Is drone-based resupply viable?

Military logistics and sustainment have always played a crucial role in operations at all levels–strategic, operational, and tactical. Following major geopolitical changes, as well as shifts in technology and doctrine, military logistics have evolved over the past decades, with one of the main directions being a shift toward robotics and autonomy. The experience of the Russo-Ukrainian War provides new impetus to research and development programmes in this area and has also sparked many theoretical debates. Given the breadth of the topic, this article focuses specifically on drone-based resupply for ground forces.

Why autonomous resupply?

Several factors have contributed to the trend of introducing robotics and autonomy in military logistics.

1. First, technological advances in robotics, microelectronics, and related fields. The proliferation and mass adoption of these technologies, including in the private sector, have made them more affordable, more robust, and therefore more attractive to the military.
2. Second, following the end of the Cold War, many militaries (primarily in the West) shifted from mass conscription to smaller, volunteer-based forces. This coincided with a growing imbalance between combat and non-combat elements of the armed forces, commonly referred to as the ‘tooth-to-tail ratio’ (T3R).

Since the First World War, the proportion of combat troops relative to command and sustainment elements has steadily declined, reaching roughly a 1:3 ratio in the US Army during the 1991 Gulf War.^[1] As a result, modern armies – already smaller than their Cold War counterparts – typically field fewer combat soldiers than sustainment, logistics, and headquarters staff. This imbalance is further exacerbated by chronic challenges in recruiting and retaining personnel.^[2]

These pressures have reinforced the understanding that at least some logistics and sustainment functions can and should be automated in order to free personnel for combat roles. In addition, greater automation can reduce the number of personnel required for logistics and sustainment tasks, thereby enabling more efficient resource allocation and cost savings.

Finally, a common feature of many initiatives is the use of robotisation and autonomous systems to reduce risk for soldiers and keep them away from exhausting and monotonous tasks.^[3]

Lessons have been drawn from the low-intensity conflicts of the 2000s and 2010s, the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and the ongoing full-scale Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The experience of these conflicts has underscored that, whether in counterinsurgency operations or in high-intensity warfare, logistics and sustainment operations have become increasingly dangerous and risky.

Logistics for the modern battlefield

What conditions define logistics on the modern battlefield? First of all, the increased density of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, ranging from satellite observation to reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Some observers suggest that the proliferation of UAV reconnaissance has made the battlefield ‘transparent’ and observation ‘almost constant’. While these claims might be exaggerated at the strategic or operational levels, the growth of ISR at the tactical level and in the close rear is undeniable.

Another issue is the growing threat to logistics routes and infrastructure, even in further rear areas. This was evident in Iraq and Afghanistan, where logistics systems were under constant threat from ambushes and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In Ukraine, logistics is threatened by a wide range of conventional weapons (artillery, anti-tank guided missiles, airstrikes, etc.), while a new array of threats has also been added to the mix, including remotely-laid minefields, strike UAVs, loitering munitions, and UAV ambushes.

As a result of the increased density of ISR and the evolving threat environment, combat zones have expanded, sometimes stretching tens of kilometres in depth beyond the line of contact (LOC).^[4] Rear areas once considered safe are now under threat, imposing further strain on logistical operations.

On the other hand, units engaged in large-scale conflict with peer or near-peer adversaries (a likely scenario for future wars) require a continuous, high-volume flow of supplies, often comparable to or even exceeding Cold War-era logistical demands. For example, a tank company of ten T-72B main battle tanks requires about 450 rounds per day, which amounts to 10–14 tonnes of ammunition, depending on the types of rounds used.^[5]

Generally, the problem may be summarised as follows: large amounts of supplies and equipment need to be transported continuously in an increasingly contested environment. While operational and operational-tactical supply lines remain at risk, ‘last-mile’ resupply has emerged as the most dangerous and problematic element of the logistics chain. A possible answer to this may lie in drone-based resupply systems – whether employing unmanned aerial or ground platforms. However, the introduction of such systems also presents a number of dilemmas.

Logistical dilemmas

The key dilemmas revolve around platform class (light, medium, or heavy) and their payload capacity. In addition, there are unique, domain-dependent dilemmas specific to UAVs and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs).

The typical payload capacity of small commercial aerial drones varies between 0.5 and 10 kg, while industrial or agricultural models can carry 20–50 kg.^[6] Some models, such as AeroVironment’s HawkEye glider-type UAV, have demonstrated the capacity to deliver a payload of 25 kg.^[7] However, it remains in the development stage.

