Assessing Serbia’s ground forces procurement efforts

Serbia has undertaken a sustained effort to modernise its land forces, balancing legacy Yugoslav-era weapons with new domestic developments and selective foreign acquisitions.

As a diplomatically neutral state in a region increasingly integrated into Western-aligned political and military structures, Serbia faces growing pressure to maintain sovereign and credible defence capabilities, having faced painful consequences from the conflicts of the 1990s – most notably the de-facto independence of Kosovo. This pressure has only intensified with the recent Joint Declaration on Defence Cooperation signed in Tirana in March 2025 by Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo, further highlighting Serbia’s regional isolation. While Serbia’s procurement is limited to air and land platforms, this article will focus solely on Serbia’s land programme acquisitions which have received less comprehensive coverage in recent times. These land programmes reflect Belgrade’s attempt to build a credible sovereign defence capability, deter adversaries from potentially targeting Serb territory or ethnic Serb populations, and discourage what Belgrade often views as escalatory actions by Pristina in the areas of northern Kosovo predominantly populated by ethnic Serbs.

Serbian defence policy

Serbia has long pursued a policy of military neutrality, formally prohibiting membership in defence alliances. This places Serbia in a strategically disadvantageous position, as it cannot rely on external alliances for military defence, while the broader region is largely integrated into NATO structures and, in many instances, the EU as well.

Despite remaining outside formal military alliances, Serbia actively cooperates with several major security structures, including the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and NATO. Serbia holds observer status within the CSTO and has previously participated in the annual ‘Slavic Brotherhood’ exercise alongside Belarus and Russia. Under the EU’s CSDP, Serbia has contributed to multinational operations in the Central African Republic and Somalia, and participates in the EU’s Greek-led HELBROC Battlegroup – also known as the Balkan Battlegroup – located in Larissa, Greece.

The most substantial cooperation, however, is with NATO. Beginning with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and later through an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), Serbia has participated in numerous joint exercises primarily aimed at enhancing interoperability in peacekeeping operations. Apart from select engagements such as annual air defence drills with Bulgaria and the Slavic Brotherhood exercises, Serbia’s defence cooperation remains largely confined to training for peacekeeping-related interoperability.

Recognising the absence of an external security guarantee, Serbia must maintain credible national defence capabilities capable of deterring external armed threats and contributing to domestic and regional stability. In 2009, Serbia re-adopted the ‘total defence’ concept, once practised in the former Yugoslavia. This holistic approach extends beyond the armed forces, involving civil organisations, private actors, and the general public in national defence planning. By blurring the lines between military and civilian roles, the total defence concept seeks to mobilise all sectors of society in support of territorial defence – vastly expanding the potential human resource base. However, in Serbia’s case, the practical implementation of this policy remains limited. Compulsory military service was suspended in 2010, and no concrete steps have yet been taken to reinstate it.

A further part of Serbia’s defence policy is the development of a domestic arms industry. While Serbia inherited a substantial defence industry from the former Yugoslavia, this industry was not designed to function independently and was deeply integrated across various republics of Yugoslavia. The breakup of Yugoslavia and ensuing conflicts effectively dismantled these supply chains, leading to the collapse of many defence enterprises. Serbia was not immune to this disruption but has made considerable efforts to rebuild specific sectors to enable the domestic design and production of defence materiel.

Serbia’s leading defence enterprises are predominantly state-owned. Among Serbia’s predominant activities include the manufacture of ammunition across all calibres and the production of land-based platforms. In addition to manufacturing, Serbia retains a moderate capacity to service and upgrade Yugoslav-era platforms. Amid heightened global tensions, the Serbian defence industry has capitalised on rising international military spending. In 2023 alone, defence exports exceeded USD 1.6 billion. While this represents a valuable revenue stream, Serbian-manufactured equipment has occasionally appeared in conflict zones, potentially undermining Serbia’s declared neutrality. Most notably, reports in May 2025 alleging Ukrainian use of Serbian-supplied ammunition prompted diplomatic inquiries from Moscow, following allegations from the SVR (Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service), although no retaliatory measures were ever announced by Russia. In late June 2025, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić declared that Serbia had halted all exports of arms and ammunition for the time being, citing national security and economic interests.

Serbia will likely continue investing in domestic defence production to meet its national security needs while seeking to expand its export footprint. The long-term ambition looks to penetrate higher-value and more prestigious international markets, enhancing the reputation and competitiveness of Serbia’s defence industry.

