VP from Kyiv: Deep strikes, energy infrastructure, and politics

Following the negotiation of a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, along with the release of Israeli hostages, the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine is anticipated to regain prominence on President Donald Trump’s foreign policy agenda. The US President was reportedly leveraging the potential provision of Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine as a means of exerting pressure on the Russian Federation. Despite these efforts, President Vladimir Putin has shown no indication of willingness to engage in ceasefire negotiations. Perhaps consequently, the possibility of the US providing Tomahawks to Ukraine was withdrawn by Trump in a 17 October 2025 meeting with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The move was a blow to Ukraine, as recent weeks have witnessed an escalation in Russian military activity, both through intensified strikes on Ukrainian territory and an increase in hybrid operations across Europe. As weather conditions deteriorate and temperatures fall, Russia has resumed large-scale attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

In a 10 October 2025 announcement, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, stated that since the beginning of autumn, the Russian Armed Forces had increased the number of aerial attacks against Ukraine by 1.3 times. This escalation has been accompanied by a new strategy involving coordinated missile and drone strikes designed to overwhelm and bypass Ukrainian air defences. By accumulating a larger stockpile of ballistic, cruise missiles, and one-way attack (OWA) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Russia has begun conducting coordinated strikes involving combinations of these munitions.

In response to Russian strikes, President Zelenskyy stated that Moscow should expect new attacks on military and energy facilities within Russian territory using Ukrainian-made drones and missiles. The so-called ‘deep strikes’ are becoming increasingly painful for the Russian economy and its oil and gas industry. By the end of September 2025, 38% of Russia’s primary oil refining capacity was idle, with Ukrainian drone attacks cited as the primary cause, resulting in fuel supply disruptions in more than half of Russia’s regions. Restoration efforts may require several months. To address the growing fuel shortage, Moscow has increased gasoline purchases from Belarus and is also attempting to import gasoline from China, South Korea, and Singapore.

An increase in strikes against both Russian oil refineries and military facilities can be expected, as Ukraine ramps up production of long-range drones and missiles. It is estimated that approximately 60% of strikes on Russian territory are carried out by Ukrainian ‘Fire Point FP-1’ OWA UAVs, with a 1,500 km range and resistant to electronic warfare (EW). Other models used by Ukraine for long-range strikes include ‘Bober’ and ‘Liutyi’ OWA UAVs and others.

In addition to drones, Ukraine is focusing on increasing production of cruise missiles. In August 2025, Ukraine unveiled the new ‘FP-5 Flamingo’ long-range cruise missile, state to be capable of striking targets at ranges of over 3,000 km. In October 2025, Ukrainian authorities announced the successful deployment of this missile in tandem with another cruise missile – the ‘Neptune’. Currently, the number of Neptune missile modifications is unknown. However, a new version of the Neptune cruise missile with additional fuel tanks was demonstrated to NATO representatives on 7 October 2025, suggesting that there are now four versions of the missile, each with different range and warhead characteristics. If serial production of the aforementioned Ukrainian-made missiles is successfully established, the frequency of combined missile and drone strikes targeting Russia’s rear areas is expected to increase over time, posing an additional challenge to Russian air defence systems.

While the possibility of the US supplying Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine looks remote at present, they are still desired by Kyiv. The missiles possess sufficient range (circa 1,500 km) to strike targets across virtually the entire European part of Russia, and a desirable feature of these missiles is their ability to fly at extremely low altitudes and follow terrain contours, making them difficult to detect and intercept.

Putin’s strategy of extending the war and increasing strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has been coupled with a parallel campaign of hybrid activities aimed at destabilising Europe. This strategy is driven not only by the Kremlin’s continued pursuit of a symbolic victory over the West, but also by its desire to demonstrate that Russia retains the capacity to sustain a multi-front war. Despite troubling internal developments – including reduced oil revenues, economic slowdown, ballooning budget deficits, heightened military spending, and a fuel crisis – Putin remains focused on external aggression. At the time of writing, the pendulum of US efforts appears to have swung back toward exerting pressure on Ukraine to accept a ceasefire along the current front lines. However, it is difficult to predict whether or not this will remain the case, or whether further attempts will be made to pressure Russia to end the fighting.

Alex Horobets