Larger models, such as the TRV-150C TRUAS drones employed by the US Marine Corps (USMC), including helicopter-type or vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) UAVs, have significantly higher payload capacities. For instance, the TRV-150C can carry up to 68 kg,^[8] while in November 2022, Sikorsky and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) successfully tested an unmanned Black Hawk helicopter that carried a payload of 226 kg during a resupply mission and also performed a rescue operation.^[9]

Aerial platforms on the lighter end tend to be relatively cheap, allowing deployment in greater numbers. This in turn enables the establishment of supply lines along multiple routes. They also provide higher speed compared to ground vehicles, are easier to disperse, and are not constrained by terrain. On the other hand, light or even medium aerial platforms are susceptible to electronic warfare countermeasures, have limited payload capacity, and are unable to carry certain types of cargo – for example, spare parts for heavy vehicles, engineering supplies, heavy munitions, or bulk fuel and lubricants. In addition, the use of small UAVs can be severely restricted by weather conditions such as strong winds, rain, or low temperatures.

 

UGVs by contrast typically offer greater payload capacity than their aerial counterparts. For instance, all three models of Rheinmetall’s Mission Master family of UGVs have a maximum payload capacity of 1,000 kg,^[10] Hanwha’s Arion-SMET can carry up to 550 kg,^[11] while General Dynamics Land Systems’ MUTT offers 408 to 1,134 kg, depending on the variant.^[12] However, UGVs are required to negotiate terrain or artificial obstacles and minefields, all which can prove highly challenging; added to this, they are typically remotely controlled, with some elements of autonomy.

Light UGVs offer better concealment than UAVs, are able to stay idle and can carry more payload. However, even light UGVs tend to cost significantly more than small UAVs, often reaching into the hundreds of thousands of euros per unit.

Heavier UGVs can offer better protection, including various types of passive armour, electronic warfare (EW) systems, or smoke and aerosol launchers. They have greater payload capacity, and greater operational range, but at the cost of reduced concealment and a higher price per unit. It is important to highlight that, given the conditions on the modern battlefield, the factor of concealment primarily benefits small-sized (likely single-vehicle) resupply runs. Due to the high density of ISR assets in the tactical zone, a swarm of small resupply UGVs would likely be detected with a similar probability as a group of larger ground vehicles.

Given these conditions, the key question is what applications remain for drone-based resupply on the modern battlefield–and what future potential it holds.

Concluding thoughts: A matter of scale

Many militaries have been experimenting with autonomy and robotics in logistics since the 2000s or even earlier.^[13] Despite substantial achievements in this field, most programmes related to logistics and sustainment (involving both UAVs and UGVs) remain at various stages of development and are either undergoing trials or deployed only in limited numbers. The results achieved to date vary depending on the vehicle class, domain, and position within the logistics chain.

At the tactical level, small and medium unmanned platforms are primarily employed for emergency resupply of light, high-value, and urgent cargo such as medical supplies, batteries, radios, spare UAV parts, water, small-arms ammunition, or field rations. These platforms may also prove useful in certain environments, such as urban areas or high-altitude terrain.^[14]

In some scenarios, UGVs (‘robotic mules’) may be useful for special operations forces (SOF) or small units of dismounted infantry. However, practical experiments with UGVs have produced mixed results. For example, trials conducted by US Army units in 2024 showed that an infantry unit deployed with the small multipurpose equipment transport (S-MET) had to deviate from its concealed route because the S-MET was unable to overcome obstacles in rough terrain.^[15]

Given financial considerations, as well as the tactical and technical characteristics of small and medium UAVs and UGVs, large-scale, continuous supply and sustainment operations for large units, (or heavy forces such as armour, mechanised forces, or artillery), appear ineffective, if not impossible, at the tactical level, including last mile resupply.

On the other hand, logistics may benefit from wider implementation of robotics and automation at higher levels (from tactical to strategic) through their use in large hubs, warehouses, and depots, as well as in large-scale transportation with autonomous convoys or leader-follower technology. Experimentation in this area is ongoing in many militaries, including those of Russia,^[16] the US,^[17] China, and others. Given the scale of military transportation and logistics operations in a modern high-intensity conflict, focusing on autonomy at higher levels of the logistics chain seems reasonable. Statistics provided by Lieutenant General Andrei Bulyga, Deputy Minister of Defence for Logistics and Director of Logistical Support of the Russian Armed Forces, offer a broad overview. In a 2024 interview, Bulyga claimed that year Russian Material and Technical Support forces had transported over 8 million tonnes of materiel – a 30% increase compared to 2023 – including 50,000 tonnes of spare parts and 12 million units of ammunition.^[18] In February 2024, during an Association of the US Army event, Maj Gen Michelle Donahue, Commanding General of the Army Combined Arms Support Command, provided statistics on the US Army’s logistics demands. According to Donahue, since the 1970s, the Army’s fuel demand has increased by 374%, while demand for maintenance has grown by 37%.^[19]

 

The experiments with light and medium unmanned platforms will continue in the near future, aiming to achieve a higher level of autonomy (rather than simple remote control) and to reduce the cost per unit. At the lightest end of the scale, small logistics UGVs or UAVs should be inexpensive and expendable.

