The demand for anti-tank guided missiles is expected to grow in the near future, with a clear need for new capabilities.

Since their introduction in the 1950s and 1960s, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) have evolved from purely anti-tank assets into versatile weapons capable of engaging a wide range of targets, including armoured fighting vehicles, low-and-slow aircraft, and fortifications. Today, ATGMs are in service in numerous countries worldwide, with newer generations of these systems continuously being developed and produced.

It is important to highlight that earlier expectations, which proposed that various types of drones would replace or assume the functions of ATGMs on the battlefield, appear to have been exaggerated. The experiences of ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and across the Middle East show that these types of weapons successfully coexist and complement each other, despite their somewhat overlapping capabilities.

Front view of MBDA’s Akeron MP ATGM, showing the dual-band (Day TV and IIR) seeker. At Bourges, on 26 January 2017. [MBDA/Laurent Guichardon]
Looking forward, the global market for man-portable anti-armour weapons is expected to grow by 2.98% to 5% between 2025 and 2031, according to market analyses. The analysis by IMARC Group sets the lowest expected figure, predicting that the global ATGM market could reach USD 4.3 billion by 2033, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.98% from 2025 to 2033.[1] In turn, a Research and Markets report published in January 2025 expects the ATGM market to reach USD 9.6 billion by 2030, with a CAGR of 5.0% between 2023 to 2030.[2] Other analytical companies generally follow these expectations, forecasting growth figures between 3.35%[3] (Market Research Future) and 4.1%[4] (Coherent Market Insights).

Existing capabilities

The systems currently in service in various countries around the world vary widely in age and generation. While some countries still use first-generation systems, such as the Soviet-era 9M14 Malyutka or its modernised derivatives, others have already adopted so-called fifth-generation systems, such as MBDA’s Akeron MP and Rafael’s Spike LR2[5] and Spike NLOS[6]. However, the backbone of ATGM weaponry in most countries consists of man-portable and vehicle-mounted systems from the second and third generations.

Generational distinctions are not always cut-and-dry, with plenty of room for debate. Capabilities can differ greatly across systems of the same generation, or earlier and later versions of missiles within the same family. For example, the Russian Kornet ATGM is considered by some as a third-generation system, despite featuring a semi-automatic command to line-of-sight (SACLOS) guidance system more typical of second-generation ATGMs.[7] On the other hand, the Kornet family’s 9M133M-2 missile has range of 8 km, and a powerful tandem-HEAT warhead capable of defeating over 1,300 mm of rolled homogenous armour equivalent (RHAe). Added to this, the launch station is provided with a thermal sight to facilitate targeting at night. Such characteristics and performance are more commonly associated with third-generation systems.

Two missiles from the Kornet family on display at EDEX-2021. The 9M133FM-3 (left) is provided with HE-FRAG warhead and proximity fuze, for engaging low-and-slow aircraft, while the 9M133M-2 (right) is fitted with a tandem-HEAT warhead for engaging tanks. [Alexey Tarasov]
Examples of second-generation systems include the 9K115 Metis, 9K111 Fagot, 9K111-1 Konkurs, 9K133 Kornet family, the Skif (Stugna-P) family, the BGM-71 TOW family, the MILAN family, among others. Despite some of these systems being introduced in the 1970s and 1980s, they remain in service and have been continuously upgraded to prolong their service life and improve combat capabilities. One of the latest instances of such an improvement is Russia’s 9K111-1M Konkurs-M system, which received remote control capability, as reported by Kalashnikov Concern on 27 December 2024. According to the manufacturer, the remote control system was developed based on the combat experience of using ATGMs in Ukraine (notably, remote control functionality has long been a feature on the Ukrainian Stugna-P ATGM). This feature is intended to increase the survivability of both the system and its crew, and a single remote control system enables an ATGM operator to remotely control three Konkurs-M launchers sequentially during daylight hours.[8]

It is worth noting that second-generation ATGMs were primarily introduced and mass-produced during the Cold War. Today, these systems remain the most numerous (with tens of thousands in surplus) and are cost-effective to produce, while still possessing sufficient combat effectiveness.

