Is 2024 the decisive year for Ukraine?

It will be difficult to identify true turning points in the Ukraine war. Instead, we should look to understand the trajectory of the war from multiple perspectives. This piece examines the current situation in Ukraine, and what things may begin to look like going forward.

Social media-fuelled optimism

Viewed through the camera of a drone, or one of the social media accounts that claims to track Russian losses in the war, it appears as though Ukraine is on course to win the war. In multiple videos, defeated Russian soldiers seem to give up and beg the drone operator for mercy before they are dispatched. In others, small vehicles weighed down with entire sections of Russian soldiers are engaged with first person view (FPV) drones, leaving the viewer to imagine the consequences. The Russians rarely seem to have had any form of defence; occasionally they fight back using rifles, shotguns or by swinging at the drone as it approaches. Rarely, it seems, are they successful. These stories are personal, and for those that are willing, it is possible to watch the final moments of Russian soldiers every day and to witness the despair and resignation they feel as the outcome becomes clear.

At the other end of the scale, social media accounts claim to have tracked Russian losses – some days they note hundreds of destroyed vehicles in a single day’s combat. Prestige kills still attract applause, the loss of a T-90M, long-range strikes against Russian air bases, or the sinking of a Russian ship in the Black Sea. And yet, the fighting continues, day after day. Other accounts, such as the British MoD’s Defence Intelligence provide optimistic updates, often without the context that would make the updates valuable in so far as understanding the state of the war is concerned. For example, a 12 July 2024 update notes that Russian casualties had increased to a daily conflict high of 1,262 in May 2024 and 1,163 in June 2024.^[1] The same update claimed there had been 70,000 Russian casualties in the two months leading to mid-July 2024. There was no analysis of what these figures mean for Russia, nor are there reliable data on Ukraine’s own losses, which makes them a poor proxy for analysing the current status of the war.^[2]

Instead, there are three elements that should be considered in assessing the current state of the war: Russia’s recent successful strikes against Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure – in particular its energy generation and distribution network. A holistic view of the situation on the frontline arrived at through those sources that are mapping the changes in the frontline combined with reported conditions there. And finally, an analysis of both countries’ ability to continue the war. Together, these threads are shaping the trajectory of the war, and they must be considered in their totality to understand what has happened in 2024, and what might happen in the months ahead.

The bottom line up front is that Russia has succeeded in many of its likely aims for 2024. Ukrainians are already facing hours without power in the summer, with worse to come in the winter. Its armed forces have made steady gains on the frontline leading to extensive casualties on both sides. Sadly, those are losses that are harder for Ukraine to replace than for Russia. At the same time, Russia’s defence industry has been mobilised and this is beginning to show results in terms of vehicles produced and refurbished, as well as the amount of ammunition reaching the frontlines and Ukraine’s cities.

All of this together has created a trajectory that will be difficult for Ukraine and its Western partners to alter, on timelines that are challenging in the extreme. There is, of course, the US election and the possible return of a Trump administration to the White House where he has promised to “end the war quickly.”^[3] Furthermore, a recent poll of Ukrainians found that 44% believed it was time to negotiate with Russia, against 35% who did not.^[4] Most rejected Putin’s conditions for peace, but these figures nevertheless indicate that the war is fatiguing Ukraine’s populace. While wider Western support for Ukraine remains firm in the face of several elections that could have changed the situation for the worse, few are providing support at the scale required to change the war decisively. It is likely that many are nervously considering the point at which they will have to focus on their own defence needs, at the expense of Ukraine’s. This means that if the war continues on the current trajectory, Ukraine will likely be forced to negotiate a settlement.