Main battle tanks

The Serbian Army’s main battle tank (MBT) fleet has undergone notable modernisation and expansion over the past decade. In 2006, Serbia possessed a relatively large but outdated tank force comprising 204 M-84s, 28 M-84As, 61 T-72Ms, and an unspecified number of T-55s. Serbia gradually retired the T-55s from active service by 2010, leaving the M-84s and T-72s as the core of the tank fleet.

In 2020, Serbia began receiving newer T-72B1MS ‘White Eagle’ tanks, with delivery of the entire batch of 30 understood to have been completed in 2021. Today, the Serbian Army maintains four tank battalions, each subordinated to one of its four brigades. All but one of these battalions are equipped exclusively with M-84 tanks. The exception is the 46th Tank Battalion of the 4th Brigade, which fields one company (typically 13 vehicles) equipped with T-72B1MS tanks. Additionally, a separate T-72B1MS battalion is controlled directly by the Army Command, rather than being integrated into a brigade. This latter case illustrates the support Serbia has received from Russia in recent years.

 

Aside from this one-off Russian donation, Serbia has not actively pursued foreign acquisitions to complement or replace its legacy MBT fleet. Instead, the focus has been on upgrading existing in-service platforms. While there was discussion in the mid-2010s about initiating a domestic tank design, this ambition is widely regarded as unfeasible, due to the high costs involved and a lack of the technical and industrial base required to develop such a complex system. Although the M-84 is a Yugoslav-developed platform, its final assembly line was located in present-day Croatia, and its components were sourced from all across the former federation. Consequently, Serbia did not inherit the complete infrastructure or expertise necessary to start full-scale MBT production.

This has not deterred efforts to modernise the M-84 fleet domestically. Several previous upgrade attempts were either export-oriented or failed to gain traction. Notable examples include the M-84AB1, which bore a strong visual resemblance to the Russian T-90S, and the M-84M, which was mainly focused on explosive reactive armour (ERA) application. However, it was not until 2020 that a domestic upgrade programme gained official backing from the Serbian Ministry of Defence (MoD).

The M-84AS1 (2017) was unveiled at the Partner 2017 defence exhibition in Belgrade. Developed by the Military Technical Institute (MTI) in Belgrade, this vehicle introduced significant enhancements in protection and situational awareness, but the design continued to evolve. By 2020, a revised variant appeared, referred to as the M-84AS1 (2020), as well as the very similar-looking but more refined M-84AS2.

In terms of recognition, the M-84AS2 appears very similar to M-84AS1 (2020), with the main visual differences being the M-84AS2’s full ERA coverage on the glacis, more steeply-sloped ERA arrangement on the turret cheeks, laser warning receivers (LWRs) on the turret sides, a taller commander cupola to reduce blind spots caused by roof-mounted ERA, revised panoramic sight for the commander, and the presence of mudguards above the toe plate to prevent fouling of the headlights and driver periscope.

Both the AS1 (2020) and AS2 models were seen on exercises, and undergoing trials in the early 2020s, but the latter design appears to have been favoured. According to Serbian sources, the M-84AS2 upgrade is being rolled out gradually. As of 2024, around 20 units were believed to have entered service, with at least nine displayed during the Zastava 2024 event at Batajnica air base. It remains unclear whether this modernisation will be extended across the entire M-84 fleet or confined to select battalions.

The M-84AS1 (mod. 2020) and M-84AS2 reportedly feature a new domestically-developed ERA package applied to the glacis, hull sides, and turret front, sides, and roof. Additionally, both feature a remote weapon station (RWS) armed with a 12.7 mm heavy machine gun (HMG), along with a day/thermal sight, and a 360° panoramic camera suite integrated onto an updated meteorological sensor. Interestingly, although an early AS2 prototype displayed in 2021 was fitted with the Safran PASEO commander’s panoramic sight (and prior to that 2020, an AS2 seen on the ‘Support 2020’ exercise used a different model), more recent presentations – such as at Partner 2023 and the Zastava 2024 display in late 2024 – omitted this feature. This is probably a cost-saving measure, since the commander already has an RWS, which can serve as a panoramic sight. The gunner is believed to use a domestically produced DNNS-2TI thermal sight, while the driver also gained a thermal camera. The AS2 retains the Soviet-era V-46-6 engine, upgraded to 840 hp. With a combat weight of approximately 46.5 tonnes, this yields a power-to-weight ratio of around 18.1 hp/tonne, which is modest by contemporary MBT standards.

 

The upgrade’s export potential hinges on its applicability to the broader userbase of the T-72. With Russia currently constrained in its ability to offer comprehensive support to these countries, Serbia could potentially leverage its experience with the M-84AS2 to market upgrade solutions abroad, providing a valuable capability within the MBT upgrade market.

