On 6 August 2024, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) surprised many by staging a surprise incursion into Russia’s Kursk oblast, bringing the fight to Russian soil. The stretch of border where the incursion occurred was largely weakly-defended, largely by conscripts and guards from the Russian Border Service. Fairly quickly, the Ukrainian force managed to secure a bridgehead, and by 9 August, had captured the town of Sudzha, along with a number of smaller settlements. On 10 August, a Russian relief force attacked toward Sudzha from the East, and while they initially managing to regain some land, they were pushed back by 16 August. Between 16 and 19 August, Ukraine’s advances were considerably slower. On 20 August, the AFU were pushed back from around Belitsa and Bol’shoe Soldatskoe, but made substantial gains in the North flank and smaller gains to the West flank. At the time of writing on 21 August, Ukraine controlled somewhere between 815 km2 to 1,250 km2 of territory.
While the numbers of Ukrainian personnel involved in the operation are difficult to estimate accurately, the AFU seems to have assembled an ad-hoc patchwork force from the combat-ready portions of various formations. This is evidenced by the highly diverse range of platforms seen being operated, as well as damaged and destroyed. In terms of Ukraine’s vehicle losses, the list includes various higher-end platforms, such as: Challenger 2, PT-91 Twardy, T-64BV, Marder, Bradley, Stryker, BTR-4, as well as larger numbers of lighter platforms such as M113, VAB, Cougar H, MaxxPro, Kozak-2M1, Kozak-7, Senator, among others.
The key question is whether or not this offensive can be considered a success. To a large extent, accurately assessing the success or failure of the operation depends on the intentions, objectives, and strategic logic behind it. With regard to this, on 18 August, President Zelenskyy stated that the goal of the operation was to build a “buffer zone” in Kursk to hinder Russian cross-border attacks. Assessed on those terms, the results appear mixed at best.
By creating a salient within Russia, Ukraine have extended the length of the front line to be defended, and have done so in an area where it is relatively risky to bring up air defence systems. Secondly, the AFU have taken fairly serious losses of capable personnel and high-value equipment, both of which are difficult to replace. Lastly, the offensive has taken up a lot of Ukraine’s offensive potential, and the longer the operation lasts, the more Ukraine’s defenders on the main front will feel the absence of personnel, vehicles, and ammunition being used in Kursk. Indeed, over the same time period as the Kursk operation, Russian advances have actually accelerated in some sectors of the main front, most notably in the direction of Pokrovsk. Taken together, these factors make Zelenskyy’s claim of the goal being to establish a buffer zone seem somewhat dubious.
There have been some definite positive outcomes for Ukraine. For starters, having spent the best part of a year on the defensive, finally being back on the offensive has been a major morale and propaganda boost for the AFU, as well as being highly embarrassing for Putin. Along with causing significant attrition to Russian units sent to deal with them, the AFU also secured an estimated several hundred prisoners, which may be exchanged. According to some reports, Russia was also forced to divert some units from their Kharkiv offensive to stymie Ukraine’s progress, along with diverting some aviation, munitions, and reserves to deal with the threat in Kursk.
Yet, taken together, it is difficult to argue that the gains have been worth the cost, not least because the offensive will require ongoing sustainment if the AFU choose to remain in the area. Due to shortages, this sustainment will necessarily have to come at the expense of other units on the main frontline. Indeed, some reports from AFU sources on the main frontline have already stated experiencing greater shortages of supplies such as ammunition. As such, the question of why the AFU chose to do this remains open to discussion, and multiple theories have been floated to fill the gap of ignorance.
Some have posited that Ukraine aimed to take as much land as possible, to facilitate more favourable land exchanges at potential upcoming peace talks. Yet overall, Russia retains the initiative on the main frontline, so there would seem little incentive for them to go along with such a proposal.
Another theory has posited that the attack was essentially diversionary, designed to relive pressure on Ukraine’s East by drawing away Russian units stationed there. While this seems the most plausible, if true, it does not appear to have succeeded, as seen with Russia’s accelerated gains along parts of the main frontline.
Overall, in strategic terms, the nagging feeling is that the AFU now find themselves holding a poisoned chalice. Ahead of them lies the choice of either retreat, or commitment. The former would preserve lives and equipment, but would call the entire purpose of the operation into question, making it look like a blunder. Commitment would continue to exacerbate shortages on the main frontline, in exchange for holding on to questionably useful gains. Neither seems particularly good.
Marc Cazalet
