The challenges of last-mile logistics

The methods and means of conducting combat operations have changed significantly over the past decade, prompting militaries worldwide to react and adapt. Logistics, as one of the most critical components of modern warfare, has likewise undergone substantial transformation, with many changes already implemented and others still in the trial phase. Against this backdrop, so-called last-mile logistics has emerged at the forefront of both innovation and adaptation.

Modern military thought emphasises that last-mile logistics–the final delivery of supplies, equipment, or support to frontline or operational units–remains one of the most vulnerable and complex aspects of military sustainment.

Defining the last mile

Official doctrines define “last mile resupply” or “last tactical mile” logistics as a part of the logistics chain physically closest to enemy forces and therefore most exposed to direct action.^[1]

According to the United Kingdom’s ‘Autonomous Last Mile Resupply System’ competition document, “The ‘last mile resupply’ involves the delivery of combat supplies from the forward-most location (such as a physical base or a logistics/infantry vehicle) to personnel engaged in combat operations. Although relatively small in distance, these resupply activities are challenging as they are in an environment that is typically hostile, complex and contested. These activities need to quickly and efficiently deliver vital supplies in order to maintain operational tempo and enable successful mission outcomes.” At the same time, the document specifies that ‘last mile’ is a concept rather than a fixed distance and, in some scenarios, may extend up to 30 km.^[2]

Enemy force characteristics, theatre conditions, geographical features, and socio-political factors may further add complexity to the environment in which logistics operates. Some adversaries possess a full spectrum of conventional and precision weapon systems, while others – such as various non-state armed groups (NSAGs) – benefit from extensive local support, a network of dispersed strike nodes, and concealed communications.

The environment

While the experience of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict should not be considered universally applicable, it remains the largest, most protracted, and technologically sophisticated ground conflict of recent decades. Due to its scale and nature, it provides a vast amount of data for analysis and lessons learned.

Based on this experience, logistics in the modern combat environment are shaped by several key factors:

• The battlefield has become increasingly transparent as a result of the high density of reconnaissance and surveillance assets. Observation density increases progressively toward the line of contact;
• The combat zone and the close rear area have expanded,^[3] as have the widths of defensive sectors assigned to formations, and the defensive areas of individual units.^[4] Depending on the tactical situation, the depth of the combat zone and close rear areas may vary from a few hundred metres to several tens of kilometres;
• Ground forces operating near the combat zone function in a contested electronic warfare (EW) environment. Communications may be disrupted, intercepted, and exploited by the enemy. The density of EW assets has also increased at the tactical level;
• The density and diversity of precision-guided fires available at the tactical level have increased. Precision munitions and associated delivery systems have become increasingly affordable and, in many cases, expendable;
• The speed of reaction in ‘detect-decide-engage’ cycle has decreased several times, up to 4–6 minutes.^[5] According to an interview with Colonel General Andrey Mordvichev, Russian ground forces have begun employing ‘micro-nodes’ within their reconnaissance-fire system, enabling a streamlined decision-making process and providing tactical commanders with the capability to rapidly observe and engage identified targets. Essentially, a micro-node may consist of a single system – a mortar, artillery piece, tank, MLRS, or other fire asset – coupled with a reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

Considering the factors outlined above, armed forces now conduct operations in a highly contested, geographically extended battlespace, characterised by constrained mobility and elevated threat levels. The logical response to these challenges has been the dispersion of both combat and logistics elements. However, this dispersion has also placed additional strain on the sustainment system.

The challenges

In the modern operational environment, logistics operations–including last-mile resupply–are shaped by several key challenges.

First, the dispersion of combat elements has significantly increased the complexity of the logistics system, making it more resource- and labour-intensive. For example, whereas company-sized infantry units were previously supplied with ammunition, food, and water at a single point, logisticians are now required to divide cargo into smaller loads and deliver them across, at times, considerable distances to dispersed elements, sometimes to groups of only two or three soldiers.

Another example can be drawn from the combat experience of Ukrainian self-propelled howitzers (SPHs). To enhance survivability and avoid detection, SPHs often move without ammunition across large areas between pre-positioned firing positions where ammunition stocks are stored.^[6] From a logistical perspective, this approach differs significantly from the techniques and procedures employed during the Cold War, when an entire artillery battery or battalion could be resupplied at a single location. In the case of Ukrainian SPHs, the logistics system must now support multiple dispersed firing positions, as well as secure hide sites located beyond the reach of enemy fire assets. At the same time, movement alone cannot be regarded as a panacea. Personnel, equipment, and materials required to construct, maintain, and conceal multiple firing positions must also be delivered.