Infantry fighting vehicles

As with its main battle tank fleet, Serbia retains a fleet of Yugoslav-era infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), namely the BVP M-80 series. The first serious attempt to modernise this platform came in the early-2000s with the BVP M-80A/98. The programme saw little success, and development was effectively paused until 2016.

The BVP M-80AB1 (2016), initially unveiled in 2016, was developed by the Military Technical Institute (MTI) and built upon the M-80A/98 concept. Its most significant improvement was the addition of appliqué armour across the hull. According to MTI, the latter upgrade enables the vehicle to withstand 30 mm projectiles on the frontal arc and 14.5 mm fire on the sides, a substantial enhancement given the modest baseline protection of the original M-80. It was provided with an M91 E-I single-person turret armed with a Zastava M86 30 × 210B automatic cannon. In 2021, a modified version was presented, the BVP M-80AB1 (2021). Following further development and refinement, during which another version was seen in 2020, the final variants were revealed at the Partner 2023 defence exhibition in the form of the BVP M-80AB1 (2023) and the BVP M-80AB2 variant. The former was fitted with the Yugoimport RCWS 20 remote turret, armed with a Zastava M55 20 × 110 mm automatic cannon.

The second variant shown, the M-80AB2, shares the same hull structure and armour package as the AB1 but incorporates a manned turret fitted with a 30 × 173 mm M12 cannon, a NATO-standard evolution of Zastava’s M86 design. It also features an upgraded anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) system based on the domestic Malyutka platform, supporting the Malyutka 2T, 2F, and 2TS variants, also developed by MTI. At the Zastava 2024 event, only one M-80AB2 was presented, compared to up to 13 examples of the M-80AB1 (2023).

 

It remains unclear which of these variants will be adopted as the standard for upgrading the existing M-80A fleet. The greater numbers of the M-80AB1 present at Zastava 2024 suggests a preference for the unmanned turret variant, which continues to employ the older 20 mm M55 cannon used on the original M-80A. It is possible that development is underway to adapt the unmanned turret to support the newer 30 mm cannon, or possibly that the Serbian Army is content to retain the M55 for the foreseeable future given the likely abundance of domestically-made 20 mm ammunition. While no definitive decision has been announced, the M-80AB1 currently appears to be the leading candidate for at least a partial modernisation of the M-80A fleet.

Armoured personnel carriers

Serbia has achieved notable success in developing a domestic line of wheeled armoured personnel carriers (APCs) that are entirely new designs, rather than modernisations of legacy Yugoslav-era platforms. This progress is exemplified by the Lazar family of 8×8 APCs. Since the launch of the Lazar 1 project in 2008, the series has undergone several iterations, culminating in the more refined Lazar 3, which has been adopted by the Serbian Army and has also secured export orders.

The Lazar 3 is believed to have entered service in 2017 in the APC role with the Serbian Army, with smaller procurement by the Serbian Gendarmerie. The vehicle accommodates a crew of three and nine dismounts, for a total of 12 personnel. It has a maximum weight of 28 tonnes, a top speed of 110 km/h, and can ford water obstacles up to 1.6 m deep, although it is not amphibious. The chassis is reportedly built around the T900 axle set, developed by Timoney Technology and manufactured by Texelis.

 

As of 2025, the Lazar 3 remains the only vehicle in the family operational with the Serbian Army, with approximately 80 vehicles in service out of a total order of 125. The exact breakdown of variants ordered has not been publicly disclosed. However, known configurations include a base APC variant fitted with an M15 remote weapon station (RWS) armed with a 12.7 mm HMG, a version with the Kerber unmanned turret armed with three 20 mm cannons, an ambulance variant, and an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) carrier.

Yugoimport, the primary contractor for the Lazar family, has also developed the Lazar 3M – a variant fitted with the Russian 30 mm 32V01 turret. This model omits the small side windows and firing ports found on the Lazar 3, presumably to improve protection. A heavier APC variant is also in development under the name Lazanski, which has been displayed with a mock-up of the Russian AU-220M ‘Kinzhal’ unmanned turret armed with a 57 mm cannon. However, given both the Lazar 3M and Lazanski rely on Russian-supplied weapon systems, their viability may be in question due to ongoing difficulties in securing and delivering Russian defence products.

In a surprising development, Serbia has also procured surplus Hungarian BTR-80A vehicles, with estimates ranging from 50 to 70 units. The rationale behind this acquisition remains unclear. Hungary has already begun phasing out its BTR-80 fleet, suggesting that Serbia may have acquired the vehicles at favourable rates. It is also possible that production rates for the Lazar 3 have fallen short of expectations, necessitating an interim solution. Alternatively, the deal may reflect deepening bilateral defence cooperation in the region, following the signing in Belgrade of a Strategic Defence Cooperation Plan between Serbia and Hungary in April 2025; this was seemingly a reaction to the defence cooperation pact formed by Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo the month before.

