfare looks when both sides field large, multi-layered air defence networks. At the opening phase of the war, Ukraine operated a significantly smaller and less modern air force compared to Russia, so consequently, a greater share of the task of contesting the Russian Aerospace Forces’ (VKS’) power would need to fall on GBAD systems. In many ways Ukraine’s Soviet legacy helped it here, as the Soviet armed forces operated a very large and diverse fleet of GBAD systems covering many range and altitude bands, of which Ukraine inherited a substantial portion. Many of these older systems remained sufficiently effective against 4th-gen fighters, and were key to Ukraine preventing Russia from attaining air superiority in the opening phase of the 2022 invasion, as well as keeping Ukraine’s airspace contested in the months and years that followed.

The effect over time was that these GBAD systems effectively prevented Russia from using its fast jets to full effect, largely forcing them to operate at very low altitudes for pop-up attacks, or employing less plentiful guided munitions from standoff distances. Initially, the latter typically comprised air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), and was later supplemented by gravity bombs fitted with UMPK glide/guidance kits. Alongside these, Russia also introduced the massed one-way attack (OWA) drones such as Shahed/Geran, and others, along with decoys into its aerial threat mix.

As Ukraine burned through its legacy missile stocks, and acquired new systems and munitions from allies, its GBAD gradually Westernised, with the country now operating a large and diverse mix of US and European designs, along with some hybrid oddities such as the Buk ‘FrankenSAM’ using RIM-7/AIM-7 missiles. While such systems were often effective, Ukraine’s reliance on Western munitions introduced a vulnerability in supply – with perhaps the most concerning moments for the Ukrainian frontlines coming around February 2024, during which Ukraine’s surface-to-air missile (SAM) depletion reached critical levels. In this window, some signs of limited, localised air superiority for the VKS rapidly began to emerge, with Russian President Vladimir Putin claiming “thousands of sorties” in the operation which culminated with the fall of Avdiivka on 17 February 2024. This window was not to last, as US Congress managed to pass a long-awaited USD 60.8 billion aid package on 20 April 2024. These deliveries saw a replenishment of Ukraine’s SAM stocks, and consequently the ended the brief window in which the VKS had enjoyed localised air superiority.

 

In short, Ukraine has demonstrated the extent to which GBAD can influence the battlefield. While of course air-to-air exchanges have taken place, and manned aviation on both sides has played a role in air defence, it has not been the prime driver of the trends seen. With neither side able to employ air power in the typical desired fashion (persistent medium-altitude flight in close proximity to enemy positions, with emphasis on ground attack), the nature of the fighting was forced to become relatively static, positional, and attritional – an environment in which both artillery and small drones thrive. Both sides have nonetheless attempted to find alternative ways to employ their available air power, but GBAD has continued to prevent air power on either side from playing a decisive role.

All told, it would probably not be much of an exaggeration to argue that Ukraine’s GBAD hindered the success of Russia’s invasion more than any other single factor, due to its compounding shaping effects on the rest of the battlefield. While there are a number of shaping effects at work on the battlefield, artillery being an oft-cited example, this author would argue that there is a hierarchy of shaping effects. In the case of artillery – it is able to exert the shaping effects it does primarily due to the absence of persistent air power which under other circumstances could have located and destroyed it. Much the same could be said of drones; to my mind it is doubtful that this war would have seen the rise of small drones if Russian airborne ELINT and strike assets were free to roam Ukraine’s skies, dropping KAB-250s on any emission signature even remotely resembling a drone ground control station. More to the point, in such a scenario, the war would likely have been over long before a domestic drone industry could arise.

How applicable are these lessons to NATO?

So, what can NATO members learn from the battlefield influence of GBAD in the Russo-Ukrainian War? As ever, one should be cautious about applying lessons from this war, as many observed operational realities exist due to Ukraine’s unique circumstances vis-à-vis Russia, and may not necessarily apply in other scenarios, such as a hypothetical full-scale conflict between Russia and NATO. The latter is precisely the scenario the current wave of modernisation and rearmament is geared toward readying the Alliance for.

With that in mind, are large fleets of GBAD systems as necessary for NATO as for Ukraine? Arguably less so. For starters, air superiority over Russia was never a realistic goal for Ukraine, whose pre-war fast jet fleet largely comprised small-medium numbers of older Soviet-era 3rd/4th-gen aircraft. As such, GBAD had to shoulder the burden of keeping Russian aircraft at bay. By contrast, many NATO members operate significantly more modern, capable, and in some cases larger fighter fleets. As such, attaining air superiority should be a far more realistic goal for NATO than for Ukraine, and indeed would probably represent the Alliance’s best chance for ending a war with Russia quickly. Consequently, given NATO’s vastly superior air forces relative to Ukraine’s, it is fair to question the likelihood that GBAD would play an equally-important role in the aforementioned scenario. In a time of budgetary pressures, it may therefore seem tempting to save on GBAD to free up funding elsewhere. Yet, as tempting as that route may be, there remain many good reasons for NATO members to invest in their GBAD capabilities.