By comparison, third-generation ATGMs include a number of advanced capabilities that, on the one hand, improve their combat performance, but on the other, increase complexity, as well as maintenance and production costs. Representatives of this generation include systems such as the FGM-148 Javelin, AT-1K Raybolt, Hongjian-12 (HJ-12), and others. Most third-generation medium-range systems are capable of attacking targets within a range of a few hundred metres to over 5 km.

Systems classed as third-generation typically entered service between 1990 and 2010. These tended to share several common features, such as a lock on before launch (LOBL), as well as allowing the operator to select between direct and lofted (top-attack) trajectories. These missiles would also typically be equipped with an imaging infrared (IIR) seeker for guidance.

LOBL, also commonly referred to as ‘fire-and-forget’ mode, is arguably the most important development introduced in third-generation systems. Compared to first-generation manual command to line of sight (MCLOS) or second-generation SACLOS systems, where the operator needs to keep the sight on target until impact, ATGMs featuring LOBL allow the crew to rapidly change their position after launch, increasing the survivability and tactical flexibility of ATGM crews on the battlefield. However, similar levels of crew safety from return fire can be achieved on second-generation systems using remote controlled SACLOS firing posts.

The final distinctive feature of third-generation ATGMs is top-attack capability. Originating as a solution to counter advancements in the protection of main battle tanks (MBTs) in the late 1980s and 1990s, it has proliferated over the decades and become a standard element in third-generation and newer ATGMs. Top-attack capability allows a missile to target the weaker roof armour of a heavily armoured target such as a tank, thereby bypassing the majority of its passive protection.

9P163-3 Kornet-EM vehicle, shown with Kornet quad-launchers deployed. This version displayed at the Armiya-2024 exhibition is based on the Remdizel K-53949 Taifun-K 4×4 platform. [Alexey Tarasov]
It is important to highlight that, while some third-generation ATGMs have been deployed in combat and used against armoured vehicles, these instances typically involved technologically inferior adversaries in low-intensity conflicts. The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict has therefore become the first armed conflict where third-generation ATGMs (such as FGM-148 Javelin) were deployed en masse against a peer (or peer-plus) adversary. While the top-attack and fire-and-forget capabilities were seen as important, it is difficult to evaluate their overall performance against Russian armoured vehicles, as well as their overall impact on the war.
Table 1: Key characteristics of select third-generation ATGMs
System Country of Origin Max. Range (km) Top-Attack Capability Firing Modes
FGM-148 Javelin USA 2.5 (Baseline CLU)
4 (Lightweight CLU)
4.75 (Vehicle mounted)
Yes LOBL
Type 01 LMAT Japan 4 km Yes LOBL
AT-1K Raybolt South Korea 2.5-3 km Yes LOBL
HJ-12 Hongjian-12 China 4 (daytime);
2 (night)
Yes LOBL

 

Meanwhile, some countries have already developed and adopted fourth- and fifth-generation ATGMs—depending on the classification used—such as MBDA’s Akeron MP and Rafael’s Spike LR/LR2, Spike ER/ER2, and Spike NLOS systems. These ATGMs broadly began entering service after 2010, and tended to feature more advanced modes, such as lock-on after launch (LOAL) capability, also referred to as ‘fireandupdate’ mode. LOAL mode allows the operator to observe the battlefield in real-time through the projectile’s IIR and/or day seeker and update the target or missile flight parameters during the flight, if needed. This mode allows non-line-of-sight (NLOS) engagements to take place.