Winter is coming

Russia’s strikes against Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure (CNI) between March and June 2024 have brought the country to the precipice.^[5] By early June, Russia had destroyed half of Ukraine’s energy generation capacity, leading to regular blackouts across the country.^[6] Without securing additional power, Ukrainians will face a horrific winter that may weaken morale yet further. Ukraine’s heating and power generation are often linked in combined heat and power plants (CHPs), such as CHP No. 5 in Kharkiv which provided heating and power for around 1.3 million people.^[7] CHP No. 5 was destroyed during a large Russian strike on 22 March 2024, which included 151 missiles and drones.^[8] Many more strikes have followed targeting most of the CHPs and hydroelectric power plants in Ukraine, leading to severe damage that will take years to repair. Some of the plants had only recently completed repairs following strikes conducted against them in 2022 and 2023. Russia’s earlier strikes had tended to focus on the facilities that distributed Ukraine’s power such as substations. These were easier to repair and could be fixed quickly to restore power once damaged.^[9] Now, however, Russia has destroyed entire power stations as well as the rare and expensive equipment that makes them work.

Russia was able to achieve this because Ukraine’s air defence interceptors had been largely depleted and it had been unable to adequately resource all of its competing needs. Months of attacks by the Shahed-136 one-way attack (OWA) drones and cruise missiles had finally taken their toll and paved the way for more successful and larger-scale attacks. Another key element to this is Russia’s shift to a war economy and the resultant increase in its defence production, which will be covered in the third analysis of this article. This meant that it could afford to launch a large and complex strike package against Ukraine using ground-based 9M720 Iskander quasi-ballistic missiles, the air launched and hypersonic Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, Shahed-136 OWA drones, and various cruise missiles in a single night of airstrikes. Combined with the depletion of Ukraine’s air defences, the 22 March attack was almost certain to succeed. Russia’s patience had paid off. The West scrambled to replenish Ukraine’s air defence systems, with additional Patriot batteries and interceptors promised in short order.^[10] This is important in helping Ukraine deflect the worst of Russia’s future efforts; the F-16s may also add to the country’s beleaguered air defence if properly employed. However, the same problem will occur again if those air defences and aircraft are not supplied with plentiful stocks of interceptors and air-to-air missiles.

For the average Ukrainian, there are already regular blackouts – some up to 12 hours in length – along with a litany of other challenges.^[11] They range from a loss of mobile phone coverage, which makes it difficult to reach emergency services, to no elevators, which are essential in a country where the dominant form of housing is an apartment block. More severe impacts include the loss of running water, the loss of refrigeration during a very hot summer, and disruption to surgery and other life-saving care facilities. As winter approaches, temperatures in Ukraine will drop, and for most they will hover around 0℃ until February or March 2025. There are some estimates that blackouts will last for 20 hours during winter to help the energy grid cope with the demand placed upon it by people staying home for longer and by the need for heating.^[12] If Ukraine is unable to keep the heating going, it may face a winter of burst pipes and further damage to its CNI that will have to be repaired. There are an estimated 3.7 million internally displaced Ukrainians, along with a further 6 million externally displaced.^[13] Already there are reports of extreme challenges in housing and catering for internally displaced Ukrainians, with housing and support scarce and unsuitable in some cases.^[14] It is very likely that a winter without heating will drive many of those internally displaced towards the border with Europe.

This is not all. Ukraine had a large defence industry prior to the invasion, which has suffered significant damage at the hands of Russian missile strikes. The invasion spurred the growth of Ukraine’s defence industry, which has progressed from a cottage industry to one that performs a vital role in keeping the country in the fight.^[15] However, it relies upon power – without power, it cannot produce new equipment and repair existing equipment, both of which Ukraine desperately needs. Although Ukraine does not depend entirely on its domestic industry to meet its needs, it cannot always rely upon the timely delivery of aid from its Western partners. This means that any loss of production capacity will have an impact upon the frontline that will in turn feed into the overall trajectory of the war.

In sum, Russia’s campaign against Ukraine’s CNI means that the country must prepare itself for what will undoubtedly be a difficult winter; one that will fuel the desire of many to bring the war to a close and end the day-to-day challenges they face. This is arguably the purpose of Putin’s campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, and it appears to be a part of a strategic operation to compel the Ukrainian state to seek peace.^[16] So, Ukraine’s energy situation is dire in technical terms. It does not generate enough power to meet its winter needs, that much is clear. It is harder to assess the impact that this will have as the Ukrainians have proven themselves to be hardy and there are no overt signs of low morale at present, despite the findings of the survey noted in the opening section.^[17] It stands to reason that the winter will play a role in shaping Ukrainian support for the war, and therefore the ability of the country to continue in its fight. This thread shapes the trajectory of the war by damaging and degrading Ukraine’s domestic defence industry, by raising the pain of the average Ukrainian, and by forcing the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) to make difficult decisions about where its air defences are located. This thread will continue alongside the constant violence of the frontline where it appears that Russia has a slight advantage.