 

To begin with, some context. Despite Russia’s often poor tactical performance in Ukraine, and the superiority of NATO’s air forces, the survival of sufficient numbers of NATO fast jets for long enough to attain air superiority in a full-scale conflict with Russia should not be taken for granted. In a scenario where it is fighting NATO, Russia would be expected to invest considerable resources into destroying the Allies’ fast jet fleets on the ground, such as via ballistic and cruise missile strikes, along with using its GBAD and aviation to attrit NATO aircraft as they ventured into defended airspace to perform offensive counter-air, and suppression/destruction of enemy air defence (SEAD/DEAD). Alongside this, Russia would be expected to continue employing massed low-cost long-range precision strike means, such as OWA drones, against both military targets, as well as strategically-vital industrial and energy infrastructure. In this kind of environment, GBAD would provide a relatively low-risk form of persistent protection for strategic assets and ground formations.

First, the mere presence of larger numbers of GBAD systems, particularly long-range air defence (LRAD) systems such as PATRIOT, would restrict the freedom with which Russia’s own air forces could operate in-theatre, likely forcing the VKS to either stay further back from the front lines, or dedicate more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike assets to hunting down GBAD. This would also come at a time where they would be in very high demand for other tasks, such as locating key command and control (C2) nodes, or defensive counter-air. Likewise, the presence of GBAD could provoke the expenditure of precious high-performance munitions, either to ensure high-value targets were struck, or against the GBAD system itself.

Second, large fleets of GBAD systems would give Allies greater scope to devote fewer fast jets to the defensive counter-air role. This should not be understated – even leaving aside the cost asymmetries of using the likes of F-35 to down Shahed/Geran series OWA drones or Kalibr cruise missiles, dedicating a sizeable portion of the Allied fast jet fleet to conduct large-scale defensive counter-air also imposes an opportunity cost, insofar as these aircraft will not be usable for offensive action at the same time. Ultimately, the success of NATO attaining air superiority will hinge on the number of aircraft it is able to dedicate to offensive counter-air and SEAD/DEAD.

Third, there is a need for redundancy in case of losses. As seen in Ukraine, GBAD on both sides has suffered significant attrition, especially during the highest-intensity phase in the opening weeks of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Ukraine’s Western-built systems have thus far suffered fewer losses, however these have mostly seen action during portions of the war where hostile SEAD/DEAD was less of a risk, and Ukraine has also been more conservative with their positioning than with its Soviet legacy systems. That said, even Western systems have suffered losses during the relatively static phases of the war; most notably, Ukraine was visually confirmed to have lost part of a PATRIOT battery to a 9M723 Iskander-M strike in March 2024. What remains true for both sides, is that the relatively large GBAD fleets they started with meant they could absorb said losses without the situation turning truly catastrophic. Many NATO armies at present lack this level of redundant capability, meaning that any system losses risk leaving persistent gaps.

 

Fourth, there are some targets that fighter aircraft are simply unsuited to engaging – a case in point being ballistic missiles. At present, there is no real alternative to using ground- or sea-based systems for the ballistic missile defence (BMD) role. While not all GBAD is suited to the role, with SRBM interception typically being the domain of specialised LRAD systems, many V/SHORAD and MRAD systems nonetheless provide a level of capability against lower-tier threats such as artillery rockets or various types of precision-guided munitions, against which employing aircraft would be impractical, even though they may technically possess the requisite capability to engage such targets.

Fifth and finally, even when going up against an opponent with good SEAD/DEAD capabilities, there are a number of characteristics of GBAD systems which can make them a thorny problem to deal with effectively.

• GBAD systems can be difficult to locate, meaning an opponent needs to invest significantly in ISR to do so reliably, and often at considerable operational depths, particularly in a large theatre.
• Even when located, GBAD systems can often protect themselves against the very weapons which would typically be used to engage them. In the case of LRAD systems, these will often have V/SHORAD or MRAD systems protecting them.
• Even when engaged, GBAD systems represent quite complex targets, since they tend to operate as dispersed systems of systems comprising multiple vehicles. The system can usually keep functioning if a launch vehicle is destroyed, making total defeat of a GBAD system quite difficult. Furthermore, due to advances in networking technologies, some GBAD systems are now capable of using an allied asset’s radar picture for target tracking and even fire control, making even the loss of a GBAD system’s primary radar somewhat less of a dire prospect than in years past.
• GBAD systems exist primarily to protect other assets, so even in when they are successfully defeated, as long as the critical object or formation they are protecting survives long enough to achieve strategically-important effects, the GBAD has done its job.

