F-35: “The system as a whole is a cultural change!”

One of the Vice Presidents at Lockheed Martin is Jeff ‘Cobra’ Harrigian, Commander of the US Air Force in Europe (USAFE) until 2022, with 4,100 hours on F-22, F-15C and A/OA-37. Now he is responsible for ‘Strategic Campaigns’ at the world’s largest defence contractor. On the sidelines of AIRPOWER-24, ESD spoke to him about the F-35 fighter jet, its European distribution and the approaching Austrian Eurofighter succession. The interview was conducted by Georg Mader.

Mader: According to the internationally visible timelines, our next government will not avoid preparing and making decisions about what should come after the 15 early Eurofighters. So RFI from around 2027, then RFP etc., contract 2028 or 2029, to delivery in 2033 and then IOC. And if you ask around in the air force – right up to the top – you can already see some ‘glowing’ eyes here and there when it comes to the F-35. So what do LM think of the current production rates and delivery times for the F-35? Our Czech neighbours in Fairford said they signed up for 2023 and won’t get the first ones at home until 2031.

Harrigian: Well, we know all this of course. Our production has stabilised at 156 F-35s per year. And the Czechs will receive their jets prior, but at Ebbing AFB because Luke AFB is already overcrowded with various customers. But delivery in 2031 was their choice, a customer request.

Mader: 156 per year – and the projected number for the USAF alone is still 1,763 units, isn’t it?

Harrigian: Yes, that is still the planned number, which has been in place for several years. But ultimately it will be the US Air Force that decides whether this number will be maintained, based on the global situation, technical progress and budgets. For us, the key to all of this will be to work closely with the nations and to understand the requirements of the nations and the wishes of the customers in terms of schedules – as in the case of Austria. Because, as you have emphasised, there is a special preparation process everywhere to work out its individual and unique characteristics. And that is always a challenge everywhere. The countries have to plan this – and our job is to be a strategic partner for it.

Mader: Have you been approached here yet, with some indications of when something should happen?

Harrigian: The discussions here with the AF Commander were primarily related to his or your relationship with the Vermont Air National Guard present here in Zeltweg, with their F-35s. And that’s a great relationship. That’s not a given. I don’t know if you know my background, but in my previous job I was commander of the US Air Force for Europe. And there the Air Force of our National Guard (ANG) plays a major role in providing very flexible support for some of our requirements across the theatre. And I think the relationship with the ‘Green Mountain Boys’ of the Vermont ANG is very instructive for the entire Austrian Air Force in terms of understanding the F-35. Not only from an operational point of view, but also from a maintenance and repair point of view. And what it takes to do that with F-35. A good thing.

Mader: There are people here – and it was the same in Switzerland – who are media representatives, bloggers and enthusiasts and who think that the F-35 has a rather expensive footprint, including life cycle costs and the ALIS logistics program, or ODIN then.

Harrigian: So I think the important part here – and you know this better than anyone – is the context. It may seem expensive – in comparison to what? You have to understand the life cycle costs and how they are distributed over many years, or how they will play out in the long term, again but in comparison to what? In terms of against operational or mission value? We are very relaxed about that.

Mader: There is a lot to do at the technical level here over the next few years anyway. Last year, a ‘final’ support contract was signed for the current [Eurofighter] Tranche 1 for the next seven years, including for the engines, etc. Some upgrades are still planned, but otherwise no operator wants to invest in T1 anymore. And if – in theory – an F-35 in particular were to be selected, when would you start with the infrastructure? And then, until the war in Ukraine, we had a rather ‘underdeveloped’ electronic warfare capability with a lot of theory only – but the F-35 is largely EW! Especially for this solution, we would have to start training for it now! Couldn’t the ‘comrades’ from Vermont help with that initially?

Harrigian: Of course, you have to prepare for such a succession early on, including in terms of personnel. And as for a possible F-35, there are already a number of nations across Europe that could help now. If you look at the number of these aircraft that will be in Europe during that period, it’s 600 to 700. You could look north, for example, to Germany, which has been known for years to be very knowledgeable in the field of EW. Of course, it is important to learn about utilising EW and to study the mindset and operations of the 5th generation in even greater depth. And the U.S. Air Force – including the ‘Vermont Boys’ – would also provide support, for example in training. But as I said, there is already a great deal of expertise in Europe that is available.