All of this requires a greater number of vehicles, more drivers or operators–where conditions permit the use of UAVs or UGVs in a logistics role–and increased effort in construction, loading, unloading, and cargo sorting.

Second, sustaining multiple dispersed positions and pre-positioned supply stocks requires increasingly complex planning and scheduling. This task becomes even more demanding when supporting a diverse mix of capabilities–for example, artillery, infantry, strike UAVs, and armour. From an administrative and data-management perspective alone, ensuring that the right supplies reach the right recipient at the right time has become a major challenge. Enemy activity further compounds this complexity.

Third, increasingly complex logistics networks generate higher requirements for protection and connectivity. Establishing and maintaining secure and resilient links between combat and sustainment elements dispersed across a wide area poses a further significant challenge.

Fourth, the character of future combat is likely to vary depending on theatre and conditions; however, a high density of reconnaissance and surveillance assets, coupled with the rapid responsiveness of enemy fire systems, is likely to become a persistent feature.

As a result, logisticians will have to adapt to multiple, and at times fundamentally different, operational scenarios – from static or semi-static attritional combat, characteristic of some sectors of the Russo-Ukrainian front, to highly fluid, fast-paced operations in the Pacific theatre, as envisioned by the US Marine Corps (USMC).

Finally, large-scale conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary remains a realistic possibility. Logisticians must account for threats and capabilities that were often overlooked during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) era. For example, in addition to the ‘last mile’, which may extend up to 30 km, modern precision weapons (such as guided rocket artillery and loitering munitions) can engage targets at ranges of 80–120 km. For this reason, some analysts argue that areas once considered safe rear echelons during the Cold War have effectively been ‘functionally erased’.^[7]

Taken together, these challenges make last-mile logistics an increasingly difficult undertaking in an unpredictable and dangerous battlespace. The increased density of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, combined with the expanded range and precision of enemy fires, has substantially elevated the risk to personnel, platforms, and materiel compared to conflicts of the late 20th and 21st centuries. Consequently, the ‘cost of transaction’ has increased significantly for ‘last mile logistics’.

The responses

While many of the challenges discussed above were identified in the late 2010s, widespread changes to established logistics systems have largely been implemented only in recent years, driven primarily by the operational lessons of the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.

This delay can be attributed in part to the limited experience of most armed forces with protracted, large-scale warfare, as well as the significant investments required to modernise military logistics. The emerging operational environment has imposed new requirements on combat sustainment that, in many cases, necessitate a near-complete restructuring of legacy logistics systems.

In this regard, the Russian Ground Forces – one of the few large land armies currently engaged in a protracted high-intensity conflict – provide a useful case study of institutional priorities, implemented measures, and near-term plans.

In December 2024, Russian Minister of Defence Andrey Belousov, speaking at an extended session of the Ministry of Defence Collegium, outlined several priority areas for the development of the materiel and technical support system (MTO). These included enhancing the protection of arsenals and fuel and lubricants depots located within the reach of enemy strike systems, as well as eliminating open storage sites. Additional measures included enhanced concealment, the formation of mobile air-defence groups, and the establishment of coordinated command-and-control (C2) links with air defence units.

Belousov also emphasised the need to revise existing approaches to storage and logistics organisation. Large, centralised, multi-purpose storage facilities, he argued, should be replaced by a distributed, layered network of depots, with corresponding adjustments to logistics systems and methods of cargo delivery.^[8]

According to Belousov, these tasks were largely completed during 2025. In December 2025, he announced new objectives for 2026, including the completion of a multi-layered storage system and the initiation of the first phase of digitalising inventory management processes. He also reported the widespread deployment of all-terrain vehicles and the expanded use of UAVs and UGVs in last-mile logistics operations.^[9] An analysis of these priorities highlights both concrete responses to major operational challenges and several emerging trends.

First, logistics organisation has shifted away from Cold War-era practices toward decentralisation across all levels of the sustainment system, with a transition from large, centralised storage facilities to smaller, distributed resupply nodes.

