Ukraine: Russian forces capture key towns

It can be remarkable how quickly things change in a single month. Writing in late September I discussed the fact that five Ukrainian towns – Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Kupiansk, Kostiantinivka, and Siversk – were at risk of capture, with a sixth town – Lyman – likely at risk over the longer term (see: ‘Ukraine: Five sieges’ in ESD 10-25). Yet since then the picture has evolved concerningly rapidly.

At the time of writing in early November, the Russians have captured the vast majority of Kupiansk and Pokrovsk, along with a large portion of Myrnohrad. Elsewhere, their forces have pushed up to the outskirts of Kostiantinivka, Siversk, and even Lyman. Alongside this, the Russians have also expanded offensive efforts elsewhere, notably in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, where they have moved to within 10 km of Orikhiv, and advanced westward over the Yanchur river to within 12 km of Huliapole. These two towns are the largest Ukrainian-held settlements along the southern portion of the Zaporizhzhia front, and Orikhiv is notable for being the staging point from which Ukraine launched its unsuccessful main offensive effort during its summer 2023 counteroffensive.

There have been some notable developments in Russian offensive approaches in the last few months, however the most significant were at the strategic level – such as Russia’s shift to the methodical destruction of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, region by region. At the tactical level some new developments have been seen – such as the introduction of new, longer-range fibre-optic first-person-view (FPV) drones, along with mounting ‘lances’ with small explosive tips (not unlike the ‘thunder sticks’ seen in recent ‘Mad Max’ films) onto drones for the aerial interception role.

However, these are relatively minor developments in the grand scheme of things, and do not equate to a radical improvement to Russian ground forces’ assault capability which would explain their numerous and relatively rapid advances in a number of directions at once. Instead, the most likely culprit would seem to be that Ukraine’s forces are severely undermanned, undersupplied, overstretched, and consequently struggling to cope with Russian numerical superiority along many points of the front. While this has been true for years, Ukraine’s situation today in terms of manpower and munitions shortages seems perhaps worse than ever. Russian forces have taken advantage of this imbalance to make numerous, and often significant gains. This battlefield progress is presumably a factor in the Kremlin’s unwillingness to negotiate an end to the fighting.

Yet even with Ukraine’s forces stretched, one may rightly ask how Russian advances have accelerated at precisely the same time their country is facing a fuel crisis, precipitated by Ukraine’s numerous successful strikes on Russia’s hydrocarbon infrastructure in September/October. While Ukraine does appear to have caused significant economic damage to Russia’s economy with these strikes, this has yet to translate into a meaningful change on the battlefield. One explanation is that we may be seeing a delayed effect – that as military fuel stockpiles dwindle, the effects will begin to bite, and Russian forces will begin to struggle to move forward. Yet this does not seem entirely likely. For starters, the Russian Ministry of Defence is able to requisition fuel for the war effort, diverting it from civilian purposes to ensure a steady supply to the front lines. Second and more interesting, is that the Russian ground forces also appear to have become less fuel-hungry than they were in 2022.

Looking at the state of play today, the frontlines have been moving very slowly for several years now, and the presence of the ‘drone line’ (See: ‘Beyond the drone line: Lessons from the drone war in Ukraine’ in ESD 6-25) has made operating large logistics vehicles at depths of 20 km (or even more) a risky prospect. Much the same risks apply to ground assaults within this zone, with mechanised and armoured forces being highly vulnerable to detection and destruction. Both sides have adapted to this state of affairs by changing the way their tactical logistics and assaults operate. Today, it is fairly common to see utility vehicles, motorbikes, quad bikes, bicycles, small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), or even dismounted infantry delivering supplies at tactical depths. Likewise, most assaults today rely on a core of either dismounted infantry stealthily moving forward and entrenching themselves in foxholes, or rapid pushes by infantry on motorbikes or quad bikes, sometimes backed by one or two armoured vehicles or occasionally tanks. What these approaches have in common is that they require relatively little fuel.

The systemic knock-on effects of such sweeping changes would seem fairly obvious – if both tactical logistics and core assault capability place relatively limited demands on fuel supply, then naturally, fuel supply disruptions would not yield the same effects as they would for a more conventional armoured or mechanised force.

Of course, Russia’s ground forces are not immune to supply disruption – travel and logistics at operational depths, air defence, artillery, aircraft, utility vehicles, field generators, to name but a few, will continue to exact a demand on fuel. However, tactical logistics and assault capability can form a considerable percentage of day-to-day fuel demand in this kind of war, and therefore reductions on the demand side would naturally make the overall force more resilient to disruption. While Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s hydrocarbon infrastructure look set to continue, it seems probable that for the time being, these will have a more immediate impact on the economy than the battlefield.

Mark Cazalet