The frontline

Distributed advances

An analysis of maps from organisations that are pro-Ukraine and those that are pro-Russian indicate that Russia has made small but consistent advances throughout 2024. The Institute for the Study of War has created time lapse maps of the frontline showing how territory has changed hands over time.^[18] The DeepStateMAP group, which is pro-Ukrainian, provides indications of Russian unit locations and their offensive directions as well as changes in territory.^[19] Soar.earth adds satellite imagery and annotated drawings to a regularly updated map showing Russian and Ukrainian advances. It indicates that the AFU has prepared defensive positions West of Avdiivka, that the Russian forces will soon come into contact with.^[20] Militaryland.net provides a range of maps showing how key battles like Bakhmut and Avdiivka developed over time, as well as current force dispositions and areas with intense fighting.^[21] The pro-Russian outlets Rybar and Lostarmour also provide maps showing Russian force dispositions and detailed maps on a smaller scale showing local advances and combat.^[22] Examining all of these sources, it is clear that Russia is pursuing distributed advances designed to put pressure on much of the frontline all at once, rather than develop a single line of advance. It is likely that the trajectory of the fighting on the frontline will continue in this way throughout 2024.

The foundations for what is now happening were laid in the summer of 2023 and the bloody battle of Bakhmut, which cost Ukraine many soldiers and placed a strain on its ability to regenerate forces in sufficient quantity to support the rest of the line. Ukraine’s planned counter-offensive was unable to dramatically alter the trajectory and open the static frontline to manoeuvre, it also resulted in very heavy losses of Ukrainian personnel and equipment. Meanwhile, Russia attempted to stabilise and recapitalise its forces following the defeats of 2022 and delegated offensive action to Wagner (for a time), thereby shielding the bulk of the Russian armed forces from more costly types of action. The strongest signal that Russia was prepared to resume the offensive came with the siege and eventual capture of Avdiivka in February 2024. Ever since, Russia has made consistent advances on the frontline with the goal of seizing the Donbass Oblast in its entirety and extracting the maximum toll on the Ukrainian forces as it does so.

As of early August 2024, the Ocheretyne axis – heading towards Pokrovsk – now forms one of three that the Russian commanders have prioritised, along with Chasiv Yar, which is near Bakhmut, and a small city called Toretsk.^[23] If each axis is successful, Russia will have succeeded in taking much of the Donetsk oblast, which has been one of the long-held goals of the invasion. This has forced Ukraine into a position where it is always trying to manage the situation and prevent or limit any form of breakthrough rather than preparing for more decisive offensive actions.

The Kharkiv offensive launched on 10 May 2024 appeared to catch Ukraine’s defenders somewhat off-guard and led to the rapid repositioning of Ukraine’s well-equipped formations to the area to stop the Russian advance. Initially, the AFU lacked the ammunition and resources to properly respond, three months without US aid had taken its toll. However, once the supplemental was passed and ammunition began to reach Ukrainian units once more, artillery units in the area came to be well-supplied with ammunition and were able to contribute to stalling the Russian offensive.^[24] The opposing Russian units used this opportunity to engage hundreds of Ukrainian vehicles as they rushed to the area with Lancet loitering munitions, including successful engagements against valuable systems such as Caesar 155 mm howitzers.^[25] The goal of this advance was reportedly to bring Russian guns within range of Kharkiv, to make life unbearable for the 1.3 million Ukrainians living there. Furthermore, it has distracted Ukrainian attention from the Donetsk oblast and led to further losses for the stretched and under-resourced AFU.