Mader: And then by then, our neighbours the Czechs, the Swiss or the Italians will already be ‘in the middle’ of the F-35. We have been working very closely with Italy in particular recently.

Harrigian: Exactly. That’s why I think that participating in this broad program, especially among Europe, would really offer significant advantages.

Mader: And you think that this ‘networking’ could possibly help to reduce the financial footprint?

Harrigian: At the end of the day, it’s going to be a government-by-government decision and they have to work through how it’s all going to play out in their organisation. I would just suggest that when you look at it strategically across Europe, you don’t just look at the important interoperability from an operational perspective. The system as a whole is a cultural change. And there are nations that have already initiated or implemented it.

Mader: I think this change should be driven by relatively young people or people who are attracted by the new technology. For larger NATO countries, this may not be such a big deal, but for us, in terms of personnel, it’s a bit like ‘space exploration’.

Harrigian: That may well be, but in this respect, every user is part of a huge and growing community.

Mader: A brief word about the – reported – costs. One hears that when the Swiss carried out their assessment, the bill of 36 aircraft over a lifespan of 20 years resulted in a platform that was two billion cheaper than the other contenders. Did that include everything?

Harrigian: The Swiss included airframes, life cycle costs, infrastructure and training in this their calculation.

Mader: One argument or ‘accusation’ that you often come across, is that the Americans ‘dictate’ that you have to demolish everything at the location, build protective structures and erect a high-tech perimeter, etc. Your VP Randy Howard said to me in Dubai, that if you have such an important resource – and it’s also a coalition one – you want to protect it.

Harrigian: Randy Howard retired, by the way, last month. But he’s absolutely right about that. And again, a lot of countries have been through this process already and could be very helpful in coming up with a plan based on the lessons learned on all the aspects you mentioned, from the infrastructure area you mentioned, to training and all those things. Several countries that are partners and allies of the Austrians certainly have a wealth of experience in this area.

Mader: Do you actually need a complete mission simulator or just a few cockpit computer workstations? Or could you share a simulator with other users or neighbours?

Harrigian: Of course, that will be their decision. But I think these discussions also need to be held because, as you point out, the maturity of simulation technology is constantly changing, every two years. So is the miniaturisation or the software and the possibilities of what is possible. There are certainly opportunities for discussion, which options can be used? Perhaps the overall scope will be smaller. This would always be negotiated in the G2G regime, government to government, or with the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) to ensure that the customer’s requirements are met, who can ultimately make the decision.

Mader: Regarding the aircraft itself. The big topic at the moment, and for the near future, is the software standard ‘Technology Refresh 3’ (TR-3), as a prerequisite for Block 4, right? It is now coming in a kind of initial configuration, after a number of aircraft had to be produced ‘on stockpiles’ because no acceptances were possible. Is that right, or what is the status?

Harrigian: TR-3 has been communicated to all nations. There is a combat-training-capable release in those aircraft that are currently being delivered, both from the production line and from those that were held back until we reached TR-3. This release will be continuously improved throughout this year, so the plan from the beginning of 2025 is to provide the fully operational TR-3 version from then on. And as that continues to advance, the JPO is working specifically on Block 4. And I would describe it best, as being refined in the future, that the goal was to complete the infrastructure for it from Block 3. So that you can then further expand this infrastructure with TR-3 and with Block 4 functions. We expect continual software updates related to TR-3 insertions and Block 4 capabilities, with major milestone software drops along the way, to ensure we are always providing our customers with the most advanced technology.

Mader: And the new capabilities of that Block 4 will be more in the direction of armament or sensors? Or, to put it another way, what new features and capabilities will Block 4 aircraft have, that previous blocks have not?

Harrigian: A mixture of both, I would say. The JPO is currently working on this and will announce over the next few months – as far as possible – what the exact configuration will look like in the future. In any case, the Block 4 upgrades will represent the most significant development to date in the F-35’s capabilities, with likely increased missile numbers, additional advanced non-kinetic EW-capabilities and improved target detection. They will ensure air superiority for us and our allies and partners and increase deterrence against so-called ‘near-peer threats’ for decades to come. But we can’t go into more detail at this point.