Protected mobility vehicles

Alongside the Lazar family of armoured personnel carriers, Serbia has also developed and produced its own protected mobility vehicle, the BOV M16 Miloš, which is employed as a general-purpose patrol vehicle and in a number of specialised variants. Like the Lazar, the Miloš uses a Texelis-manufactured axle set, the T700, reflecting continued reliance on key foreign subcomponents within Serbia’s defence industrial base.

Yugoimport has also unveiled the Miloš 2, although its only notable distinction from the baseline variant appears to be the integration of the same 20 mm M55 unmanned turret found on the BVP M-80AB1 (2023). The vehicle has a maximum weight of 18 tonnes and accommodates up to 10 personnel, including both crew and dismounts. At least 30 baseline Miloš vehicles are known to be in service with the Serbian Army, in addition to an undisclosed number operated by the Gendarmerie. In January 2024, President Vučić announced an order for an additional 112 Miloš vehicles. If fulfilled, this would bring the total fleet to approximately 142 units. The breakdown of the ordered variants has not been publicly disclosed.

 

Beyond its domestic developments, Serbia has also benefitted from foreign military assistance, notably from Russia, which donated 30 BRDM-2MSs alongside the T-72B1MS tanks. These armoured reconnaissance vehicles serve within the Army’s dedicated reconnaissance battalion. While the BRDM-2MS is still a relatively limited platform, it offers significantly greater utility and survivability than the older BRDM-2 models in use by Serbia.

Serbia has also expanded its inventory of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), having originally received 47 units as US donations between 2012 and 2017. To augment this fleet, Serbia placed an order for up to 118 additional vehicles, with at least 66 known to have been delivered by 2023. The rationale behind this procurement appears to be an effort to expand the pool of interoperable vehicles for deployment in multinational peacekeeping operations. However, Serbia has also deployed UN-marked Miloš vehicles as part of its contribution to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), indicating that local designs are also used for expeditionary roles. The additional HMMWV acquisition may therefore also reflect limited annual production capacity of the Miloš rather than a purely tactical preference.

Tube and rocket artillery

One area in which Serbia has retained significant expertise from the former Yugoslavia is the design and production of artillery and rocket systems. This tradition continues today, with Serbia actively developing such systems for both domestic use and export markets. Recent procurements in this sector include updated variants of the 155 mm Nora B52 truck-mounted howitzer and the reported acquisition of the Israeli Precise and Universal Launching System (PULS) rocket artillery system.

Until the more recent Nora B52 M21 and Nora B52 NG variants, both of which were based on a MAN 8×8 truck platform, the system was mounted on a KamAZ platform – the latter may become increasingly difficult to procure and export due to geopolitical constraints. As a result, Yugoimport may shift entirely to using the MAN truck platform, even for domestic service. The Nora B-52 NG weighs up to 40 tonnes and is armed with a 155 mm L52 main gun. The gun uses an automatic loading system, allowing a maximum firing rate of four rounds per minute. The vehicle carries 30 rounds in the autoloader, with an additional six stored on the vehicle. In 2021, former Defence Minister Nebojša Stefanović confirmed that six additional systems had been ordered, supplementing the 12 already in service at that time. However, rising costs and continued reliance on imported components, particularly the chassis, may limit broader production and procurement for domestic use.

While the Nora B52 represents the modern element of Serbia’s self-propelled artillery fleet, the legacy 2S1 Gvozdika remains in service as a secondary platform. A domestic modernisation package developed by the Military Technical Institute (MTI) and implemented by Srboauto has extended the vehicle’s operational life. Upgrades include a new fire-control system, a 7.62 mm machine gun mounted for the commander, and a thermal imaging camera for the driver. These enhancements will support the continued use of the 2S1 Gvozdika in the near term.

 

In the rocket artillery domain, Serbia has reportedly signed a contract with Israel’s Elbit Systems for the acquisition of the PULS. While Elbit’s official press release in November 2024 referred only to an “unnamed European customer”, President Vučić hinted at a press conference later that month that Serbia may have been the buyer. The exact configuration of the PULS variant destined for Serbia has not been disclosed. The modular PULS launcher can launch a range of rocket types with varying calibres and ranges – from shorter-range 122 mm rockets to long-range 370 mm Predator Hawk tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) with a range of 300 km. As the PULS is capable of launching 122 mm rockets, it remains to be seen whether Serbian-manufactured munitions can be integrated into the system, potentially expanding domestic industry involvement and reducing long-term logistical reliance on imports.