Elsewhere, the Ukrainian beachhead at Krynky in the Kherson region finally folded after the loss of around 1,000 Ukrainian troops reported killed and missing.^[26] The conditions for Ukrainian marines in Krynky were very difficult and it is remarkable that they were able to hold the area for nine months under constant Russian offensives. Both sides made extensive use of drones to the extent that Russian units came to regard a posting there as a death sentence. Ukrainian forces remain nearby, so it is unclear whether or not the end of the Krynky operation will lead to the repositioning of Russian forces elsewhere on the front.

Tactical evolution

Fortunately for Ukraine, Russia appears to be unable to bring together a consolidated force above brigade strength and deploy it on a single line of advance. If Russia were able to deploy division-sized forces into an attack it would likely be very difficult for Ukraine to prevent its advance while maintaining integrity along the rest of the front. Despite an inability to muster and command large formations in the field, Russian units had captured 880 km² of terrain by May 2024, Russia’s defence minister, Andrei Belousov said.^[27] This statement was issued 20 days after the Kharkiv offensive was launched. There may be more to Russia’s inability to employ large formations than a lack of command capability; Ukraine has routinely punished Russian units for concentrating in more than company strength, and the length of the frontline (over 1,000 km) is stretching and dispersing the force footprint on both sides.^[28]

This has led to a preference for small unit tactics in defence and offence, which makes a decisive breakthrough in any area unlikely. As a result of this, the trajectory of fighting on the frontline should be expected to continue on its current course, with small pieces of territory seized or recaptured each week. Small unit tactics have evolved throughout 2024 and the Russians appear to rely on a fairly consistent model of probing Ukrainian defences searching either for weakly-defended areas, or weaker units to target. The latter approach was pursued in Mariupol, where Russian units would target the joining points for Ukrainian units – the link between marines and the Azov forces, for example. They also look for vulnerable moments such as force rotations. Russian units were able to advance 5 km and inflict significant casualties in April 2024 as the 47th Mechanised Brigade prepared to exchange positions with the 115th Mechanised Brigade near the village of Ocheretyne, which is close to Avdiivka.^[29] Notably, many accounts of sudden Russian advances indicate that 5-8 km is the limit of what they can achieve in a given attack with their current force disposition. This is likely a result of the size of the units available and the location of their supplies, as well as Ukraine’s ability to reposition its forces rapidly around the front.^[30]

The exact nature of the vulnerability at Ocheretyne is unclear, however Russia was able to capitalise on a weakened Ukrainian force presence to seize the initiative and capture Ocheretyne as well as the villages of Novobakhmutivka and Soloviove by 1 May.^[31] Success in these areas enabled Russian units to push toward Toretsk and Chasiv Yar; the latter occupies high ground, giving an advantage to Ukrainian defenders in inflicting casualties on Russian units in the area. Furthermore, the defences protecting Toretsk have stood since 2014, if both towns fall; Russia will be able to threaten Kostiantynivka, which sits on the intersection of two key highways.^[32]

Russian tactics appear to follow a pattern with inexperienced units made up of mobilised soldiers and prisoners used in an initial push to identify Ukrainian strong points. In Bakhmut, these tactics were used in waves and subsequently became known as the ‘meat grinder’. Once the expendable troops had identified Ukrainian positions, these positions would be attacked by well-trained units using combined arms tactics to overwhelm the now-exhausted Ukrainians. Regular motorised rifle regiments would then be used to hold those positions as the better-trained units rotated out and prepared for the next opportunity. This pattern has continued, with one evolution being the focus on weak units, as opposed to weak points. This is combined with the use of overwhelming firepower in the form of massed artillery and glide bombs when opportunities arise. One Ukrainian commander indicated that entire units can be lost to a glide bomb strike through concussions.^[33] This is challenging when a platoon of 10-15 personnel might be holding several kilometres of the front.