Mader: Some people here think that the short-take vertical landing version, the F-35B, has a certain charm: it could operate from anywhere in our topography, logistics provided, etc. But it has no cannon, smaller bays, and is well a third more expensive, etc. What do you think of that?

Harrigian: As you know, this version provides options to the nations, whether it be launching from aircraft carriers or austere locations. Nations ultimately make the decision on which model they prefer based on their operational requirements. For Austria, as long as they haven’t reached the point of officially announcing that they are even considering procuring F-35s, it is not appropriate to say anything about a preferred version or similar customer-specific details.

Mader: Ok. Another claim or question that one also hears here – for example from political defence speakers etc. – is that the F-35 is a stealth attack aircraft that ‘smashes’ the door to a heavily defended hostile airspace on the first day of a conflict. Do we need that? Would we ever use it? One of our former ‘Air Chiefs’ said to me just the other day, that we wouldn’t need a bomber to bomb Moscow!

Harrigian: [shaking his head] It is primarily about air defence, isn’t it? Can I give you my perspective on this?

Mader: Yes, please.

Harrigian: So, first of all, I go back to the time when the Russians invaded Ukraine in 2022 and I – then Commander of the US Air Force in Europe – went to my Defense Secretary and said, “I need F-35s.” Why did I want F-35s? First, to deter Putin, to make sure he understood that we would be able to protect the eastern flank.

Mader: And this intention was, because they respect this particular aircraft?

Harrigian: Exactly, yes. Because of the capabilities that the F-35 system brings. The second aspect was that it enabled the other friendly and allied actors, whose fourth-generation aircraft – and even some third-generation aircraft – then had a better situational awareness. In other words, the information that the F-35 collected could be shared with everyone. Because I wanted to make sure that we were making smart decisions. Our mission was to defend NATO’s eastern flank, while being prepared for anything that should follow…clearly we did not want a war, but we had to be prepared.

Mader: So F-35 as a multiplier…

Harrigian: It clearly is…There are various options for sharing information. All these mechanisms are in place. But the point is that the F-35 was able to make everyone perform better. When we were sitting on the eastern flank, our first task was to make sure that Putin was aware that we had F-35s in the airspace. Our second task was to keep everyone informed of the situation. And my final point was that if we put young men and women in harm’s way, we have to equip them with the best possible resources and aircraft available.

Mader: Yes, you never know what will happen in five or seven years. It’s the same argument as in Switzerland, where they also said that it was an ‘offensive’ or ‘aggressive’ fighter aircraft, not just for airspace surveillance.

Harrigian: Of course, the F-35 can do that but also can execute offensive operations – if that is the mission. If that is the mission, we must be prepared to deter and also penetrate the considerable threat of Russian forces. The aircraft for this is the F-35, because they are survivable. Thanks to the weapons and sensors that I know, it can achieve the specific goals for which they were developed.

Mader: Nevertheless, air-to-air will be our top priority here, at least for the foreseeable future. The question is how robust this concept should be in the near future. Will it remain the practice of active air surveillance as it is now – or should it become what our generals always now tell everyone? Real defence mode? No air policing, but true air defence. For me however, that also means hardened aircraft shelters, alternate runways, robust logistics. So a much broader approach – not just the aircraft.

Harrigian: I agree, the concept of agile combat operations, to which you are referring I believe, however applies to the whole of Europe today. However, I think that one or the other aspect is important here, especially in view of the requirement of joint forces to not only interact with others in the air, but also to recognise the information we see in the air and to share or distribute it. Be it other enemy fighter jets – which at that time do not yet know about me – or incoming cruise missiles, or a new ground-based anti-aircraft radar, etc. So also in concert with the air defence of the land forces, so that you have a multi-layered defence capability for the nation, given its size. And there are countries all over Europe that are working on exactly this problem. And they recognise that F-35 is the decisive factor that will help them all.

Mader: Thank you for your time here at Zeltweg.

Harrigian: Thanks for your interest in the F-35.