In sum, large numbers of dispersed modern GBAD systems represent a genuine headache for even a well-equipped air force to deal with, and can exert considerable shaping effects on the battlefield over time if they are allowed to operate unopposed.

 

Doing things properly

When it comes to fielding a meaningful GBAD capability, there is a right way and a wrong way to do things. Perhaps the best exemplar of the former is Poland, which is currently in the process of procuring the following:

• 8 PATRIOT batteries, each comprising eight launchers (64 total) armed with PAC-3 MSE missiles (Range: ~120 km), under the Wisła programme. Deliveries to be completed in 2029.
• 23 EMADS (Narew) batteries, each comprising six launchers (138 total) armed with CAMM-ER missiles (Range: >45 km), under the Narew programme. Deliveries to be completed in 2035.
• 2 EMADS (Mała Narew) batteries, each comprising six launchers (12 total), armed with CAMM missiles (Range: >25 km), under the Mała Narew programme. Deliveries completed in 2023. It is unclear whether or not these will eventually be folded into Pilica+ batteries.
• 22 Pilica+ batteries, each comprising six SPAAGMs (132 total) armed with both twin-23 mm cannons and Piorun missiles (Range: 6.5 km); additionally each battery receives two separate launchers (44 total) armed with CAMM missiles (Range: >25 km), under the Pilica+ programme. Deliveries to be completed in 2029.
• 79 Poprad launch vehicles (split between eight formations and a training school), armed with either Grom (Range: 5.5 km) or Piorun missiles (Range: 6.5 km). Deliveries completed in 2021.
• Collaboration between MBDA and PGZ in the development of the CAMM-MR missile, purportedly slated to have a range of approximately 100 km. Planned to eventually enter service with Poland on both land and naval platforms.

As things currently stand, in 2035 Poland will possess probably the largest, and one of the most modern GBAD system fleets among all European NATO Allies. The fleet will be capable of combating a wide variety of threats, including small drones, cruise missiles and PGMs, modern fast jets, and SRBMs. This represents a remarkable turnaround in a relatively short span of time, especially considering the Polish Army had previously not procured any new GBAD systems, aside from man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), since the Cold War.

Moreover, in a synergistic move Poland has opted for a common C2 system for its PATRIOT and its Narew batteries in the form of IBCS. This not only provides it with a modern, capable C2 system, but one which has already been integrated with F-35, which Poland is also procuring. This would in principle enable targeting data sharing across PATRIOT, Narew, and F-35. The most likely envisioned use cases would include, for instance, using F-35 radar data to enable PATRIOT and Narew batteries to conduct engagements below their own ground-based radar horizon, as may be required against very low-flying threats such as cruise missiles. This data-sharing capability would also enable redundancy in case of a ground-based radar being jammed or lost.

By contrast, the British Army is a notable example of chronic under-investment in GBAD, especially relative to the country’s technological and economic potential. As with many countries, the UK’s GBAD acquisitions were fairly limited in the decades following the Cold War, with the primary system for 27 years being Rapier FSC, a SHORAD system which served from 1995 until its retirement in January 2022. Rapier was formally replaced in service by Sky Sabre, which is the service name for the UK’s specific configuration of EMADS, equipped with CAMM missiles. Although often referred to as SHORAD, it would more accurately be described as sitting at the lower end of the MRAD band. While Sky Sabre is a modern, capable system which represents a substantial improvement over the old Rapier FSC system, the UK’s overall GBAD picture nonetheless does not look particularly rosy. The two key problems here concern quantity and diversity.

 

At present, 16th Regiment Royal Artillery is understood to operate just four Sky Sabre batteries, each with three launchers (for a total of 12). On the V/SHORAD front, IISS’ The Military Balance 2025 publication cites a figure of 38 FV4333 Stormer vehicles in service with the UK, which can be armed with Starstreak (Range: 5.5 km) or LMM missiles (Range: 8 km). Aside from some MANPADS, that is effectively the sum total of the British Army’s GBAD at present. Based on a rough calculation, the British Army’s current capability results in a theoretical maximum defended footprint similar to just the organic GBAD available to two Russian tank divisions. While this is admittedly a somewhat flippant example, as different systems have varying typical deployment distances between launchers and command posts which can influence the real defended footprint greatly, it nonetheless serves as a rough litmus test of capability. All told, things could be better.