Air defence

Serbia’s air defence network has undergone significant investment over recent years, marked by the acquisition of foreign systems and sensors, as well as efforts to develop indigenous short-range air defence (SHORAD) capabilities. While Serbia continues to rely heavily on legacy Soviet-era platforms, its procurement strategy has increasingly pivoted toward Chinese systems, as Russian hardware has become difficult to acquire. As a result, Serbia has become the first European operator of both the FK-3 (the export variant of the HQ-22) and the HQ-17AE systems. Concurrently, domestic projects such as the PASARS-16 and the newly unveiled Harpas self-propelled anti-air gun and missile (SPAAGM) systems remain ongoing.

The FK-3 had its first components delivered in early 2022, airlifted to Serbia by Chinese Y-20 heavy transport aircraft – a rare deployment of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) to Europe. A medium- to long-range system-of-systems, the FK-3 complements Serbia’s legacy S-125M and 2K12M2 Kub systems and is likely to form the long-range backbone of Serbia’s air defence network. With an advertised maximum engagement range of 100 km, the FK-3 is roughly analogous in range capability to older variants of the S-300P series, having comparable missile characteristics.  FK-3 reportedly achieved full operational capability in early-2025 and is assigned to the 2nd Air Defence Missile Battalion, which is tasked with the defence of Belgrade. The system’s entry into service may allow for the eventual retirement of the static S-125M.

In a surprising move, Serbia also procured the HQ-17AE, a wheeled variant of the HQ-17, itself derived from the Russian Tor-M1 system. The acquisition, revealed in 2024, was even more unexpected than the FK-3 deal. Previously, in 2019, Serbia had acquired the Pantsir-S1, and by late 2021, expressed interest in the Pantsir-S1M. However, logistics and political constraints – specifically the inability to deliver Russian systems through NATO airspace – likely rendered this impossible. In that context, the HQ-17AE perhaps offered an alternative system for SHORAD that would not have entailed the same difficulty and consequences that would have emerged from purchasing a Russian system.

 

On the domestic front, Serbia continues to develop the PASARS-16, a 6×6 truck-mounted SPAAGM platform armed with a single licensed-produced 40 mm L/70 Bofors cannon. While previously it had a notable absence of any radar systems, the model showcased at Partner 2023 did have RADA Electronic Industries’ multi-mission hemispheric radars, possibly for target detection. This cannon is reportedly capable of firing programmable ammunition, possibly BAE Systems’ 3P rounds. The variant presented at Partner 2023 showcased a broad weapons suite mounted on a manned turret. This included a jamming system, two man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), including the locally-produced Strela-2M and the newly acquired Mistral 3 ER, and two extended-ranged Malyutka ATGMs for defence against ground targets.

Complementing this is the Harpas, a tracked SPAAGM unveiled at Partner 2023, developed on an M-84 MBT chassis. It serves as Serbia’s attempt at a domestic analogue to the 2K22 Tunguska, providing a combined gun/missile air defence system with mobility suited for armoured brigades. The Harpas uses twin 40 mm Bofors cannons to deliver a higher rate of fire than the PASARS and incorporates up to four short-range missiles, notionally these would be Serbia’s RLN-RF and RLN-TK missiles. The RLN-RF uses a thermal seeker, while the RLN-TK is guided by a semi-active radar homing (SARH) seeker, with both reportedly offering engagement ranges of up to 12 km – far exceeding the effective range of the onboard cannons. For target detection, the Harpas is equipped with the Thales GS-40, a modification of Weibel’s Xenta-M X-band radar system. Whether this platform will progress beyond the prototype stage remains to be seen, but it reflects Serbia’s ambition to develop a mobile, domestically produced SHORAD capability that can support its manoeuvre forces.

Closing thoughts

Serbia’s procurement efforts reflect a deliberate attempt to modernise its armed forces and build up a larger pool of domestic expertise and manufacturing capability, all while also having to navigate its relations between East and West. Though constrained by budgetary and geopolitical limits, Belgrade has revitalised domestic industrial capacity in several key sectors, particularly in wheeled armoured vehicles and artillery. Meanwhile, legacy Cold War-era equipment continues to be upgraded and retained where feasible. The result is an eclectic, but increasingly capable force structure designed to meet Serbia’s unique security requirements in the immediate region, where many of its neighbouring states are often smaller in size and lack many of the capabilities the Serbian armed forces have built up since the collapse of Yugoslavia. As regional dynamics evolve, diplomatic pressures may test the sustainability and coherence of its procurement choices in the future.

Chris Mulvihill