The use of glide bombs and artillery is fairly consistent with Russian doctrine, and its forces have always tried to bring the maximum number of effects to bear upon Ukrainian positions. At times, Ukraine’s strikes on Russian air bases and air defences are able to hold Russian air power at risk; in Krynky this reduced the number of glide bomb strikes from 80 per day to just 4, according to an interview with a Ukrainian soldier published by The Times in June 2024.^[34] However, Ukraine has depleted its air defence interceptors and is unable to provide for the needs of the entire frontline, which enables Russian drones to operate at depth behind Ukrainian positions, and fixed-wing aircraft to approach to within 20 km of the frontline to deploy their guided bombs. As noted above, a single bomb can destroy an entire Ukrainian position or incapacitate a section. Russia was able to employ over 3,000 of them in April 2024 alone.^[35] However, the Russian aircraft must get close if they are to strike a designated Ukrainian position. Here, the arrival of F-16s and further air defence missiles could drive Russian aircraft further back from the front and degrade their accuracy, making them less effective at reducing Ukraine’s defences.

What is new to Russian units is the mass use of drones. In the drive toward Pokrovsk, Russia deployed hundreds of highly-trained FPV operators employing a new control frequency for their drones that Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) was not prepared to jam.^[36] Their initial targets were Ukraine’s logistics routes in the area. The use of different frequencies is a common occurrence and can drive almost weekly changes in EW doctrine and drone software to adapt to changing conditions. Drones are also used to target Ukrainian dugouts, forcing relocations and the building of new positions, as well as casualties. In other accounts, the Russian forces targeted a new Ukrainian unit exclusively with FPVs, shortly after they had occupied a new position in the village of Ivanivske. The drones reportedly killed or wounded 80% of the 70 soldiers occupying the trench.^[37] The relative precision of drones also makes them better suited to targeting small infantry positions and lone civilian vehicles providing logistics than massed artillery barrages. If FPVs do not succeed, however, Russian units can often resort to the use of artillery and mortar fire support where Ukrainians cannot. For the Ukrainians, drones are a vital lifeline and often the only form of fire support that they are able to employ.^[38]

Russian infantry often operate in teams of 3-4 and work slowly, using tree cover and EW to counter Ukraine’s own fleet of drones and work their way forward. If they are able to infiltrate without being detected, the teams may assemble into a larger platoon of 15 or more and, once Ukrainian positions are identified, call on artillery, drones, and airpower to engage them before assaulting.^[39] The Ukrainian forces have to work hard to track the smaller sections and target them before they are able to gather into a consolidated force. Both sides occupy trenches that are separated at times by a just a few hundred metres, which makes offensive operations risky and places a premium on movement at night, and the consequent use of thermal and night vision scopes as well as suitably-equipped drones for reconnaissance.^[40]

Although Russian tactics struggle to generate momentum, they have proven successful against Ukrainian forces that are depleted and struggling to regenerate personnel, whilst also running much lower on ammunition than they did in 2023.^[41] One AFU unit reports being able to fire just 60 rounds from its D-30 122 mm howitzer at the worst moments of Russian assaults, and are almost unable to conduct meaningful fire missions at other times.^[42] By way of example, prior to the passing of the US aid bill, Ukrainian guns were completely silent during Russian bombardments in the Donetsk oblast.^[43] This leaves the Russians with fire superiority, which means that they can take the time necessary to degrade Ukrainian positions before conducting further offensive actions.

Overall, Russia is driving toward capturing all of the Donetsk oblast and causing as many Ukrainian casualties as possible through distributed advances. It may not achieve this goal in 2024, but the current trajectory indicates that the Russian forces will eventually be successful without dramatic changes to the AFU’s ability to continue the war. This will enable the Kremlin to claim that it has successfully achieved some of its war aims such as demilitarising Ukraine and securing the Donbass. It could, if it chose, assume defensive positions at that point and demand greater concessions during negotiations – if and when they happen. The current methods employed by Russian units are difficult for Ukraine to challenge without ammunition, and even with greater supplies of ammunition, the losses inflicted on Ukrainian units are draining the AFU’s ability to maintain its positions.