Regarding diversity, the Army currently fields only V/SHORAD and MRAD systems; it has neither LRAD, nor BMD capability. As things stand, this leaves the UK with no answer to the likes of 9M723 Iskander-M or Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, both of which have been commonly used by Russia in Ukraine. Through the Royal Navy’s Type 45 Destroyers, the UK does have Aster-30 missiles, which in theory would be capable of dealing with the aforementioned threats – although reports from Ukraine in early 2025 suggested otherwise. In any case, being ship-based, these would be of limited utility in the context of a land war occurring deep into the European continent. As things currently stand, the UK’s main options for force protection in a NATO-Russia scenario would seem to comprise: relying on Allied GBAD to plug the Army’s gaps, and/or dedicating at least some of its fast jets to a defensive role. Thus far, the MoD has signalled it is pursuing the latter approach in the 2025 Strategic Defence Review, stating: “The RAF combat air force provides the core of UK IAMD ‘effect’ capability, with Typhoon and F-35 providing the UK and NATO with air defence against air and cruise missile attack.”

Filling the gaps in the UK’s GBAD would require substantial investment, but there have been some small signs that the MoD intends to consider the issue more seriously. Among these is the UK-led DIAMOND initiative, which according to an MoD statement aims “to integrate NATO’s missile defences, while also pledging to develop new long-range, cutting-edge missiles, improving the Alliance’s collective air defence and offering opportunities to the UK defence industry”. However, until hard figures are revealed by the MoD in its 2025 ‘Defence Investment Plan’, slated for publication at some point in the autumn, it is difficult to assess the extent of the UK’s ambitions in this field.

 

An oppressive layer

In general, it is fair to say that GBAD has not enjoyed quite the same level of attention or credit for its role in the Russo-Ukrainian War as many other weapons. This was especially the case during the first two years, where the main references to it consisted of mocking calls of ‘what air defence is doing?’ on social media.

Some of this was due to poor public understanding of GBAD. Strikes on positions happen, so people assume air defence doesn’t work. GBAD system components get destroyed, so people assume they’re useless. Few confirmed kills are posted on social media, so people assume targets aren’t being intercepted. Additionally, there’s the problem of attrition inflation in the public imagination – mainstream press are used to dealing with single-vehicle systems such as tanks, whereas many GBAD systems are multi-vehicle systems. The result has been that media will be far more likely to report something like ‘two S-400 systems destroyed’ rather than the more accurate ‘two 5P85TM launchers destroyed’ – which would be just a portion of an S-400 battery. This isn’t helped by the myriad variations in air defence system sizes among different systems and users, with terms such as ‘fire unit’, ‘battery’, to the Russian ‘divizion’ and ‘polkovoi komplekt’ – all of which can be confusing.

Attitudes did start to change somewhat as the war dragged on, especially as Ukraine’s air defenders began to regularly post regular interception reports on social media, and increasing insight into the nature of the fighting began to drip-feed into public discourse. However, perceptions of GBAD’s importance are difficult to shift, and fundamentally this comes down to GBAD being a low-propaganda value weapon, unsuited to the information war for several reasons.

For starters, given the massive area in which aerial targets could fall after being downed, many GBAD successes become confirmed only much later, such as when one side captures an area where an aircraft wreckage landed – yet this could take weeks, months, years, or in some cases might never happen. Such was the case with Bayraktar TB2 – the flurry of TB2 strikes published to social media led to it being hailed as a wonder weapon in the public imagination, even having a song written about it. However, the reality on the ground looked quite different – by the fourth week of Russia’s 2022 invasion, new clips of TB2 strikes had dried up almost entirely. Then, only many weeks later as Russian ground forces gained ground in some sectors, they began posting photos of TB2 wreckages they had found to social media. Since the opening weeks, there have been only a small handful of new clips of TB2 strikes, broadly restricted to portions of the Black Sea.

Next, aside from some very kinds of short-range engagements such as those against small drones, most engagements (especially those against the highest-value targets) will tend to happen beyond visual ranges, sometimes even beyond the range of a system’s optoelectronic sights (if present), meaning they can only be seen on radar. Simply put, video footage of a track on a radar screen losing altitude doesn’t make for compelling sharable social media content in quite the same visceral manner as a first-person view (FPV) drone strike.

Yet the effects of air defence in the Russo-Ukrainian War become fairly evident when looking for notable absences on the wider battlefield. Are fast jets regularly flying at medium-high altitudes close to the front lines? Are drones in the medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) or similar class being observed in use? Are deployments via parachute being carried out? Are attack helicopters being used in offensive operations? After the high-intensity opening phase of fighting, the answer to all of these broadly became no. In this capacity, GBAD has served as an invisible, oppressive layer hanging over the battlefield in Ukraine, greatly limiting the utility of manned aviation for over three years. Within this kind of environment, both sides began to understand that regular flight along the frontline would only be possible by going small, cheap, and unmanned.

Mark Cazalet

Mark Cazalet is the Editor-in-Chief of ESD. Previously, he worked for Janes as a Senior Analyst on the Land Warfare Team, and Editor of the Janes Artillery and Air Defence, and Janes Firepower, Survivability and Mobility yearbooks. Prior to that he worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), contributing to The Military Balance.