Second, force-protection measures for logistics infrastructure have expanded significantly, encompassing enhanced concealment and deception, EW measures, and the deployment of air defence systems to protect depots, routes, and critical infrastructure.

Third, new transportation solutions have been introduced at the tactical level, both manned and unmanned. Manned platforms include a wide range of all-terrain vehicles and motorcycles, while experimentation with unmanned logistics systems continues. According to Belousov, more than 12,000 tonnes of cargo were delivered by unmanned systems during 2025; however, this accounted for less than 0.2% of the approximately 8 million tonnes of materiel transported in 2024 by the Russian Material and Technical Support forces.^[10] In parallel, additional protection kits and protected logistics vehicles have entered service in the heavier platform segment.

Finally, announced efforts to digitalise logistics processes represent a critical enabling development, given the growing complexity of modern sustainment systems and the increasing requirement for accurate, timely data to support planning, coordination, and execution.

Closing thoughts

Looking ahead, last-mile logistics will increasingly be conducted in a persistently contested, transparent, and lethal battlespace. Logistics disaggregation – the dispersion of sustainment nodes, transport assets, and delivery routes – will become a defining characteristic of future combat logistics, reflecting the broader dispersion of manoeuvre forces and the transformation of the traditional views on sustainment.

In this environment, a ‘protected-everything’ approach is likely to shape last-mile sustainment. Protection will increasingly take precedence over speed, driving the design of logistics platforms and procedures toward integrated force-protection measures, including EW, short-range air defence, signature management, and layered passive and active protection systems.

Unmanned systems will assume a growing role in last-mile resupply, but their employment is likely to complement rather than replace manned logistics. To sustain dispersed yet operationally significant formations, heavily protected logistic UGVs may emerge alongside UAVs evolving toward greater payload capacity and endurance.

Finally, as logistics networks increase in scale and complexity, the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML)-enabled tools for predictive planning, routing, and inventory management will become essential to reduce the burden on personnel and to enable resilient sustainment operations under continuous threat.

Alexey Tarasov

Author: Alexey Tarasov is a land warfare expert specialising in Europe, Russia, and armoured vehicles. He has contributed to ESD, Shephard News, along with other publications, and has authored several books.

 

[1] Combat Logistics in the Twenty-first Century Enabling the Mobility, Endurance, and Sustainment of NATO Land Forces in a Future Major Conflict, Christopher Kinsey and Ronald Ti – https://academic.oup.com/book/45784/chapter/400597938/chapter-pdf/49772827/oso-9780192857422-chapter-4.pdf

[2] Competition document – autonomous last mile resupply. Updated 29 June 2017 – https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/accelerator-competition-autonomous-last-mile-supply/accelerator-competition-autonomous-last-mile-resupply

[3] APS and ERA developments. Alexey Tarasov. 21. January 2025 – https://euro-sd.com/2025/01/articles/42132/aps-and-era-developments/

[4] Выходим на новые рубежи. 01.10.2025. Interview with Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Colonel General Andrey Mordvichev – https://archive.ph/Kgnjg#selection-509.0-509.123

[5] The continuing evolution of tube artillery. Alexey Tarasov. 1. September 2025 – https://euro-sd.com/2025/09/articles/armament/46019/the-continuing-evolution-of-tube-artillery/

[6] KNDS France’s presentation. Accessible here – https://x.com/JakOSpades/status/1925932364418461907

[7] Combat Logistics in the Twenty-first Century Enabling the Mobility, Endurance, and Sustainment of NATO Land Forces in a Future Major Conflict, Christopher Kinsey and Ronald Ti – https://academic.oup.com/book/45784/chapter/400597938/chapter-pdf/49772827/oso-9780192857422-chapter-4.pdf

[8] Доклад Министра обороны РФ 2024 на расширенном заседании Коллегии Минобороны России

18 December 2024 – http://www.souzop.ru/news/companies_news/3625/

[9] Доклад Министра обороны РФ 2025 на расширенном заседании Коллегии Минобороны России. 17 December 2025 – http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78801

[10] Is drone-based resupply viable? Alexey Tarasov – 17. October 2025 https://euro-sd.com/2025/10/articles/armament/47250/is-drone-based-resupply-viable/