Continuing the war: Filling the ranks

Both sides have proven more resilient than originally thought. However, the data presented can be misleading. It is unlikely that the personnel losses suffered by Russia are as significant as many think, while the vehicle losses are challenging but many are being replaced. Research conducted by the BBC and Mediazona indicate that some 20% of Russia’s 61,000 confirmed deaths in Ukraine were prisoners, and another 12.5% were mobilised civilians that had been recruited since early 2023, with losses of Russian regular troops proportionately much lower than at the start of the war.^[44] This is to be expected given the replenishment that has been required to keep Russia in the fight. However, the use of convicts as well as the forces of the former Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (LNR/DPR) – has shielded Russia’s population from the worst effects of the war. The DPR alone suffered close to 20,000 killed and wounded by November 2022.^[45] Furthermore, Russia is primarily recruiting from rural districts where there are fewer employment opportunities, and it still maintains its annual conscription cycle, with conscripts frequently being used to defend Russia’s borders.

Meanwhile, the high value Russian troops such as the airborne forces (VDV), artillery, and snipers, are used sparingly compared with those convicts and mobilised troops driven forward to find Ukrainian positions.^[46] Artillery troops have reported regular rotations out of the frontline and bed down positions well back from the contact area that are intended to protect them from Ukrainian strikes when they are not providing fire support. Russian snipers are reportedly involved in frequent training sessions and close coordination with arms manufacturers away from the frontline to improve their capabilities. This indicates that Russia is working to maintain the capabilities of these units and that the losses suffered are unlikely to accurately reflect the nature of the impact that the war has had on Russia’s armed forces and their ability to continue the war. Nevertheless, it is likely that Russia’s mobilisation has not generated the number of forces that it had hoped for, and some reports indicate that ‘spare’ signallers are occasionally mobilised to serve in the infantry.

Ukraine is also struggling to recruit or mobilise enough personnel to maintain its units and has been drawing increasingly on its own rural population centres to sustain its forces.^[47] This marks a shift from the first year of the war when the ranks of the AFU swelled with tens of thousands of volunteers rushing to defend Ukraine. The country’s training pipeline is struggling to maintain the quality that marked earlier Ukrainian forces out from their opposite numbers. Reports frequently observe that Ukrainian units are deployed with little training and lack experience because injuries have removed veterans from their ranks.^[48] This has led to highly-qualified operators such as trained drone operators or EW practitioners being sent to frontline units. In other cases, personal grievances have been settled by getting opponents sent to the frontline, and in others, a deployment to the infantry is used as a form of punishment – a trend common to both forces.

One notable difference is that Ukraine often has no choice but to use its most proficient and elite formations, such as the 47th Mechanised Brigade, in the defence of Chasiv Yar, or its special forces near Kharkiv.^[49] Many of these units are used continuously without rotation, whereas Russia’s more capable units appear to regularly rotate out of direct contact, leaving motorised rifle troops to hold the line. The mortality rates amongst Russia’s artillery and armoured formations are also lower than the infantry, which allows for the accumulation of experience and improvement of combat skills.^[50]

For Russia, casualty evacuation is a low priority, especially amongst the storm units that are used for initial reconnaissance and screening operations. Often, they will be told to wait in position once they have made some progress, even if severely wounded.^[51] Those that die may not be recovered and their bodies left in no-man’s land. A prominent Russian blogger has reported that this is a deliberate strategy designed to keep casualty figures down.^[52] If wounded and evacuated, Russian troops face an uncertain future of poorly-equipped medical facilities and medical teams under pressure to return them to service. The high casualty rates amongst Russian infantry likely means that those units are slow to accumulate experience, especially if they are commanded by ‘butchers’, a term used by some Russian soldiers to refer to particularly callous officers.^[53]

Ukrainians can expect somewhat better treatment for the most part, with one report highlighting that 75% of the wounded are returned to service.^[54] However, another article that includes an interview with a surgeon, notes that the increase in homemade and 3D-printed bombs that are dropped from drones, means that magnetic extraction of fragmentation (a method used for mortar and artillery wounds) is now less effective as the fragments are mostly aluminium and polymer. The same surgeon also stated that there had been a dramatic increase in the number of severe burns as well as the use of Chloropicrin from drones, a chemical agent which affects the lungs and eyes.^[55] All of these injuries are more difficult to treat successfully and can lead to greater rates of infection, disability, and fatalities.

Overall, this indicates that manpower challenges are present in both forces. However, Russia’s depth of potential manpower resources and firepower advantage mean that it can compensate for poor training and replenish numbers to some extent, whereas Ukraine is less able to accomplish the same.