An illustrative example of such a system is Turkish company Roketsan’s OMTAS, which includes both LOBL and LOAL modes. The OMTAS launcher and missile are connected through an RF datalink, allowing the operator to lock on to a target once the missile is in-flight, as well as switch targets during flight.[9]

A POS-145 light anti-tank weapon featuring fire-and-forget capability. Currently in development, showcased by Yugoimport at EDEX-2021 [Alexey Tarasov]
Notably, some classifications define fourth-generation systems as similar to third-generation ones, with the main distinction being the datalink between the launch unit and operator, allowing the operator to change the missile’s flight parameters or switch targets mid-flight, or abort the mission if necessary.[10]

The most advanced ATGMs to date belong to the fifth generation. These systems feature sophisticated capabilities, such as third-party cueing, enabling their deployment in modern network-centric warfare. They are also typically very versatile, offering multi-platform integration and multipurpose tandem-HEAT warheads with fragmentation sleeves, capable of defeating explosive reactive armour (ERA) and defeating armour in excess of 1,000 mm of RHAe.[11]

The fifth-generation ATGMs typically feature an extended range of operational (firing) modes, including LOBL, LOAL, and fire-to-coordinates modes. The fire-to-coordinates mode enables firing at pre-designated coordinates in NLOS scenarios. While the latter mode does not require the operator to track a target and enhances survivability and concealment, it is best suited for stationary targets. Some systems, such as MBDA’s Akeron MP and Spike NLOS, allow for third-party target designation. This capability means that targeting data can be received from manned or unmanned aerial or ground-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.

According to manufacturers, many fifth-generation systems are resistant to jamming, whether using fibre-optic datalinks which have no way to be jammed, or encrypted radio frequency (RF) datalinks, which are quite difficult to jam. Additionally, ATGMs of this generation can be equipped with sophisticated seekers that feature both colour television (TV) and uncooled IIR channels, sometimes along with other sensors.

Table 2: Key characteristics of select fourth/fifth-generation ATGMs
System Country of Origin Max. Range (km) Top-Attack Capability Firing Modes Datalink
OMTAS Türkiye 4 (ground launch) Yes • LOBL

• LOAL

 

RF datalink
Spike LR2 Israel 5.5 (ground launch);

10 (air launch)

Yes • LOBL

• LOAL

• Fire-to-coordinates

Fibre-optic

datalink

Spike ER2 Israel 10 (ground launch);
16 (air launch)
Yes • LOBL

• LOAL

• Fire-to- coordinates

 

RF datalink
Spike NLOS Israel 32 (ground launch);

50 (air launch)

Yes • LOBL

• LOAL

• Third party target designation

• Guidance handover

RF datalink
Akeron MP France 4[12] (ground launch) Yes • LOBL

• LOAL man-in-the-loop for non-line-of-sight (NLOS) scenarios

• Third-party target designation

Fibre-optic

datalink

 

As a sign of the direction things are headed, the most recent iteration of Rafael’s Spike NLOS has added several additional noteworthy capabilities. The first is a salvo firing mode, in which up to four missiles can be simultaneously launched and controlled while in the air by a single launcher. The second is a guidance handover capability, in which control over a missile can be transferred from one platform to another. The tactical possibility this opens is for the original launch platform to quickly relocate or hide after firing, while a second platform takes over guidance to ensure the target is successfully engaged. A third capability is that of uploading aerial imagery of the target to the launch platform and then matching these images to the video feed from the missile seeker. This can assist a fire team with quickly distinguishing and identifying the correct target. [13]

Future systems

Several trends in the future development of ATGMs can be identified. Firstly, ATGMs are moving towards greater range capability, not least to maintain relevance relative to loitering munitions. While the majority of systems currently in service have a maximum range of up to 5 km, the requirements for future systems point to an increase in standoff distance.

Rafael’s Spike family of ATGMs showcased at DSEI 2017. [RecoMonkey]
For example, the requirements for the Close Combat Missile System – Heavy (CCMS-H), a potential successor to the BGM-71 TOW family, include a maximum range of 4.5 km for direct engagement and a cooperative engagement range of equal to or exceeding 8 km.[14] Earlier, Mark Andrews, Director of the Combat Capabilities Branch at the Maneuver Requirements Division, stated that the US Army wants the CCMS-H to retain many of the TOW’s advantages but have the capability to defeat the most advanced enemy tanks out to 10,000 m.[15] A similar trend can be seen in the growing number of long-range Spike ER2 and Spike NLOS systems procured or on order around the globe in recent years.