It is reasonable to assume that UGVs designed to operate close to the line of contact will likely be based on ‘robotised’ versions standard armoured platforms, possibly even heavy ones. Adapting what already exists could offer a more cost-effective approach than developing specific designs for every role. This kind of approach has already been seen in experiments with autonomous logistics trucks – for example, the US Army uses the standard Oshkosh PLS (Palletized Loader System), while Russia has been experimenting with the ubiquitous Kamaz-5350 and Ural-4320 family of trucks.

 

Finally, it is important to highlight that many aspects of modern conflicts, in Ukraine, Gaza, and the Middle East, are unique and, therefore, their respective lessons cannot be regarded as universally applicable. Drone-based resupply and sustainment systems are still at the early stages of development, and the definitive form of such a system has not yet been established. Nor has the ideal design for a frontline resupply vehicle been determined.

Alex Tarasov

Author: Alex Tarasov is a land warfare expert specialising in Europe, Russia, and armoured vehicles. He has contributed to ESD, Shephard News, along with other publications, and has authored several books.

[1] John J. McGrath. The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations.

[2] The Army Is Losing Nearly One-Quarter of Soldiers in the First 2 Years of Enlistment. 7 March 2025 – https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/03/07/army-losing-nearly-one-quarter-of-soldiers-first-2-years-of-enlistment.html

[3] Potential for Army Integration of Autonomous Systems by Warfighting Function. Maj. Thomas Ryan, US Army Vikram Mittal, PhD. September-October 2019 – https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2019/Mittal-Autonomous-Systems

[4] APS and ERA developments. Alexey Tarasov https://euro-sd.com/2025/01/articles/42132/aps-and-era-developments/

[5] Танк Т-72Б. Техническое описание и инструкция по эксплуатации. Москва, Военное издательство, 1995

[6] How Much Weight Can a Drone Carry? (Comprehensive 2025 Guide) – https://www.jouav.com/blog/how-much-weight-can-a-drone-carry.html

[7] AeroVironment, Inc. official website – https://www.avinc.com/innovative-solutions/small-uas

[8] Heavy Lift Drones Deliver the Goods. Neesa Sweet. October 15, 2024 – https://insideunmannedsystems.com/heavy-lift-drones-deliver-the-goods/

[9] Unmanned Black Hawk Helicopter Flies Autonomous Logistics & Rescue Missions – https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2022-11-02-Sikorsky-and-DARPAs-Autonomous-Black-Hawk-R-Flies-Logistics-and-Rescue-Missions-Without-Pilots-on-Board

[10] Rheinmetall’s booklet. The Rheinmetall Mission Master family. A pioneering line of autonomous unscrewed ground systems – https://www.rheinmetall.com/Rheinmetall%20Group/brochure-download/Uncrewed-Systems/B253e1024-Rheinmetall-Mission-Master-family.pdf

[11] Hanwha’s Arion-SMET Successfully Completes Foreign Comparative Test with US Military  – https://www.edrmagazine.eu/hanwhas-arion-smet-successfully-completes-foreign-comparative-test-with-us-military

[12] Multi-Utility Tactical Transport (MUTT) – General Dynamics UK – https://generaldynamics.uk.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/MUTT-Datasheet.pdf

[13] Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032. Department of Defense,Washington. 2007

[14] Specialised drone operations showcased at high altitude in Ladakh.. 17 September 2024 – https://www.thestatesman.com/india/specialised-drone-operations-showcased-at-high-altitude-in-ladakh-1503344210.html

[15] Frozen drones and robotic mules: What the US Army learned from a key exercise in Germany. 13 February 2025 –  https://breakingdefense.com/2025/02/frozen-drones-and-robotic-mules-what-the-us-army-learned-from-a-key-exercise-in-germany/

[16] Материально-Техническое Обеспечение ВС РФ №4 2024. P.B. Zhernakov, A.A. Vorobyev, V.V. Sergeev. Robotic Systems for Logistics Support: Near- and Long-Term Prospects

[17] Army picks Carnegie, Forterra for autonomous logistics truck prototyping. 26 February 2025 –  https://breakingdefense.com/2025/02/army-picks-carnegie-forterra-for-autonomous-logistics-truck-prototyping/

[18] Материально-Техническое Обеспечение ВС РФ №1 2025. “Results and Priorities of Material and Technical Support for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”, an interview with Lieutenant General Andrei Bulyga, a Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation.

[19] Army Seeks Sustainment Precision, Automation. 2 September 2024 – https://www.ausa.org/news/army-seeks-sustainment-precision-automation