Equipping the ranks

Russia’s defence industry is ramping up its production and restoration of armoured vehicles and ammunition. It is now stockpiling missiles as well as launching them at Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and priority targets such as PATRIOT batteries and HIMARS launchers. While it is unable to produce as much ammunition and as many vehicles as its troops need, it can supply sufficient quantities to maintain the tactics described above. Ukraine, however, is reliant upon its own production of drones, which has likely been impacted by the strikes against its energy infrastructure, as well as Western aid. The greatest impact appears to come from US aid in particular, which may be in doubt if Trump is elected president.

Furthermore, many European countries have given very significant quantities of aid, and their industries are busy replenishing depleted stockpiles. This means that they must balance Ukraine’s needs, with their country’s own potential needs to deter Russia. If the trajectory of the war continues downward, it may become more likely that European states prioritise their own equipment needs over Ukraine’s, which will further accelerate the decline of Ukraine’s capabilities. Armoured vehicles and howitzers have, in some scenarios, given way to the mass use of drones, but they cannot be completely replaced in this way. This paradigm may partially ameliorate the immediate need for new vehicles and equipment for Ukraine, however, it continues to lose howitzers, air defence systems and vehicles such as the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), which provide vital fire support and protected mobility.

The threads make a rope

All of these threads combine to reveal the trajectory of the war. At present, Ukraine’s forces are able to exact a high price from Russian units as they seize towns and territory. The price they can exact depends on the level of Western support they have access to. More support increases the price as they can hold Russian aircraft at risk and return fire. Less support provides Russia with the opportunity to employ massive firepower to destroy Ukrainian positions without risking its own infantry. However, in general Russian units are showing greater tactical proficiency combined with more effective levels of firepower, which compound Russia’s advantages and can counter some of Ukraine’s strengths. If this situation continues, Ukraine will lose more territory and its position in any future negotiations will be weaker.

Ukraine may be able to reverse this situation if it can counter some of Russia’s advantages and retake lost towns at a sufficiently low cost that it does not expose the frontline to further shocks such as the Kharkiv offensive. However, this is largely dependent upon continued US aid and an increase in available troops and training. The third thread is the power situation and the civilian population’s willingness to continue the war. The frontline situation contributes to the overall sense of the country’s ability to actually win the war and the likely outcome. However, it is likely that the severity of the coming winter and attendant suffering imposed without power will shape the number of Ukrainians who believe that it is time to negotiate. This means that the war is unlikely to end in 2024, either militarily or socially. However, if the prevailing conditions at the beginning of 2025 are sufficiently dire for Ukraine’s population and its armed forces, the likelihood of an end to the war in that year increases significantly. In that sense, 2024 is a decisive year.

Sam Cranny-Evans

^[1] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1811678866672353372

^[2] How Russia and Ukraine’s Losses Compare – Newsweek

^[3] Ukraine war briefing: Trump vows to end war in call with Zelenskiy

^[4] 44% of Ukrainians believe time for negotiations has come, but majority disagree with Putin’s terms | Ukrainska Pravda

^[5] Bracing for the Hardest Winter: Protecting Ukraine’s Energy Infrastructure | Royal United Services Institute

^[6] Zelensky Says Russia Destroyed Half of Ukraine’s Energy Capacity – The Moscow Times

^[7] Russia’s new large-scale attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure: losses and challenges | OSW Centre for Eastern Studies

^[8] Years needed for energy recovery: Kharkiv reliant on other regions after Russia’s attack on CHP plant and Россия атаковала энергетическую инфраструктуру Украины. Удар нанесен по плотине Днепрогэса. Харьков остался без света — Meduza

^[9] The race against time to save Ukraine’s energy grid – POLITICO

^[10] NATO allies commit to sending dozens of air defense systems to Ukraine, including four Patriots

^[11] ‘We’ve learnt to do surgery without electricity’: Ukraine’s power cuts worsen

^[12] Ukraine extends blackouts as Russian bombings continue – BBC News

^[13] This section gives an overview of currently available data on people on the move from and inside Ukraine: refugees, Third Country Nationals (TCNs), IDPs, vulnerable groups on the move, and data on missing migrants.