As became obvious from the conflict in Ukraine, systems—both man-portable and vehicle-mounted—with a maximum range of 4-5 km, operating close to enemy lines, are likely to be spotted by one ISR assets—such as reconnaissance drones—and targeted by artillery, loitering munitions, or other available fire assets long before they are in a position to engage the enemy. The standoff distance of up to 5 km, combined with the fire-and-forget mode, once understood as sufficient measures to avoid detection and enemy fire, now seems inadequate.

The second trend is driven by recent developments in armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) protection. In response to the proliferation of anti-tank assets, including advanced missiles and loitering munitions, militaries across the globe have accelerated the pace of implementing advanced protective solutions for both armoured and soft-skin vehicles. Therefore, the capability to defeat armoured vehicles equipped with advanced multilayered protection suites, incorporating both soft-kill and hard-kill active protection systems (APS), is now becoming mandatory.

Another trend is the growing versatility of ATGMs. While during the Cold War this class of armaments was seen as the primary weapon for defeating enemy armour, today the spectrum of combat missions performed by ATGMs is significantly wider. The variety of combat scenarios and operational environments in which ATGMs are employed has also increased.

The need to adapt ATGMs for diverse combat scenarios has resulted in continuous improvement and the implementation of new functions that have increased their flexibility. An illustrative example is the introduction of the so-called ‘soft-launch’ feature, which allows ATGMs to be used in confined spaces during urban warfare, as well as the use of smokeless propellants, contributing to better concealment. Another direction is the development of multipurpose missiles (with selectable or modular configurations) or munitions offered with with thermobaric or high-explosive fragmentation (HE-FRAG), or tandem-HEAT multipurpose (HEAT-MP) warheads, allowing for employment against a wide range of targets. Alongside this is the addition of more fuzing options. A good recent example can be found in the Spike LR2, which features operator-controlled fuzing, allowing for air-burst, impact-delayed (for defeating bunkers or fortified structures), and impact fuzing modes.

A THeMIS UGV fitted with remote weapon station (RWS) with FGM-148 Javelin. [RecoMonkey]
Finally, there are ongoing developments in capabilities that are likely to be introduced in the next generation of ATGMs or through upgrades to existing systems. For example, MBDA unveiled the Ground Warden AI at the Eurosatory 2024 event—an artificial intelligence (AI)-powered system designed to enhance target acquisition and the decision-making process for the Akeron MP family of weapons.[16] Other manufacturers, including Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Lockheed Martin, and others, are also working on developing and implementing AI and machine learning technologies into missiles, including ATGMs.

Further ATGM enhancements may include swarming capability, data sharing between multiple missiles in a network, new propulsion systems, autonomous guidance and targeting, and integration with both manned and unmanned platforms. While some of these capabilities have already reached the prototyping and testing phases, the timeline for adoption and deployment remains unclear.

Conclusions

Today, ATGMs remain an essential precision-guided weapon at the tactical level, employed against diverse targets such as armoured and soft-skin vehicles, watercraft, aircraft, field fortifications, buildings, and infantry – whether concealed or in the open – among others. Thanks to inexpensive technology and vast Cold War-era surpluses, second-generation ATGMs will likely remain in service and production in some countries, complementing more advanced ATGMs and loitering munitions. These older systems are expected to receive upgrades and capability enhancements, allowing them to perform with acceptable efficiency at least until the mid-2030s.

As a result, many countries’ ATGM arsenals will consist of a combination of simpler and cheaper ATGMs, loitering munitions, and advanced ATGMs with enhanced capabilities. While not ideal, this configuration offers several advantages. For instance, second-generation ATGMs are more affordable and ready for large-scale production, while military personnel, including reserves, can arguably be trained to use them more easily.

The latest-generation ATGMs will continue to evolve, although they will be produced and procured in limited numbers. Probably the most significant factors contributing to this limitation are their complex designs, higher production costs, and longer production cycles. For example, in their January 2023 report ‘Rebuilding U.S. Inventories: Six Critical Systems’, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimated that it would take 12.5 years to replenish the 8,500 FGM-148 Javelin systems supplied to Ukraine if the pace of production remains as it has been in recent years, and 6.5 years if the production rate increases.[17]

While the technological advantages of newer generations of ATGMs are indisputable, they raise concerns from a military perspective. The increasing complexity of these systems, coupled with often higher personnel training requirements, risks transforming a basic tactical weapon—originally designed to be common, affordable, and expendable—into an expensive, scarce, and difficult-to-replenish asset, potentially challenging to employ during a large-scale conflict.

An FGM-148 Javelin ATGM captured during the Battle of Mariupol in 2022 at the exhibition in Patriot Park, 2024. [Alexey Tarasov]
Finally, it is important to note that a certain number of guided (FGM-148 Javelin, BGM-71 TOW family) and unguided (NLAW, Panzerfaust-3, RGW 90) anti-tank weapons were captured by Russian forces during the conflict in Ukraine. While many of these weapons do not belong to the latest generation of anti-tank systems, they remain in service in many countries worldwide. It is possible that some of these systems might be reverse-engineered by Russian defence companies or, more importantly, handed over to Russian allied countries such as China, Iran, and North Korea. Access to these systems could incentivise domestic development of anti-tank guided missiles and various countermeasures, both passive and active, in these nations. While the impact of the latter would likely be minimal in the immediate term, nonetheless over the longer term it could potentially influence ATGM and countermeasure development in some countries and even alter the market landscape.

Alexey Tarasov

 

[1] IMARC Group Report, https://www.imarcgroup.com/anti-tank-missile-system-market

[2] Research and Markets Report https://www.researchandmarkets.com/report/man-portable-anti-armor-weapons#tag-pos-2

[3] Market Research Future – https://www.marketresearchfuture.com/reports/anti-tank-guided-missiles-market-40359

[4] Coherent Market Insights – https://www.coherentmarketinsights.com/industry-reports/manned-anti-tank-guided-missile-system-market?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[5] Spike LR Brochure – https://www.rafael.co.il/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/spike-lr2-missile.pdf

[6] Spike NLOS brochure – https://www.rafael.co.il/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Spike-nlos-eo-guided-stand-off-missile.pdf

[7] Depending on the methodology, the 9K135 Kornet with the 9M133 missile can be classified as a second-generation system, while the Kornet-EM is considered third-generation. Scientific Technical Review, 2023, Vol.73, No.1, Analysis of the Development of Five Generation of Anti-Armor Missile Systems

[8] https://t.me/kalashnikovnews/3114

[9] OMTAS system specifications on Roketsan’s official website. https://www.roketsan.com.tr/en/products/omtas-medium-range-anti-tank-missile-system

[10] Scientific Technical Review, 2023, Vol.73, No.1, Analysis of the Development of Five Generation of Anti-Armor Missile Systems, p.32.

[11] Medium-range missile for French Army. Christopher F Foss. 15 June 2016. Retrieved – https://web.archive.org/web/20171107015740/https://www.janes.com/article/61385/medium-range-missile-for-french-army-es2016d3

[13] Spike NLOS – https://www.rafael.co.il/system/spike-nlos/

[14] Request for Information: Close Combat Missile System – Heavy – https://sam.gov/opp/e8bdc42ce40342aeb7b57169ee3c0251/view#description

[15] Army Wants to Replace the Cold War-Era TOW Missile with a New Longer-Range Tank Killer https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/04/08/army-wants-replace-cold-war-era-tow-missile-new-longer-range-tank-killer.html

[16] Ground Warden AI system – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Zh-C-OyvgA

[17] Rebuilding U.S. Inventories: Six Critical Systems. Commentary by Mark F. Cancian. January 9, 2023 – https://www.csis.org/analysis/rebuilding-us-inventories-six-critical-systems