^[14] Thousands of Ukrainian IDPs are struggling to adapt amid housing, employment crises

^[15] Ukraine’s Arms Industry Is Growing, but Is It Growing Fast Enough? – The New York Times

^[16] (U) Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts

^[17] Civilian morale in Britain during the Second World War

^[18] Interactive Time-lapse: Russia’s War in Ukraine

^[19] DeepStateMAP | Map of the war in Ukraine

^[20] https://soar.earth/draw/1243?pos=48.21632419652533%2C37.46557729383738%2C10.98

^[21] https://militaryland.net/maps/

^[22] https://twitter.com/rybar_force?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor; https://lostarmour.info/map

^[23] Russia, adapting tactics, advances in Donetsk and takes more Ukrainian land

^[24] As Fighting Rages in Ukraine, a Struggle Is On for Artillery Supremacy – The New York Times

^[25] Применение барражирующих боеприпасов “Ланцет” в зоне СВО

^[26] Ukraine loses more than 1000 men in battle for single village

^[27] Russian Army Claims Sweeping Battlefield Gains So Far in 2024 – The Moscow Times

^[28] Ukraine in maps: Tracking the war with Russia – BBC News

^[29] Russian advance blamed on Ukrainian troops rotation blunder

^[30] See https://archive.vn/btnEk; https://archive.vn/MRp96; and https://archive.vn/FyJ5b for example.

^[31] Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 1, 2024 | Institute for the Study of War and How One Crack in the Line Opened a Path for the Russians – The New York Times

^[32] Russia’s advance toward key eastern highway threatens Ukraine’s grip of Donetsk Oblast

^[33] Russia, adapting tactics, advances in Donetsk and takes more Ukrainian land

^[34] ‘This is like Gallipoli’: inside Ukraine’s hardest battle yet

^[35] Zelensky: Russia drops over 3,200 guided aerial bombs on Ukraine in April

^[36] US combat vehicles keep the Russians at bay — but for how long?

^[37] With all eyes on Kharkiv, Russian troops take one Donbas village after another

^[38] Ukraine’s thin line of defence against new Russian target

^[39] https://archive.vn/btnEk; US combat vehicles keep the Russians at bay — but for how long?; https://archive.vn/MRp96; and https://twitter.com/MaxRTucker/status/1817121404585656812

^[40] Eye of the storm: A day in the life of Ukrainian infantry on the zero line near Toretsk; Land on fire: Russia’s offensive in Donetsk Oblast brings destruction to new towns (Photos)

^[41] Russia’s advance toward key eastern highway threatens Ukraine’s grip of Donetsk Oblast

^[42] Land on fire: Russia’s offensive in Donetsk Oblast brings destruction to new towns (Photos)

^[43] With all eyes on Kharkiv, Russian troops take one Donbas village after another

^[44] 60 тысяч погибших и охота за добровольцами: что известно о потерях России в Украине – BBC News Русская служба

^[45] The Donetsk Separatist Army Went To War In Ukraine With 20,000 Men. Statistically, Almost Every Single One Was Killed Or Wounded.

^[46] See Боевая работа снайпера в зоне СВО: как готовят, задачи, винтовки Lobaev Arms and 60 тысяч погибших и охота за добровольцами: что известно о потерях России в Украине – BBC News Русская служба

^[47] Eye of the storm: A day in the life of Ukrainian infantry on the zero line near Toretsk

^[48] With all eyes on Kharkiv, Russian troops take one Donbas village after another

^[49] In a foxhole with the special forces taking out 40 Russians a day

^[50] https://t.me/vault8pro/51436

^[51] “Shreds of bodies hung from the branches”: Confessions of “meat grinder” assault veterans

^[52] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57824

^[53] https://t.me/vault8pro/51436

^[54] Ministry: Over 75% of injured Ukrainian soldiers return to service after rehabilitation

^[55] Land on fire: Russia’s offensive in Donetsk Oblast brings destruction to new towns (Photos); Chloropicrin (PS): Lung Damaging Agent | NIOSH | CDC.